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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyses whether compliance behaviour in financial reporting may be 
influenced by differences in regulatory sources and in the design of the regulations 
themselves. A logistic binomial model is -used to describe the relative odds of full 
compliance rather than regulatory avoidance by way of partial or creative 
compliance. The analysis is based on the accounting policies adopted by 
internationally listed companies registered in Europe where, despite the 
harmonising impact of the European company law directives, regulatory strategies 
in accounting continue to be diverse. 
xv 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Objective 
In accounting, whatever the regulatory strategy, effective control over corporate 
financial disclosure may be an elusive goal, not only as a result of a priori political 
bargaining over the choice of regulation but also through a posteriori manipulation 
of accounting rules by the regulated themselves, who, as noted by Power (1993), 
seek to preserve their ability to exercise discretion in interpretation. Such 
avoidance of regulatory control in accounting is known as creative compliance and, 
in the UK, is already well documented. (Griffith, 1986; Smith, 1992; Naser, 1994; 
Shah, 1996). The underlying objective of this thesis is to examine such compliance 
behaviour in a comparative context, and to investigate whether the avoidance of 
regulation is associated with the different regulatory strategies for accounting 
found in Western Europe. 
1.2 Background 
The approaches to the regulation of accounting vary considerably among European 
countries. First, the institutions issuing accounting regulations, and hence the 
authority of rules, differ from one country to another. Thus European companies 
are governed by a variety of regulatory instruments, depending on their country of 
incorporation. Accounting rules are more likely to be enacted in the form of 
parliamentary or governmental legislation in France, Germany, Belgium, Spain and 
Italy, while accounting standards issued by the accountancy profession are more 
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prevalent in the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands and Denmark. Non-binding 
accounting regulations in the form of recommendations are common in most 
jurisdictions, but these take on more importance in certain countries because they 
fill a regulatory vacuum. 
Furthermore, the variety of laws, standards and recommendations issued by 
national institutions is intensified by the different approaches taken to the design of 
the regulatory text. While some regulators adopt very precise rules which aim at a 
high level of uniformity in financial reporting, others prefer more open-textured 
rules which allow for individual circumstances to be taken into account. For 
example, with the 'true and fair view' a more judgemental approach was 
introduced into EC company law at -the initiative of UK accounting regulators, 
which in turn met resistance by other European regulators who prefer detailed 
rules (van Hulle, 1997a). 
In systematising different approaches to regulatory control in accounting, this 
thesis focuses on two aspects in particular. The first of these concerns the sources 
of authority of accounting rules, which may have ftffl legal force, or summarise 
standard practice, or which may merely provide advice. The second aspect 
concerns the design of the regulatory text, whereby a rule may either tend towards 
precision or be more open-textured. 
The issue of compliance is central to the political debate concerning regulatory 
form. Contemporary accounting reforms, which are particularly intensive in Europe 
and aim at restraining the creative compliance and non-compliance behaviour of 
companies, relate to both the institutional authority and the design of accounting 
regulation. 
In France, for instance, the introduction of a new rule-making hierarchy in 
accounting has been accompanied by accusations of 'vagabondage comptable', the 
argument being that the institutional structure of regulation must be changed in 
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order to take effective action against non-compliant companies which shop around 
for suitable accounting policies (Henisse, 1997). The Comiti de la Riglementation 
Comptable (CRC) instituted in 1996, which is a governmental body, has been 
given the power to issue legally binding accounting regulations without prior 
approval by the government. In addition, a law approved in March 1998 allows 
French companies whose securities are traded on a regulated EU or foreign stock 
exchange to use International Accounting Standards (IAS) under two conditions: 
the first, if the relevant IAS has been translated into French and the second, if it has 
been adopted by a ruling of the new CRC. 
In Germany, on the other hand, the driving force behind the efforts to reform the 
financial reporting regime is that compliance with domestic regulations may have 
prevented German companies from gaining flill advantage in international capital 
markets (Ebke, 1997). A bill which was passed by the lower house of parliament 
on 27 March 1998, exempts German companies which use either IAS or US 
GAAP to acquire capital on international stock exchanges from presenting their 
consolidated financial statements in accordance with German consolidation 
regulation (Frankfurter Allgerneine Zeitung, 28 March 1998). Further legislation 
will establish a Bilanzrat, set up by representatives of industry, the audit profession 
and academia, which will be a private accounting standardisation council with three 
main responsibilities: first, to develop recommendations to reform existing German 
consolidation regulation; second, to advise the Ministry of Justice on this issue and 
third, to represent Germany at the IASC (Frankfurter Allgerneine Zeitung, 14 
February 1998). 
Thus, in contrast to France, Germany will opt for a privately organised. standard 
settifig agency to accommodate national accounting regulation to the forces of 
internationalisation. The French and German examples demonstrate that, even 
though national regulators accept the penetration of internationally accepted 
accounting rules into local regimes, the institutional arrangements and hence the 
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sources of authority and the design of policies which regulate accounting will 
continue to differ between nation-states. 
Paradoxically, compliance achievement is not necessarily the primary goal of a 
regulatory authority. In fact, such institutions may be established in ways which 
constrain their ability to act in an effective manner, resulting in regulatory capture 
by parties which then set the kind of rules with which they themselves are willing 
to comply. 
With respect to regulatory design, national calls for change have also been 
motivated by a concern with non-compliance. In the UK, for example, proposals 
for less prescription in accounting regulation have been based on the view that a 
mechanistic cookbook approach to rule-making may actually encourage avoidance 
(Tweedie and Whittington, 1990). The dilemma of regulatory design is, however, 
that while detailed accounting regulation may enable companies to avoid control 
without violating the letter of the law (McBarnet and Whelan, 1991) as it cannot 
take account of all possible cases which might arise in practice, on the other hand 
broad concepts such as 'substance over form' and 'true and fair' which aim at 
reflecting commercial reality in corporate reports are open to judgement and hence 
to the risk of abuse. 
Similarly, at the international level, the source and design of accounting regulation 
is currently a focus of tension and controversy. The current power struggle for 
international accounting policy harmonisation appears to be a battle between 
accounting jurisdictions that pursue different, if not contradictory, regulatory 
strategies for accounting. While EC directives negotiated by governments and 
implemented in national commercial legislation have the authority of law, JASs 
issued by the professional accountancy bodies of member countries of the IASC 
which do not necessarily represent their government, have no legal status. Thus, in 
spite of the EU Commission's change in regulatory strategy to permit multinational 
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companies to adopt IASs if these are compatible with EC Directives (van Hulle, 
1997b), such companies remain subject to diffenng national regulatory forms. 
Moreover, the debate with regard to the detail of future global accounting 
standards is contentious (Accountancy, January 1998). The endorsement of IAS by 
the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Will depend not 
only on the successful completion of the IASC-IOSCO work programme by the 
end of 1998. (Flower, 1997) but also on the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) approval which would prefer US GAAP to be the future 
internationally accepted accounting principles. If US GAAP were to become the 
future global standards, these would have a high level of detail and specificity, but 
if IAS were endorsed, they would be considerably less detailed and would integrate 
the overriding principle of substance over form. 
13 Research implementation 
This thesis investigates whether the compliance behaviour of European companies 
is associated with the differences from country to country in the institutional 
authority of regulation and the degree of formalism of the accounting rules to 
which they are subject. The analysis is based on the financial- reporting practices of 
those European multinational companies which compete in international capital 
markets. Multinational corporations are particularly affected by the diversity of 
national financial reporting regimes, as they are subject to different rules of 
disclosure and measurement when competing for investors, clients and creditors in 
intemational markets. Indeed, multinational companies may have similar 
motivations to escape national governance by seeking alternative interpretations of 
accounting rules to achieve a competitive advantage. 
Despite the fact that the source and design of accounting regulation is a focus of 
ever-intensifying regulatory debate at both the national and international level, 
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there is a lack of empirical evidence on its actual influence on compliance in 
reporting practice. Therefore, the aim of the present research is to statistically 
evaluate the relationship between compliance behaviour and the different 
approaches to the regulation of accounting. For this purpose we shall develop a 
binomial probability model, where the addition of regulatory factors to the linear 
predictor will permit an assessment of the relative influence of alternative 
regulatory sources and alternative regulatory designs on the compliance behaviour 
of European multinational companies. 
A more complete understanding of the different forms of regulatory control in 
accounting can be acquired when the instruments relating to specific areas of rule- 
making are compared. It becomes apparent that regulatory approaches vary, not 
only between countries but also between different areas of accounting policy within 
the same country. Accordingly, three key accounting areas were selected to 
describe the diversity of the institutional sources and the regulatory design of 
European accounting regulation. These were the valuation of assets (the 
revaluation of fixed assets), foreign currency reporting (the accounting for foreign 
transactions) and consolidation (the definition of a subsidiary). 
For the empirical analysis, a survey of financial reporting practices with regard to 
these three accounting areas was carried out. The selection criterion for sample 
companies was whether in addition to a domestic stock exchange listing, 
companies were also quoted on another stock exchange elsewhere in or outside 
Europe. The countries in which such multinational companies were regulated were 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and 
the United Kingdom. 
Accounting policies published in the annual reports by these companies were 
examined for compliance with the relevant national regulations. The corporate 
accounting report contains, maximum regulated enterprise accounting information. 
No means exist for obtaining additional regulated information from reporting 
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companies over and above that contained in the financial reports. Those who have 
additional financial statement information obtained in the course of other 
relationships with a company are not allowed to exploit this information on the 
market (Bromwich and Hopwood, 1992). Furthermore, it is unlikely that either the 
management or the auditors of a company would convey information above that 
disclosed in the corporate reports, unless required to do so by an enforcement 
agency. 
In order to control for changes in compliance behaviour over time, three financial 
years: 1987,1993 and 1995, were selected for the empirical analysis. The starting 
year was taken as 1987. By 1993, financial statements could be expected to reflect 
the regulatory amendments brought in with the Fourth and Seventh Directives 
which by that year had been implemented in all of the countries under study. Also 
in 1993, a number of IAS were revised with the objective of narrowing options 
formerly contained therein. These revised standards became effective two years 
later in 1995. Moreover, in 1995 the IASC agreed with-the IOSCO on a work 
programme, aiming at the recognition of IASs for companies listed on international 
stock exchanges. A change in EU regulatory strategy was also announced by the 
European Commission in 1995, allowing the use of IAS in consolidated financial 
statements for multinational companies, provided that they conform with the 
European Directives. 
1.4 Main empirical results 
The empirical analysis of this thesis suggests that the compliance behaviour of 
European companies is systematically associated with the differences in the 
institutional authorities which issue the relevant accounting regulation in Europe. 
Thus, which authority is issuing the regulation constitutes an important aspect of 
companies' compliance with the regulations themselves. This result was confirmed 
in all three areas under investigation: individually, combined, and after controlling 
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for national differences in compliance behaviour. In fact, the source of the 
regulation outperformed country differences as a factor in compliance with the 
rules relating to each of the three accounting policies. 
Specifically, the results of this study suggest that the avoidance of accounting 
regulation in financial reporting is at its lowest when such regulation has been 
issued by a standard setting agency. In contrast, regulatory avoidance in the form 
of either creative or partial compliance in financial reporting is higher when the 
governing rules have the authority of laws, enacted by legislature, the government 
or individual ministers in the form of delegated legislation. When an accounting 
subject is regulated by both legislation and a standard, the results suggest that 
creative and partial compliance in financial reporting is greater than in the cases 
where accounting policies are governed solely by either a standard setting agency 
or by law. 
However, it will be seen that the standard setting agencies in Europe display 
individual national characteristics in terms of independence from government 
participation in the rule-making process and the degree of self-regulation by the 
profession. Different classifications of the factor regulatory source' take account 
of this fact and ensure that the empirical results do not depend on the assigned 
categories of this explanatory variable. The results of this. study confirm that a 
comparatively greater proportion of companies unambiguously comply with 
standards issued by professional standard setting agencies. In the case that the 
government has the residual power to review the agency's rule-making, the 
avoidance of regulation in practice is higher. 
There are two possible explanations of these results. On the one hand, a standard 
setting agency may be a more effective rule-maker in accounting since it 
concentrates expertise, while the legislature has neither the time nor the technical 
knowledge to engage in specialised regulatory policy. Moreover, maintaining a 
distance from the government may facilitate consultation with the preparers of 
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accounts and thus contribute to more effective rule-making. In accounting, 
frequent technical amendments are necessary, and these impose not only heavy 
costs but also serious delays on parliamentary inspection. An alternative 
explanation is, however, that of regulatory capture by the standard setting agencies 
because the finally adopted standard follows a process of consultation and 
lobbying, and therefore the preparers of accounts may have influenced the rules 
with which they are willing to comply. 
Our empirical results suggest that the degree of formalism in accounting regulation 
is a systematic explanatory factor for compliance only in certain policy areas. While 
the design of rules significantly affects compliance behaviour in the area of 
revaluation, there is no systematic relationship in the areas of foreign currency 
reporting and consolidation. Furthermore, regulatory design is less important in 
explaining compliance behaviour than is the authority issuing the regulation; but 
when country differences are taken into account, compliance behaviour is in fact 
significantly influenced by regulatory design. 
Detailed accounting regulations generate a higher rate of compliance in reporting 
practice than do accounting rules which are drafted in open-textured terms. Hence, 
judgement in accounting regulation leads to a higher rate of creative compliance 
than formalism. However, when the regulator adopts a rule containing elements of 
both precise and open formulations, this can be associated with a greater tendency 
to avoid that regulation in reporting practice, when compared with either formal or 
judgemental policy expressions. 
Thus, in spite of the criticism that very precise rules in accounting are likely to be 
avoided, by complying with the form rather than the substance of such rules, 
judgemental rules which are adaptable to the individual circumstances of a 
commercial transaction seem less optimal for the disclosure of financial 
information. In jurisdictions with prescriptive revaluation rules, most companies 
disclose policies in compliance with the content of such rules, even though it must 
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be noted that instances of revaluation beyond those formalised in the legislation 
have occurred. 
Notwithstanding earlier conclusions, the empirical results suggest that there are 
significant differences in national compliance behaviour although, as mentioned 
earlier, the source of regulation is a more important explanatory factor than 
country differences. The results indicate that during the investigation period 
compliance with national accounting regulations was significantly higher in 
Germany than in the rest of Europe. Conversely, compliance was lowest in France. 
This result supports earlier suggestions that the vagabondage comptable of French 
companies was evident during the investigation period while their German 
counterparts complied with the national requirements. 
As a policy recommendation, it follows that standard setting agencies in accounting 
will be more effective rule-makers than the public legislators; but of particular 
importance would be to avoid the overlapping of standards and legislation as this 
leads to higher avoidance. 
As a further policy recommendation, regulators should adopt a high degree of 
detail in accounting regulation, although it should be noted that the source of the 
regulation has a stronger impact on compliance behaviour than policy design and 
also that regulatory design is not a decisive factor for compliance in each of the 
accounting policy areas under study. Moreover, regulators should avoid mixing 
prescriptive regulatory text with broader principles as this again leads to higher 
avoidance. This result argues in favour of standards similar to US GAAP, rather 
than IAS, for future global accounting standards. However, it should be 
ackziowledged that a high degree of detail might be difficult to pursue when 
integrating the objectives of different national accounting regimes. 
to 
1.5 Summary outline of the thesis 
The first part of this thesis is concerned with the theme of accounting regulation. 
Chapter Two reviews the theory and evidence on accounting regulation. Following 
this literature review, Chapter Three describes the different regulatory strategies 
that have been pursued in the nine European countries under study. The analysis 
centres on the two dimensions of regulatory strategy which will serve as 
explanatory variables in the statistical analysis: that is, (i) the different national 
regulatory institutions and hence the sources of authority of accounting rules, and 
(ii) alternative regulatory design to control financial reporting in Europe. 
The regulatory diversity of individual accounting areas forms the second part of 
this study. Chapter Four argues that each area of rule-making is influenced by 
different circumstances and emerges from a different set of actors over time. The 
three areas of accounting referred to earlier are compared in detail across the nine 
European jurisdictions under study. The revaluation of fixed assets comprises 
Chapter Five, Chapter Six deals with foreign currency accounting and the 
definition of 9 subsidiary is discussed in Chapter Seven. Each chapter traces the 
historical development of the accounting regulations in each of these areas and 
relates this to the existing diversity of the regulatory strategies across Europe. 
Each chapter also contains examples of policy disclosure and the results of a 
preliminary survey of compliance by those European companies which are subject 
to these different regulatory circumstances. 
This part of the thesis provides a detailed evaluation of alternative regulatory 
design and the different regulatory instruments involved. In Chapter Five, asset 
revaluation illustrates the alternative regulatory design of detailed and prescriptive 
requirements on the one hand and open-textured and flexible rules on the other. 
That is, while price-level indexing approaches tend to authorise the restatement of 
defined assets in line with specified price indices on predetermined dates, the use of 
current values generally allows a company to exercise discretion with respect to 
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the basis, the scope and the timing of revaluation. Chapter Six on foreign currency 
reporting provides a good example of the diversity amongst the sources of 
accounting regulation to which companies are subject in Europe. The various 
locations of accounting regulation can be traced to legal statute, professional 
standard, recommendation and expert interpretation. Chapter Seven also 
demonstrates the regulatory conflict between formalism and anti-formalism which 
has been at the roots of controversy surrounding the drafting of the criteria 
defining group companies included in the Seventh Directive. The implications of 
different regulatory designs with regard to the concepts of legal and economic 
group control are described in detail. Unique combinations of the de jure and de 
facto criteria that define a subsidiary for consolidation have led to international 
variations of the boundaries of a consolidated' group. While some jurisdictions 
define a group solely on the basis of legal criteria, other countries have adopted, 
either purely or in addition to this, an economic concept of group control. The 
complexity of the regulatory design of the parent-subsidiary relationship is evident 
in cases where economic control is presumed to exist under certain legal control 
rights. For the areas of consolidation and revaluation in addition to the law, 
supplementary standards have been issued in some countries. 
The third part of the thesis develops and applies a probability model based on 
binomW logistic regression, with the aim of empirically evaluating the relationship 
between compliance behaviour in reporting practice and the relevant regulatory 
strategies for the three accounting policies across Europe. The theoretical 
development of the model forms Chapter Eight. Chapter Nine describes the data 
and research design and illustrates and explains the reasoning for classifying 
reported accounting policies into different forms of compliance: that is, fiffl 
compliance, creative compliance, partial compliance and non-compliance. The 
analysis of accounting practice is based on a review of annual financial reports of 
about 200 European multinational companies for the years 1987,1993 and 1995. 
The statistical analysis, which has been carried out by comparing nested linear 
logistic models, is described in Chapter Ten. In this Chapter, the results of the tests 
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are presented together with an analysis of parameter estimates. The conclusions of 
the thesis are presented in Chapter Eleven which also provides a comparison of the 
probabilities of regulatory avoidance across alternative regulatory sources and the 
different countries involved. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE: 
THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to provide a review of the literature on accounting regulation. 
The review is not exhaustive, but focuses on the principal contributions which are 
considered to be relevant for the present research study. The summary of the 
literature on accounting regulation begins by identifying the principal extant 
accounting theories which offer competing explanations of accounting regulation. 
The first of these theories to emerge was the normative and conceptual framework 
approach in the 1960's. Alternative approaches were developed in the early 70's 
with the positive accounting theory approach and, in the late 70's, with parallel 
developments incorporating social, economic and political aspects in the 
accounting domain, in particular the accounting research known as critical 
accounting. This review will make reference to different empirical research studies 
which are based on these theories. 
Secondly, the literature on public regulation as opposed to private regulation 
(professional self-regulation), will be referred to within a context of both legal 
theory and the regulation of accounting. Thirdly, the literature on substance versus 
form in rule formulation will be considered. Similarly to the previous section, the 
discussion will deal with both the legal theory perspective and the viewpoint of 
accounting regulation. Fourthly, a summary of the literature on creative 
compliance in financial reporting will be provided which, as will be seen, has been 
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limited to a single country and refers to the UK case. Finally, references to 
comparative international studies on accounting regulation will be made. 
2.2 Theories of accounting regulation 
Normative Theory and the Conceptual Framework 
There is a long tradition of accounting theory being concerned with the interests of 
the users of accounts (Sterling, 1972). While many theories have concentrated on 
aiding shareholders in decisions concerning their income, wealth and utility 
(Edwards and Bell, 1961, Chambers, 1966, Sterling 1970, Beaver and Demski, 
1974), this theoretical approach has influenced practice in the form of conceptual 
frameworks offered by professional bodies (FASB, 1978; Stamp, 1980; Macve, 
1981; IASC, 1989). 
Empirical research can be divided into studies which concentrate on individual 
shareholder usage of accounting reports and those which are concerned with the 
impact of accounting information on stock market prices, explicitly taking account 
of the effects of the aggregate behaviour of investors. 
The individual shareholder usage of accounting reports has- been assessed in two 
ways: firstly, by the application of techniques to measure the readability, and hence 
the understanding, of accounting reports (e. g. Adelberg, 1979); and, secondly, by 
shareholders' responses to questionnaires about the use of corporate reports (e. g. 
Lee and Tweedie, 1977). The prescriptions derived from this research include calls 
for accounting reports to be simplified and for accounting policy makers to 
concentrate on the needs of naive investors. Cooper and Sherer (1984, p. 210) 
emphasise the concentration of these studies on the interest of individual 
shareholders only. "In effect, shareholders are depicted as individuals operating 
within an environmental vacuum and this allows the design of corporate accounting 
reports to be considered as if it were only of private interest. But the omission of 
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any consideration for the immediate environment, the capital market, in which the 
shareholder class operates, ignores wider effects which may ensue from such 
prescriptions. " 
Empirical studies which seek to provide insights from aggregate shareholder use of 
corporate reports by investigating the relationship between published accounting 
information and stock market prices (e. g. Ball and Brown, 1969; Foster, 1978) 
indicate that while there is some information content in accounting earnings 
reports, this information is not 'timely' since market price changes precede the 
publication of accounting reports. Consequently, the private shareholder- cannot 
make consistent gains by using such information. In addition to the problems in 
assessing the efficiency of information markets (Fama, 1976), the limited value of 
the capital market research literature in relation to the value of accounting reports, 
is the concentration on the shareholder perspective of accounting information. 
Furthermore, it appears inappropriate to suggest that capital market efficiency tests 
can be used to assess the desirability of alternative accounting measures or 
disclosures (Beaver and Demski, 1974; Gonedes and Dopuch, 1974). 
It follows that, rather than being derived as a logical purpose, the conceptual 
framework studies make a fundamental assertion with regard to the purpose of 
accounting regulation and the reason for its existence: the "decision usefulnese' of 
accounting data to the users of corporate reports. This criterion however, does not 
permit a choice between alternative accounting standards. Paradoxically, while 
regulators would like to attain decision usefulness of accounting data, no 
conceptual framework appears to exist to achieve this goal. In this sense the 
conceptual frameworks contain and perpetuate a number of myths (Miller, 1985). 
Positive Accounting Theory 
It was the weakness of the FASB conceptual frainework and, furthennore, the 
political nature of the standard setting process that led Watts and Zimmerman 
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(1978) to adopt a different approach to the study of accounting regulation, namely 
that of positive accounting theory. While Solomans (1978) argued that standard 
setters should resist pressures from political lobbyists and should have as a first 
priority the setting of "neutral" accounting standards, positive accounting theorists 
called, not for speculation on what standard setting should be (what Watts and 
Zimmerman deride as normative theorising) but, instead, for concentration on what 
standard setting is (positive) and how choices are made within existing structures. 
Following Coase (1937), corporations are viewed as a set of inter-related contracts 
between participants. Applications of the contracting approach with its emphasis 
on agency relationships, have been used to provide explanations for the 
development of accounting standards. Watts (1977) was the first paper attempting 
to explain and predict accounting choices on the basis of both contracting and 
political process arguments. Subsequently, the accounting choice literature 
(Hagerman and Zmýijewski, 1979; Leftwich, Watts and Zimmermann, 1981; 
Holthausen 1981; Leftwich, 1983) sought to predict accounting choices; for 
example, with regard to depreciation, inventory, taxes, debt contracts and other 
contracting costs, primarily on the basis of managers' incentives to choose among 
permitted accounting methods in order to increase their wealth at the expense of 
other parties to the firm and in the political process. Lobbying behaviour on 
accounting standards is modelled as dependent on manageýs' utility maximisation 
(Watts and Zimmermann, 1986). The effect of accounting regulation on 
management remuneration and total wealth is based on a contracting monitoring 
model of the firm where managers' self interest is constrained to minimise total 
agency cost and to align with shareholder interest. Positive accounting theory has 
led to a vast number of lobbying studies (Walker and Robinson, 1993). 
However, positive accounting theory does not answer the question why accounting 
regulation exists at all and why it is manifested in a particular form. The theory is 
restrictive in that it sees accounting as a function of contracting costs, and unless 
an argument for the standardisation of contract terms as an economy of scale is 
is 
advanced, it can see -no reason for regulation (Neal, 1997). In fact, the positive 
accounting theorists have been the focus of extensive criticism including the 
criticism that positive theory is in fact normative and masks a conservative 
ideological bias (Tinker et aL, 1982; Christensen, 1983; Sterling, 1990). Another 
problem with the-contracting approach is that its main concern is with users of 
corporate accounts. This approach may be able to address issues for private value, 
but it does not seem able to deal with the social value of corporate reports (Cooper 
and Sherer, 1984). 
Social value approaches in accounting theory 
United in their criticism that partial equilibrium approaches to valuing accounting 
reports have failed to model the total interaction between these reports and all 
individuals and classes in society, a number of theories address the issue of the 
social value of accounting information. Social value approaches attempt both to 
understand and to explain the production and use of accounting from an economy- 
wide perspective and hence directly address the broader issue of the social value of 
accounting information. This section reviews the general equilibrium approach to 
the economics of information and the analysis of economic consequences. 
General equilibrium economic analysis seeks to identify the role of information 
amongst the welfare conditions which result in economic efficiency in the 
allocation of resources through time among all market participants. However, the 
use of the general equilibrium economic analysis to explain the functions of 
accounting in society and to provide criteria for evaluating alternative accounting 
systems is limited, not only as a result of its high level of generality and abstraction, 
but ýIso because the welfare implications of the analysis remain unclear. Whereas 
Hirschleifer (197 1) suggests that public information is socially useless, OhIson and 
Buckman (198 1) demonstrate how this information will affect the sharing of risk in 
an economy and thus have welfare implications. Demski (1974) on the other hand, 
argues that there are incentives for one individual to privately produce infonnation 
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in order to make gains at the expense of another who does not have this 
information. 
Economic consequences analysis emerged as an alternative approach for 
understanding and valuing the role of accounting in a broader social context. The 
economic consequences literature examines the consequences of regulating 
financial information disclosure. Zeff (1978) shows that economic consequences 
arguments were involved in US standard setting prior to the FASB era and, also in 
the steps which were - insfitutionalised to assure that parties -fearing adverse 
economic consequences would have a voice in the new FASB standards setting 
process. 
In contrast to the general equilibrium economic analysis, the economic 
consequences analysis tends to be empirical. However, even though the economic 
consequences literature seems to have the potential for assessing a wider range of 
effects of changes in the accounting measurement system, empirical studies have 
almost invariably evaluated such consequences solely in terms of the behaviour and 
the interest of the shareholder and manager class (Selto and Neumann, 198 1). 
Many of the studies have attempted to assess the stock market reaction to changes 
in the content of published accounting information (Griffin, 1979; Lev, 1979). But 
as Foster (1980) has observed, the inconsistency of the results of these studies is 
indicative of the general failure of such tests to specify a theory of expected effects 
and hence to identify control variables. 
Ditical accounting theory 
The lack of definite positions on the appropriate forms of accounting regulation 
which characterise neoclassical econon-dc or marginalism analysis has led to the 
assimilation of radical alternative socio-political theories into the accounting 
literature. This has followed calls (Burchell et al., 1980; Tinker, 1980) for an 
understanding of how accounting systems operate in their social, political and 
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economic contexts in order that "better" accounting systems might eventually be 
designed. The literature which forms part of this critical accounting theory can be 
divided into that based on a Marxist perspective (Tinker, 1985; Cooper and Sherer, 
1984, Cooper and Hopper, 1990) and that based on a sociological perspective 
(Miller, 1986; Robson et aL, 1994; Hoskin, 1994). 
The strength of the Marxist school lies in the critical argument of existing 
paradigms. The critical accounting theorists reject prior exclusive shareholder 
orientation in the research on accounting policy choice and suggest an alternative 
approach, known as the political economy of accounting. Implicit in this approach 
is a notion of social welfare that focuses on society as an aggregate (rather than as 
an aggregation of individuals), an emphasis on distributive as well as exchange 
(allocative) dimensions of wealth and power and a concern with socially necessary 
rather than market determined production. However, from the recognition that 
accounting policy is essentially political, it does not follow that an improvement of 
accounting policy can necessarily be achieved. Rather, there"is an implication that 
the politically determined nature of the value of accounting prevents such a 
resolution within accounting itself (Cooper and Sherer, 1984). 
The elements of the political economy of accounting are, firstly, the 
acknowledgement of power and conflict as well as the acknowledgement of a 
political process in the area of accounting regulation. The second element is an 
explicit call to take account of the historical, environmental and institutional 
arrangements in accounting research. Thirdly, it is argued that accounting is 
capable of having an emancipatory role in society and can contribute to changes in 
society and to the distribution of wealth, because of its importance as a valuation 
techfiology (Tinker, 1985). 
Similarly, the sociological theorists view accounting as a valuation technology that 
shapes and is shaped by the social environment in which it operates. However, 
while the Marxist school places greater emphasis on the role which economic and 
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political factors play in determining the form and content of accounting regulation, 
the sociological approach rejects a priori determining factors and, instead, regards 
accounting as important in its own right- and as one of a number of technologies. 
The basic position of the sociological approach is that accounting is a complex 
domain with a number of competing discourses (Hoskin, 1994). The dominant 
discourse in the regulatory bodies is the normative one, while the competing 
discourses in the academic literature may undermine the ideology of standard 
setters. 
23 Public versus private regulation 
This section begins with a discussion on the allocation of power in regulatory 
systems from a legal theory perspective and, in particular, makes reference to the 
delegation of rule-making to agencies and self-regulation by professional 
associations. Subsequently, the relevant literature refering to the institutional 
arrangements of accounting regulation, which is predominantly generated by UK 
authors, will be addressed. 
Legal theory argumentation 
According to Ogus (1994), there is a hierarchy of institutions on which relevant 
powers of policy formation, law-making, adjudication and enforcement can be 
conferred: the European Community, the national legislature, government 
departments, special (more or less independent of government) agencies and the 
courts. While under the Treaty of Rome, European law is to prevail over domestic 
law, nevertheless, the European norms may be very general in character, leaving it 
to national institutions to determine the relevant rule intensity. Subject to European 
instruments, the primary source of regulatory law in member states is parliamentary 
legislation. The issue of interest to be addressed in this section is how and why 
rule-making powers are delegated to other institutions. 
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Powers can be conferred on ministers to directly promulgate rules in statutory 
instruments. Alternatively, parliament can confer power on an agency to issue a set 
of formally binding rules, although sometimes this may be subject to ministerial 
approval. Agencies may also be authorised to issue non-binding rules which serve 
as guides to the interpretation of legal provisions. 
Although rule-making by agencies may create a problem of accountability, there 
are several arguments for delegating this function to them (Ogus, 1994). Firstly, 
expertise can be concentrated in a way which is not possible with government 
bureaucracies. In fact, legislature has neither the time nor the expertise to engage 
in detailed rule-making and when technical amendments are necessary, 
parliamentary scrutiny would impose heavy costs and serious delays. Secondly, 
maintaining a distance from government may reduce a risk of political interference, 
encourage a longer term perspective, and thus facilitate consultation and more 
open decision-making. Whether and to what extent the government should have a 
residual power to review agency rule-making is less clear. On the one hand, it is 
argued that such power is necessary to ensure that the agency's decisions in a 
specific regulatory context are compatible with the government's more general 
objectives (Baldwin and McCrudden, 1987). On the other hand, there is a danger 
that the government may interfere for short-term political purposes (Sunstein, 
1987). 
Views may differ on the degree to which regulatory agencies should be 
independent of government, but it would appear to be obvious that they should be 
independent of the interests that are being regulated. There are, nevertheless, many 
cases where the rules of conduct for professional occupations are determined by 
bodies drawn exclusively or predominantly from members of the profession and, 
which are also prevalent in the area of financial regulation (Page and Ferguson, 
1992). The issue being debated is whether self-regulation can be reconciled with 
the argument for delegation in the public interest or whether it is a subversion of 
regulation to private interests (Ogus, 1994). 
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A private self-regulatory agency may be a cheaper and more effective rule-maker 
than a public agency (Cane, 1987). First, since a self-regulatory agency can 
normally command a greater degree of technical knowledge of the practices and 
innovatory possibilities within the relevant area than can a public agency, the 
information costs for the formulation and interpretation of standards are lower. 
Secondly, and for the same reasons, monitoring and enforcement costs are also 
reduced, as are the costs to practitioners of dealing with the regulators, given that 
such interaction may be fostered by mutual trust. Thirdly, to the extent that the 
processes of, and rules issued by, self-regulatory agencies are'less formalised than 
those of public regulatory regimes, there are savings in the costs of amending 
standards. 
In contrast, critics of self-regulation see it as an example of modem 'corporatism, 
the acquisition of power by groups which are not accountable (Lewis, 1990). Self- 
regulation may itself constitute an abuse if it lacks democratic legitimacy in relation 
to members of the association (Page, 1986), but the potential for abuse may 
become unacceptable if the rules affect third parties (Cane, 1987). Furthermore, if 
the self-regulatory agency's functions cover not only policy formulation, but also 
the interpretation of rules, adjudication and enforcement (including the imposition 
of sanctions), there appears to be a fundamental breach in the separation of powers 
doctrine. It follows that rent seeking behaviour and regulatory capture may 
characterise a self-regulatory agency which is free from external constraints (Kay, 
1988). 
However, self-regulation may actually not occur in its pure form. Baggott (1989) 
indicates that self-regulatory regimes differ according to several variables: notably, 
the degree of monopolistic power; the degree of formality, for example, whether or 
not they derive legitimacy from a legislative framework; their legal status, for 
example, whether or not the rules have binding force; and the degree to which 
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outsiders participate in rule formulation and enforcement, or in other ways 
supervise the system. 
Regulatory sources of accounting 
The regulatory structures of accounting in Europe are currently undergoing 
considerable transformation subject to varied national and international processes, 
some of which began some twenty years ago but are only now reaching ftill 
development. The European Community attempted to harmonise company 
accounts, which commenced with a first draft to the Council in 1971 and are now 
embodied in a number of European Company Law Directives. However, the 
European Commission has admitted that its earlier approach of complete or very 
detailed harmonisation has not been successful and instead, has pursued the 
approach of 'minimum harmonisation and mutual recognition' (van Hulle, 1992). 
In contrast, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), established 
in 1973, has played an intensifying and increasingly dominant role in the regulation 
of accounting (Flower, 1997; Cairns, 1997). It is important to note that the IASC 
does not consist of representatives of national regulators, but is constituted from 
representatives of the local professions of its member countries (Cairns, 1995). 
Nevertheless, the IASC seems to have overcome these problems of 'legitimacy' 
(Freedman and Power, 1991) and International Accounting Standards (IAS) have 
become a significant focus for a new regulatory 'internationalism'. In 1995, a new 
strategy was announced by the European Commission which allowed European 
multinational companies to use IAS for consolidated financial statements, given 
their compatibility with the directives (van Hulle, 1997b). Furthermore, several 
European countries, namely, Italy, France, Belgium and Germany have recently 
approved legislation which allows national enterprises listed on international capital 
markets to use IAS for consolidated financial statements, if these policies are 
consistent with European accounting directives (Knorr, 1998). 
In the accounting literature, similar arguments against and in favour of legislative 
policy making for financial reporting have been put forward by Bromwich and 
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Hopwood (1992). The disadvantages of legislative accounting regulation are seen 
in the delay in dealing with urgent and emergent issues in financial reporting and 
furthermore, in the danger that technical accounting issues may be decided on the 
basis of the political views of the party in power. The principal benefits of 
accounting legislation are considered to be the legitimacy and social acceptance of 
such rules and also the procedure by which compliance with legislation may be 
enforced through the courts. 
In the UK, the regulation of financial reporting has traditionally been in form of 
self-regulation, by accountants, auditors or other preparers of financial information 
(Whittington, 1993). However, following the recommendations of the Dearing 
report (1988), the setting of UK accounting standards is now supervised by a 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) which represents a wide range of interests in 
addition to professional accountancy bodies. Furthermore, accounting standards 
have been given statutory support through the legal authority of the 1989 
Companies Act (Turley, 1992). 
The change in the regulatory strategy for financial reporting disclosure in the UK, 
in particular the 'legalisation' of accounting standards, has given rise to numerous 
research studies (special issue of The Modem Law Review, 1991; Bromwich and 
Hopwood, 1992; Laughlin and Broadbent, 1993; Sikka and 
* 
Willmott, 1995a). The 
failure of the Accounting Standards Committee (ASC), the former self-regulated 
agency of the UK audit profession, to regulate accounting standardisation has been 
described by Hopwood (1992, p. 145) in these terms: "... the [ASC] was 
established by the audit industry to prevent more rigorous modes of State 
intervention in the accounting field. Once in existence, it tended to respond to 
cris6s which had the potential to destabilise the form of professional rather than 
State control over accounting that it represented. Rather than seriously trying to 
lay down a programme for the more effective regulation of corporate accounting, 
the [ASC] had a history that was more oriented to the preservation of the status 
quo and the legitimisation of the profession's model of self-regulation". 
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It seems, however, that following various defensive tactics, self-regulation and self 
interest of the professional accountancy bodies as well as their failure to take 
effective action against offending firms or their partners is pervasive in the UK 
(Robson, 1993; Mitchel and Sikka, 1993; Willmott et aL, 1993; Robson, et aL, 
1994; Mitchel et aL, 1994; Sikka and Willmott, 1995b). But Hopwood (1992, 
p. 145) suggests that, "[o]ften real effectiveness may not be one of the primary 
goals of a regulatory authority. Regulatory institutions, themselves reflecting the 
outcomes of compromises between the interested parties can sometimes be 
established in ways which constrain their ability to act in an effective manner and 
often are subject to regulatory capture. " 
2.4 Substance versus form 
This section will discuss the literature on substance as opposed to form in policy 
formulation. Analogous to the previous section on institutional structures, the 
discussion starts by reviewing the arguments of legal theorists before going on to 
discuss relevant contributions in the accounting domain. As will be seen, only a few 
research studies exist on the subject of formalism in accounting policy formulation. 
Legal theory argumentation 
One of the central concerns of legal discussion is legal determinacy - the ability to 
formulate rules that yield certain or at least predictable outcomes. However, which 
regulatory form can achieve legal determinacy and, in particular, the optimal 
degree of formalism is open to controversy. While some believe that legal certainty 
will be improved if rigid, formalistic rules are abandoned in favour of general rules 
(Tushnet, 1984), others insist that the proliferation of detailed rules is fundamental 
to ensure predictable legal outcomes (Schauer, 1998). 
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At the heart of formalism lies the concept of 'decision making according to rule' 
(Schauer, 1988). The tasks performed according to rules take place for the most 
part through the language in which the rules are written. Formalism and language 
are conceptually intertwined. Arguments that law is indeterminate to the extent 
that legal questions lack a single correct answer and that hence all legal doctrine is 
bound to be unpredictable to some -degree are rejected 
by the formalists (Kress, 
1989). For the formalist the problem is not that all law is indeterminate, but rather 
that vague rules do not properly constrain legal decisionmakers (Weinrib, 1988). 
There are suggestions, however, that neither regime actually exists in its pure form 
and a number of theoretical legal * studies have analysed the optimal - level of 
formalism in rules with regard to compliance costs for both the regulators and the 
regulated, by applying economic theory (Posner and Ehrlich, 1974; Diver, 1983; 
Johnston, 1991). The relationship between the level of formalism in rules and 
compliance behaviour will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
Regulatory design of accounting policy 
One of the few studies that assesses the advantages and disadvantages of formalism 
and 'anti-formalism' in the design of accounting regulation is that of McB amet and 
Whelan (199 1). Formalism is defined as a narrow approach ' 
to regulatory control, 
the emphasis being on the use of detailed rules and their literal interpretation, 
which leads to uniformity, consistency and predictability in the reporting of 
accounting transactions. Anti-formalism, on the other hand, emphasises a broad 
approach to regulatory control by the use of open-textured rules. In this case, the 
focus is on the spirit of a rule and, in accounting, on the reporting of the economic 
subsiance of a transaction instead of its regulatory form. 
In the UK, the development of off-balance sheet schemes has motivated regulators 
to design broad standards in order to deal with the deeper issues which are 
common to a number of problems (Tweedy and Whittington, 1990, p. 99). The 
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authors state that "[d]etailed prescription is in many ways undesirable: it can lead 
to inflexibility and to incentives to conduct a standards avoidance game analogous 
to tax avoidance. " However, the authors believe that some degree of detail in 
standards is necessary, and argue that the level of prescription required is a 
practical matter which is contingent on the strength of opposing forces: "[A] vague 
injunction to, auditors to ensure that the accounts 'tell it the way it is' will be 
inadequate unless auditors have a remarkably similar set of thought processes (so 
that there is consistency of judgement) and considerable integrity and strength in 
resisting what is often (wrongly) described as- 'client' (Le. Management not 
shareholder) pressure. One flexible way in which a standard-setting body can 
respond to the practical need for prescription is to have fairly broadly defined 
standards but to issue more detailed interpretations when required. " 
Only in the UK has the concern with off-balance sheet finance and creative 
accounting led to regulatory action and, in particular, to an explicit change in 
accounting rule formulation (FRS 5 'Reporting the Substance of Transactions', 
1994). However, the lack of numerous arguments on this issue in the accounting 
literature (Macdonald, 1991), gives the impression that substance over form is seen 
as a peculiarly legal doctrine. 
2.5 Creative compliance in financial reporting 
As mentioned previously, in the UK, regulators of financial reporting are aware of 
the problems associated with creative compliance (Tweedie and Whittington, 1990; 
Whittington 1993). In 1985, the President of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW) described the "potentially very 
serious problems of window dressing and off-balance sheet financing" 
(Accountancy, October, p. 4). This was followed by the setting up of a working 
group (1985) and various Exposure Drafts ED 42 (1988), ED 49 (1990) before 
FRS 5 was drafted in 1994. Technical reports on current creative accounting 
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schemes can be found in the commentaries contained in Financial Reporting, the 
survey of accounts published annually by the ICAEW (Skerrat and Tonkin, 1995). 
The literature holds a pessimistic view of the struggle for control in financial 
regulation. It would seem that effective regulation of financial information 
disclosure is inevitably bound to fail as a result of the active manipulation of rules 
by the regulated themselves who wish to retain 'zones of discretion' and to 
preserve the control of interpretation (Power, 1993). In accounting, this stretching 
of rules is known as the problem of 'creative compliance'. 
McBamet and Whelan (1991, p. 848) define creative compliance as "[the use ofl 
law to escape legal control without actually violating legal'rules. " In assessing the 
effectiveness of different degrees of formalism in policy formulation with regard to 
the problem of creative compliance in accounting, the authors do not consider 
either formalism or 'anti-formalism' to be an effective form of regulatory control 
for accounting. Indeed, the dilemma seems to be that while detailed rules are easy 
to avoid by literal application which undermines the rule's intention, open-textured 
regulations allow room for judgement, which in turn requires interpretation in 
practice. Paradoxically, such interpretations will develop into working rules and 
hence will lead back to formalism and a continuation of creative compliance. The 
authors argue that attempts to combat creative compliance with general, anti- 
formalist rules - such as substance over form - run up against limits of control and 
almost inevitably generate a return to formalism. Power (1992) extends this 
argument, noting the implication that between general principles and detailed 
regulations there is an open 'interpretative space' in which creativity in the 
application of rules to a particular instance is always possible. 
Generally, the issue has been explored in the context of 'creative accounting' 
rather than the more specific 'creative compliance'. Naser (1994), for instance, 
defines creative accounting as "(1) the process of manipulating accounting figures 
by taking advantage of the loopholes in accounting rules and the choices of 
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measurement and disclosure practices in them to transform financial statements 
from what they should be, to what preparers would prefer to see reported, and (2) 
the process by which transactions are structured so as to produce the required 
accounting results rather than reporting transactions in a neutral and consistent 
way" (p. 59). 
Like Naser (1994), Griffith (1986) and Smith (1992) explain and illustrate creative 
accounting with examples as diverse as leasing, fixed assets (including intangibles), 
quasi-subsidiaries, foreign currency reporting, goodwill and equity accounting. 
Peasnell and Yaansah, (1988) consider the general development of off-balance 
sheet financing schemes in the UK in the 1980s, whilst Power (1992) documents 
the brand accounting episode with regard to the active role of accounting practice 
in creating new mechanisms by stretching existing regulations. Shah (1996) 
presents further evidence of the manipulation of accounting rules in the case of 
convertible securities. 
In summary, the research studies on creative compliance in accounting can be 
characterised as follows: firstly, the issue is treated by examining individual subject 
areas; secondly, the approach is descriptive; and, thirdly, the studies are limited to 
single countries. This thesis, however, introduces a research framework which is 
not only empirical, but also covers a number of accounting issues in an explicitly 
comparative context. 
Research studies which deal with comparative aspects of accounting regulation 
tend to be of a descriptive nature (Bromwich and Hopwood, 1983; Wallace and 
Gemon, 1991; Flower and Lefebvre, 1997). Although the literature on 
interfiational comparative accounting has demonstrated that the structures of 
accounting regulation vary considerably among nation-states, most of it has failed 
to develop a coherent explanation of how and why accounting systems differ from 
country to country. 
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A theoretical evaluation of the different types of accounting regulation has been 
carried out by Puxty et al. (1988) who compare the accounting regimes in four 
capitalist societies (Germany, United Kingdom, United States of America and 
Sweden). Associating different modes of accounting regulation with the distinctive 
histories and institutional specificities of different nations, the paper develops a 
rigorous framework for understanding the principles of accounting regulation. 
Exploring models of social order, the authors explain accounting regulation as an 
expression of the combination of the organising principles of Market, State and 
Community and theorise how the modes of accounting regulation are a function of 
how-power is distributed. In a wider context, this paper also provides a framework 
for evaluating different authorities of accounting regulation, that is, the state on the 
one hand and the professional bodies on the other, expressing concern over the 
lack of accountability of professional bodies and questioning professional self 
regulation. Puxty et al. stress that "there will be no single matrix of Market, State 
and Community principles of organisation which will apply to all areas of 
regulation. Rather the extent to which each of these regulatory forms is prominent 
in its influence upon the arena under investigation ( ... ) will vary from one 
issue to 
another" (p. 288). The present thesis builds on this theory and extends the 
explanation beyond the different regulatory modes to include the design of 
regulatory texts. Moreover, the theory is also subjected to extensive empirical 
analysis. 
Looking at the intemationalisation of accounting regulation it seems evident that 
the factors influencing accounting regulation vary through time. This thesis will 
demonstrate that such forces vary not only from country to country and through 
time but also from one accounting issue to another. In fact, this study is based on 
the belief that the categorising of national accounting systems on the basis of 
certain characteristics of their legal and business environment (Nair and Frank, 
1980; Nobes 1983) is far too simplistic and superficial. Instead, international 
accounting differences are the result of an underlying process of competition and 
conflict between nations. While the exporting and importing of accounting 
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regulations, through either international harmonisation or voluntary 
4 
transplantation, are evident (Parker, 1989), the driving force of the remaining 
national distinctiveness may be attributed to the self-interest of national regulators. 
At any given time, accounting regulations are the product of an ongoing struggle 
between the forces of globalisation and the pursuit of autonomy by individual 
states (Ebbers and McLeay, 1997). 
Finally, it should be noted that research on the measurement of international 
accounting harmonisation (van der Tas, 1988,1992, Tay and Parker, 1990; Archer 
et aL, 1995,1996) has been confined to the content of accounting regulations in 
different countries, rather than the design and the authority of the regulations 
themselves. The understanding of harmony in these studies is concerned 
exclusively with the influence of EC directives as a force which leads to 
harmonisation on a single accounting method, even though Archer et aý. (1996, 
p. 3) allow for 'different commercial circumstances' to explain the choice between 
different accounting methods. However, all the studies cited above assume that 
there is a choice between the different accounting method available, ignoring 
creative compliance and, furthermore, disregarding the possibility that the choices 
made might be influenced by the different regulatory forms to which European 
companies are subject. This thesis introduces these factors into the modelling of 
accounting policy choice and changes the focus of comparative research from 
harmonisation of accounting rules towards that of the manner in which institutional 
arrangements that differ from country to country influence compliance behaviour. 
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CHAPTER3 
REGULATORY STRATEGIES IN ACCOUNTING: 
A REVIEW OF INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES AND 
REGULATORY DESIGN IN EUROPE 
3.1 Overview 
European companies are governed by a variety of regulatory strategies, depending 
on their country of incorporation. In fact, the institutional structures of accounting 
regulation differ considerably from one European country to another. Furthermore 
the variety of laws, standards and recommendations issued by such institutions is 
intensified by the different approaches taken to the drafting of regulatory text, 
whereby a rule may either tend towards precision or be more open-textured. 
The sources of accounting regulation include not only parliamentary legislation but 
also, depending on the jurisdiction, various types of delegated legislation such as 
decree law, ministerial orders and other promulgations having legislative powers. 
In the latter category are those rules issued in national accounting plans as well as 
judicial rulings and the regulations issued by capital market regulators. In addition, 
there are various types of standard setting bodies which have been set up either by 
the audit profession or by the government, or a mixture of the two. Finally, 
recommendations on specific aspects of accounting are issued by a variety of other 
assodiations and individuals involved in the regulatory framework of accounting. 
For instance, professional and industry associations may issue recommendations 
which provide guidance to their members, and authoritative interpretations of the 
regulations in force by individual experts may also carry 
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considerable weight. Figure 3.1 provides a summary of the various sources of 
European accounting regulation. 
Accounting rules themselves may be either formulated in precise terms or drafted 
in general principles. On the one hand, detailed accounting regulation aims at a 
uniform reporting of transactions. On the other hand, a more open-textured 
approach to accounting regulation aims at reflecting the economic substance of 
transactions. Precise regulation eliminates discretion and uncertainty but because of 
its detail it is inflexible and cannot be accommodated to the variety of cases which 
might arise in practice. A more general rule, which can be interpreted to fit the 
special circumstances, requires judgement by the preparers of accounts and hence 
is open to abuse. Figure 3.2 illustrates the regulatory dilemma that appears to exist 
between the competing design of accounting rules with regard to compliance. 
The second section of this chapter explores in further detail the components of the 
three main sources of accounting regulation: (i) legislation, (ii) standard and (iii) 
recommendation. The third section is concerned with the alternative design of 
policies: (i) precise regulations and (ii) general principles. The discussion focuses 
on the relationship between regulatory design and compliance and is based on an 
economic analysis of regulatory form and legal theory. Subsequently, the national 
approaches to the regulation of accounting in European countries are described 
and compared. 
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3.2 The sources of accounting regulation 
3.2.1 Legislation 
Law 
Subject to the supremacy of EU law, the primary source of regulatory law in 
accounting, as in other areas of regulation, is parliamentary legislation. It 
' 
is 
important to note that in many European countries accounting regulation became 
statutory as a consequence of the implementation of the Fourth and Seventh EC 
Directives. It is no secret, however, that the relevant European directives were 
very optional in character, leaving it to national institutions to determine the 
relative rule intensity. In general, a legal policy is formulated by the government, 
before the law incorporating the policy is passed by parliament. 
Delegated legislation 
Legal rule-making powers are often delegated to other institutions. Legislature 
may delegate the power to promulgate legislation within defined limits to 
government departments, such as ministries and separate government agencies. 
Indeed, within Europe the number of delegated legislative instruments is vast: 
decree law, ministerial order, circular, resolution and so on. However, while the 
rules contained in statutory instruments issued by ministers or public agencies play 
a major role in some countries, they are absent in others. In Spain and France, for 
example, power has been conferred by parliament on an agency operating under 
the auspices of a ministry, and this agency can issue legally binding rules, which are 
then implemented in the national chart of accounts, although this is subject to 
approval by decree. Decree law is a common feature of accounting legislation in 
Belgium, France, Spain and Italy and is approved by the government. In addition, 
in Italy and Spain, and also in Denmark and the Netherlands, ministers can directly 
promulgate legal rules in form of a decree or an order. In contrast, delegated 
legislation is not a regulatory instrument in either Germany or the UK. Table 3.1 
summarises the legislative instruments used in the context of accounting in the 
countries under study. 
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Table 3.1 
Legislative Instruments of European Accounting Regulation' 
Belgium 
Law 
(L, oilWet) 
Royal Decree 
(Arriti RoyaL(Koninklijk Besluit) 
Denmark 
Financial Statements Act 
(Arsregnskabsloven) 
Financial Statements Order 
(Arsregnskabsbekendtgorelsen) 
Ministerial Guidelines 
France 
Commercial Code 
(Code de Commerce) 
Law 
(Loi) 
Decree 
Wicret) 
Accounting Plan 
(Plan Comptable Ginlral) 
Germany Ireland Italy 
Commercial Code Companies Act Civil Code 
(Handelsgesetzbuch) (Codice Civile) 
Group Accounts Order Law 
(Legga) 
Legislative Decree 
(Decreto Legislativo) 
Law Decree 
(Decreto Leggo) 
Ministerial Decree 
(Decreto Ministerialo) 
Circulars 
(Circolare) 
The Netherlands Spain United Kingdom 
Civil Code Commercial Code Companies Act 
(Burgerlijk Wetboek) (Codigo de Commercio) 
Administrative Decree Law Statutory Order 
(Besluit) (Ley) 
Royal Decree 
(Real Decreto) 
Accounting Plan 
(Plan General de Contabilidad) 
Ministerial Order 
(Orden Ministerial) 
Resolution 
(Resoluci6n) 
Circulars 
(Circulars)_ 
'Note. Instruments on related tax legislation, securities market law and legislation for special industries and 
financial institutions have been excluded. 
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The role of the courts 
The adjudication of disputes is a mechanism for securing compliance with the 
provisions of the law and judicial interpretation thus contributes to legal 
development in each jurisdiction. However, judicial rulings have a relatively small 
impact on the development of accounting regulation in Europe, even though some 
countries have explicitly integrated the courts into the institutional structures of 
financial reporting regulation. For instance, in the Netherlands a special court has 
been instituted to deal with judicial disputes on financial reporting, while in the 
United Kingdom a review panel may seek an order from the courts requiring the 
directors of a company to prepare revised accounts in case that company's 
accounts do not comply with the requirements of the law. But although the 
independence and autonomy of the judicial regulatory process favours a decision 
making process insulated from political pressures, the limitation of the judicial 
source of accounting regulation may be seen in the fact that the courts act only on 
matters which have been drawn to their attention. 
The Role of the Stock Exchange 
Stock market regulators can suspend share trading if a company contravenes 
extant regulations, and this represents a strong intervention into the activities of a 
finn. The requirement by stock market surveillance commissions to comply with 
existing accounting regulation or with rules issued by the s. tock market regulator 
itself may thus constitute a very powerful status for compliance. However, across 
Europe, the stock market regulators vary in their power over financial reporting 
regulation. In France and Italy, securities commissions have been empowered by 
law to issue regulations relevant to the financial reporting of listed companies, but 
in other countries, including the Netherlands and Germany, the stock market 
regufations do not have a direct impact on accounting matters. Yet, even where 
legal authority has been granted, stock market regulators usually confine 
intervention to demanding compliance with existing accounting legislation and 
standards and do not issue regulations themselves. 
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3.2.2 Standards 
As can be seen in Table 3.2, the rules issued by standard setting bodies procure 
their status from very different authorities. As noted earlier, a standard setting 
body is established either by the government in a special law, or as a self-regulated 
body of the audit or accounting profession, or, in the case of the UK's ASB, as a 
professional body with the government appointing the chairmen. A second 
characteristic is whether the rules issued by standard setting bodies have been 
granted more or less statutory support, whether they are endorsed by the stock 
exchange or, finally, whether they are not backed by a public institution and only 
respected by the audit profession itself. If backed by statute, the standards may 
either have full legal force, or the law requires companies to disclose compliance 
with the standards. 
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Table 3.2 
The status of rules issued by standard setting bodies 
Public Body: Private Body: Hybrid Body: 
set up by government law set up by the profession set up by the profession, 
government appoints 
chairmen 
Following approval by French CNC 
government, the (Conseil National de la 
standards have legal Comptabilite) 
status 
Spanish ICAC 
(Instituto de 
Contabilidad y Auditoria 
de Cuentas) 
Company law requires to British ASB ' 
disclose compliance with (Accounting Standards 
standards Board) 
Without granting legal Dutch RJ 
recognition, the (Raad voor de 
government supports the Jaarverslaggeving) 
standards informally 
Stock Exchange requires Italian CSPC 
listed companies to (Commissione per la 
comply with standards Statuizione dei Principi 
Contabili) 
Danish Accounting 
Panel 
(Regnskabspanelet) 
The audit profession Belgian CBN Spanish AECA 
respects the standards, (Commission des Normes (Asociaci6n Espafiola de 
but they are not endorsed ComptableslCommissie Contabilidad y 
by a public institution. voor Boekhoudkundige Administraci6n de 
Normen) Empresas) 
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It is important to note that the term standard is only used for the rules issued by the 
UK's ASB. In this study, however we use the term for those rules which are issued 
by an official accounting standard setting body which has been assigned with this 
responsibility, either by itself as a self-regulatory body of the profession or by the 
government as a public accounting standards commission. 
The authority of each accounting body is peculiar to individual nation states, 
especially in terms of its importance in relation to legislative accounting regulation 
as well as in terms of its private or public status, its way of funding and its 
membership structure. Within Europe, at one extreme of the spectrum, a body may 
be set up as part of a government ministry, while, at the other end, the body will be 
established and entirely funded by the auditing profession. The official recognition 
of a standard setting body may be through a law passed by the government, or in a 
ruling by the courts of law, or by the Stock Market regulators which themselves 
have been empowered to regulate. Other bodies have an exclusively private status. 
However, even though the rules they issue are not officially recognised, they may 
be followed for moral reasons of conduct and may serve as a safeguard for the 
auditor in a judicial dispute. Standard setting bodies either interpret the law, 
supplement the law or deal with new accounting issues which have not yet been 
dealt with in the law. 
3.2.3 Recommendations 
Recommendations are considered here as rules issued by all 'non-official' bodies 
involved in accounting regulation, that is non-legal bodies and non-standard setting 
bodies. These comprise a large set of rule-makers, in particular professional 
association of auditors or accountants, industrial associations and individual 
experts. As with standards, the terminology used for this type of rule may be very 
different across European countries. Also, the importance of such 
recommendations, which are often derived by convention and custom varies from 
one country to another. For instance, recommendations take on more authority in 
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countries where a standard setting body is non-existent, such as in Germany, but 
may be less important in a country with a great number of legislative instruments, 
such as Spain. Recommendations are primarily interpretations of existing 
regulations. They serve to assist companies where the law is ambiguous, or where 
an emergent issue has not been dealt with by the law. 
3.3 Regulatory design and compliance 
At the heart of the substance versus form debate in accounting regulation is the 
concern with effective control in financial reporting. This section addresses the 
alternative strategies in rule formulation and considers the relationship between 
regulatory design and compliance. The discussion is based on legal theory and, in 
particular, on an economic analysis of law. 
Regulation may be either formulated in general principles or drafted in precise and 
detailed terms. Ogus (1994) argues that there is a spectrum representing different 
degrees of formalism in rule formulation: 
"At one end of the spectrum, a standard setter may create a highly precise, 
perhaps quantitative, rule (e. g. vehicles must be driven at a speed not 
exceeding 30 m. p. h. in a given area); at the other end, a general rule (e. g. 
vehicles must be driven at a 'reasonable' speed in urban areas), requiring 
interpretation by both the actor and the enforcement agency. Because a 
precise rule eliminates discretion and uncertainty, it reduces the agency's 
administrative cost and the regulated firm's information cost. On the other 
hand, its specificity means that it is inflexible and cannot be accommodated 
to the variety of circumstances to which it must be applied. It is likely to be 
over-inclusive (deterring more than is optimal in the circumstances) or 
under-inclusive (deterring less than is optimal in the circumstances). Thus 
the 30 m. p. h. limit will unduly deter faster driving during times when few 
pedestrians wUl be present and when the optimal speed might be 40 m. p. h.; 
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and will insufficiently deter slower driving in icy conditions, when the 
optimal speed might be 15 m. p. h. A more general rule, which can be 
interpreted to fit the special circumstances, will avoid these costs arising 
from mismatch, but is more expensive to administee, (p. 169). 
A number of theoretical legal studies have attempted to analyse the optimal level of 
formalism in rules with regard to compliance costs for both the regulators and the 
regulated, by applying economic theory (Diver, 1983; Johnston, 1991; Posner and 
Ehrlich, 1974). 
Distinguishing three dimensions of regulatory precision, transparency, accessibility, 
and congruence, Diver (1983) develops an efficiency criterion of rule precision for 
a utility-maximising rulemaker who would estimate the social costs and benefits 
arising from different scenarios. It is argued that the degree of precision can have 
an impact on compliance behaviour and the transactions costs associated with 
administering a rule. Increased precision may increase compliance and decrease 
evasion costs. However, while increased transparency may be easier to enforce and 
may discourage violators from making costly efforts to avoid compliance, it may 
increase the variance between intended and actual outcomes, as the rulemaker may 
be unable to foresee all of the circumstances to which the rule may apply. While he 
can change the rule after learning of its incongruence, the process of amendment 
will be costly and will result in social losses in the interim. A more general rule, 
though facially congruent, may be over- or under-inclusive in a pplication, because 
its vagueness will invite misinterpretation. Furthermore, the cost to both the 
regulated and the regulator of applying a rule tends to increase as the vagueness 
and inaccessibility of the rule increases. 
Johnston (1991) analyses the effect of legal uncertainty on legal decisionmaking 
and suggests a pattern of dynamic legal change from detailed rules to broad rules 
and back again. Under the premise that private actors act on their ex ante beliefs 
about how the legal clecisionmaker will answer the ex post questions that determine 
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their legal liability, both the world of ex ante private choice and the world of ex- 
post legal decision will be inherently uncertain. The declaration that liability will be 
avoided if a certain action is taken provides an artificial incentive for actors to 
comply with the rule. If legal decisionmakers apply detailed rules with rigidity these 
are likely to be over- or under-inclusive. On the one hand, there is no incentive for 
the actor to do more than the rule requires, because he is completely insulated from 
liability by just barely complying. On the other hand, the actor may comply even 
though the circumstances are such that compliance with a detailed rule would 
generate high compliance costs; which is not socially optimal. 
Johnson theorises that a rigid rule may well dictate behaviour which is optimal 
under typical or average circumstances, but when the circumstances are far from 
typical the actor incurs 'atypical' costs and benefits and will rationally disobey the 
rigid rule, as it may be better to bear the cost of liability than the cost of avoiding 
liability. Thus, when compliance with rigid rules is too costly, rational actors will 
make the socially correct choice and undercomply. But by undercomplying rational 
actors incur liability even though they have behaved optimally. However, the 
uncertainty of the legal process Oudges may create exceptions when the rule seems 
at odds with economic reality) cuts the incentive to comply with a rigid rule, 
because compliance may lead to liability and non-compliance to non-liability. 
In the case of a general rule, compliance is defined precisely as optimal conduct in 
a particular situation. In the perfect scenario, where the legal decisionmaker does 
not eff, there is no incentive do do more than is really optimal, because the 
probability of liability can be lowered to zero simply by doing the optimal thing. 
There is a strong incentive not to do less, because this would entail liability. 
However, the legal process is not perfect and legal decisionmakers differ in how 
they interpret a vague standard, such as 'reasonable'. Uncertainty of this sort can 
cause a general rule to be either too weak or too strong a signal. Actors may cut 
their own costs and do less than is 'reasonable' under the circumstances, because 
they know that they may be found not liable even though they failed to behave 
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reasonably. They may do the opposite, however, and behave too carefully in an 
attempt to lower. the probability that the legal decisionmaker will incorrectly find 
that they have failed to behave reasonably. Both factual evidence and opinion as to 
what is 'reasonable' may be most obvious in extreme situations, and most 
ambiguous under typical circumstances. 
Johnson concludes from his theoretical analysis that general rules should induce 
optimal care under extreme circumstances when 'there is little uncertainty over 
what was and what should have been done, but they may induce too much care 
under normal circumstances, when there is reasonable disagreement about what 
constitutes optimal behaviour. Uncertainty, if not too great, improves incentives 
under rigid rules, by blurring artificial incentives to comply. In contrast, in average 
circumstances uncertainty causes a broad rule to deter excessively. In most 
frequently occurring situations (uncertainty and normal situation), broad rules 
result in overdeterrence while rigid rules cause neither systematical overdeterrence 
nor underdeterrence. 
Finally, Posner and Ehrlich (1974) examine the optimal level of specificity in a legal 
rule under the desire to minimise cost. They theorise that there is an optimal 
specificity for any given regulation where the administrative costs are 
approximately equal to the costs of any potential mismatch. They suggest that a 
perfectly detailed and comprehensive set of rules brings society nearer to its 
desired allocation of resources. The analysis is based on a model that integrates the 
social loss (from activities that society wants to prevent and from the deterrence of 
socially desirable activities) and the cost of producing and enforcing rules, 
including litigation costs. Efficiency is maxirnised by minin-dsing the social loss 
function. 
The authors argue that the more homogeneous the conduct which detailed rules 
affect is, the lower the costs of those rules. However, several different costs are 
associated with greater precision of rules. Some of these arise from the fact that 
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making law more precise involves making it more detailed in order to minimise the 
cost of overinclusion and underinclusion. The more specific a rule, and the more 
heterogeneous the world it regulates, the greater the costs of overinclusion and 
underinclusion. A general rule will involve underinclusion and overinclusion when 
the legal process is imperfect. Thus, Posner and Ehrlich conclude that even a 
perfect rule is necessarily overinclusive and underinclusive. 
3.4 National approaches to accounting regulation 
This section describes the financial reporting regimes in France, Germany, 
Belgium, Spain, Italy, Denmark, the UK, Ireland and the Netherlands. The analysis 
addresses the relevant national institutions and their interaction in the rule-making 
process and describes the sources of authority and design of policy of the 
regulations issued by the various parties involved. 
France 
In France, accounting regulation is primarily legalistic. A statutory public agency, 
the Conseil National de la Comptabilitj (CNC), has the central responsibility for 
financial reporting regulation. Government ministries contribute to the regulatory 
process by approving a law or decree drafted by the CNC. Other institutions 
involved in the accounting rule making process are the French Stock Exchange 
Commission (Commission des Opirations de Bourse, COB) and the two 
professional accounting organisations: the Association of Accountants (Ordre des 
Experts Comptables, OEC) and the National Association of Auditors (Compagnie 
Nationale des Commissaires aux Comptes, CNCQ. Table 3.3 surnmarises the 
sources of accounting regulation in France. 
Accounting legislation is contained in the conunercial code (Code de Convnerce) 
and in the national accounting plan (Plan Comptable General, PCG). The law (83- 
353) of 30 April 1983 together with the decree (83-1020) of 29 November 1983 
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modified the commercial code in accordance with the Fourth European Directive 
thereby introducing statutory legislation for accounting in France. A further law 
(85-11) of 3 January 1985 and decree of 17 February 1986, incorporated the 
Seventh Directive and modified the law of 24 July 1966 on commercial companies 
(Loi sur les SocMis Commerciales) with regard to consolidation requirements. 
The CNC 2 operates under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance. The essential 
role of the CNC -is to advise the government on accounting regulation, to develop 
detailed rules of accounting to be enacted in the PCG and to promote their uniform 
application (de Kerviler and Standish, 1992). The CNC's involvement in the legal 
texts on accounting and their application is twofold. Firstly, it initiates accounting 
regulations which usually lead to proposals to the Ministry of Finance. Secondly, it 
publishes opinions on technical issues and interprets legal texts when consulted by 
public or private organisations. Some institutions adapt the PCG to individual 
circumstances, which are then examined by the CNC. 
Because of its legal power to regulate the operations of the securities market, the 
COB has considerable authority to investigate the disclosure of financial 
information by listed companies and also to impose sanctions on non-compliant 
companieS3 . However, even though the COB has issued a number of 
recommendations in the Bulletin Mensuel de la Commission des Operations de 
Bourse, it has not imposed authoritative rulings (instructions) on accounting 
matters for companies quoted on the stock exchange. Nevertheless, the COB 
exercises indirect influence on accounting regulation through its representation in 
the CNC. 
In addition to the law, the regulation of accounting in France is influenced by the 
&accounting doctrine'; that is, the non-binding opinions published by the CNC 
2 ne power to make proposals for amending the PCG has been delegated to the CNC in France 
by a government decree in 1957, albeit legal modifications have to be promulgated by ministers. 3 The statutory power of the COB was increased in Law of 2 August 1989, which permitted the 
COB to sanction practices which contravene its regulations. 
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referred to above, and also the interpretation of the regulations in force by the 
professions: the accountants and the auditors. 
The OEC, representing the association of accountants, is mainly responsible for 
setting the rules of the profession and for -regulating its members. While it 
participates indirectly in the accounting standard setting process of the CNC 
through elected representatives, the OEC directly provides its members with its 
interpretation of extant accounting regulation. The OEC statements on accounting 
issues are defined as opinions (avis) and are part of the French accounting 
doctrine, while the rules on professional conduct, defined as nonnes, are 
mandatory. In addition the OEC publishes a journal, Revue franýaise de la 
comptabiliti, and a general handbook for the use of its members. 
Albeit a member of the CNC, the CNCC, in comparison to the OEC, is less active 
in the interpretation of accounting issues. Its main task is to define standards of 
professional practice and to provide interpretations on technical issues. The 
association publishes numerous journals, such as the Guide des Commissaires aux 
Comptes, the Telex Commissaires and the Bulletin du Conseil National des 
Commissaires aux Comptes, which are concerned with the regulation of the 
auditors. 
The French accounting regime is currently subject to major reforms. Recently, an 
important legal amendment to the composition and the authority of the CNC has 
reformed it, by reducing membership from 103 to 58, thus making it a more 
flexible body. In fact, the law of 26 April 1996 modified the institutional structure 
of the CNC with a view to giving direct legal authority to issue accounting 
regulation to the CNC through 'the new Comiti de Reglementation Comptable 
(CRC). A VVWte Paper launched by the French accountancy profession in May 
1997 has been relatively critical on the degree of detail of current French 
accounting principles (Accountancy, March 1998). Furthermore, recent legislation 
of March 1998 gives companies whose shares are listed on a regulated EU or other 
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foreign stock exchange the option to prepare their consolidated accounts by 
applying IAS, provided that the relevant IAS has been translated into French and 
that it has been adopted by the CRC. 
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Table 3.3 
The sources of accounting regulation in France 
Legislation 
Law 
Commercial Code Art. 8-17 
(Code de Commerce) 
Law of 24 July 1966 on 
Commercial Companies (Loi sur 
les SocUtis Commerciales) 
Law (83-353) of 30 April 1983 
Law (85-11) of 3 January 1985 
Decree 
Decree (83-1020) of 29 November 
1983 
Decree of 17 February 1986 
National Accounting Plan 
(Plan Comptable Giniral) 
Instructions 
(Instructions) 
Conseil National de la 
Comptabilild 
Opinions 
.... . ............. . ..... . ...... . ...... . .......... . ...... Ordre des Experts Comptables 
-Avis 
-Revue franfaise de la 
Comptabiliti 
Compagnie Nationale des 
Commissaires aux Compres 
Guide des Commissaires aux 
Comptes 
Telex Commissaires 
-Bulletin du Conseil National des 
L-co?? Imssaires aux comptes 
Standard Recommendation 
Accounting standardisation by the Accounting Doctrine 
Conseil National de la 
Comptabiliti 
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Germany 
In Germany, accounting ýegulation is currently undergoing similar substantial 
institutional changes. Traditionally, accounting regulation has been enacted by the 
legislature and, accordingly, has been approved by parliament. As can be seen in 
Table 3.4, in contrast to all the other countries under investigation, until the 
present time there has been no other type of regulation in Germany, either in the 
form of delegated legislation through government departments or in the form of a 
4 
governmental or professional accounting standard agency. The current reforms 
aim to establish a Bilanzrat, - set up by representatives of industry, the audit 
profession and academia, as a private accounting standardisation council with the 
task of reforming the existing German consolidation regulations and of 
representing Germany at the IASC (Frankfurter Allgerneine Zeitung, 14 February 
1998). Furthermore, a bill passed through the lower house of parliament on 27 
March 1998 which exempted German companies which use either IAS or US 
GAAP from presenting their consolidated financial statements in accordance with 
German consolidation regulation. 
This is a break with the traditionally legalistic character of German accounting, 
which is instituted as pans of the Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch, HGB). 
Of considerable importance in Germany are the legally codified principles of 
Grundsdtze ordnungsmd, 8iger BuchfUhrung (GoB) which fill a legal vacuum in the 
case of loopholes and ambiguities in the law. In the absence of a standard setting 
body, legal interpretations of the GoB, the general principles of 'proper 
bookkeeping', close to a considerable extent remaining gaps in accounting 
regulation. GoB are often the basis for an intensive exchange of arguments 
between academics and practitioners (Busse von Colbe, 1992) who contribute to 
the development of a body of very detailed rules by deductive reasoning (Leffson, 
1987). There is in Germany a vast literature of legal interpretations, published in 
4 Albeit 'informal' consultations between government and interest groups, such as industrY 
associations, the Institut der Wirtschaftspriifer (IdW), trade unions, academics, etc. are common 
during the legislative process (Ordelheide, 1997a). 57birdBook§§238-341 
of the HGB 
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journals on accounting and collected as law commentarieS6 and financial 
accounting handbookS7. In addition, the Institut der Wirtschaftspriifer (IdW), 
which represents the audit profession, publishes position statements 
(Stellungnahmen), based on interpretations of GoB. These are recommendations 
on specific accounting questions which, although not binding in a contractual sense 
for its members, may be regarded as authoritative in the event of a judicial dispute 
(Ballwieser, 1995). The statements of the Schmalenbach Society for Business 
Economics (SchmalenbachgeselIschaft ftir Betriebswirtschaft) on specific 
accounting problems may also be taken into consideration by reporting companies. 
Finally, firm-specific rules based on the interpretation of existing accounting 
regulations are developed by large corporations and distributed to subsidiaries in 
form of accounting manuals, with the aim of consolidation under a uniform set of 
rules. 
In addition, a system of detailed tax legislation and court decisions on tax related 
accounting issues by the Federal Fiscal Court (Bundesfinanzhoj) are of practical 
importance for accounting purposes. This follows directly from the unified inc ome 
approach to commercial and tax accounting, the so-called authoritativeness 
principle (MaBgeblichkeitsprinzip) laid down in §5(l) of the Income Tax Law 
(Einkommensteuergesetz). Ibis requires that, in the absence of specific tax rules, 
the determination of taxable profit must be in accordance with the principles of 
proper bookkeeping (GoB) codified in the HGB. In turn, Income Tax 
Implementing Orders (Einkommensteuerdurchfiihrungsverordungen), judicial 
interpretations by tax courts of GoB and specific tax legislation are of practical 
relevance for company accounts. 
The i3erman system of accounting rules has been described by Ordelheide (1998) 
as a hierarchical system in which rules become more detailed when descending 
through the levels of the hierarchy, with the incomplete and unclear rules 
6 Adler/Diiring/Schmalz; Kating/Weber 
7 Castan/Heymann/Mdller/Ordelheide/Scheffler 1987 
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established at one level being further elaborated at one or other of the following 
levels. 
However, the sub-levels of the text of law, which are described as 'interpretations' 
and 'elaborations' of the law, possess a different degree of authority. In fact, only 
court decisions derive their authority from the commercial code, while the rules 
issued at subsequent levels, such as statements of private organisations, legal 
commentaries and interpretative articles have 'expert authority' only and are not 
legally binding. 
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Table 3.4 
LEGISLATION 
The sources of accounting regulation in Germany 
........................................................................... 
Parliament 
§§ 238-341 Third Book Commercial Code 
Handelsgesetzbuch 
Grunds&tze ordnungsmd. 6iger BuchfiArung 
Federal Supreme Court 
Court decisions on financial repbrting 
Ministry of Finance 
Tax specific legislation 
Einkommensteuergesetz 
Einkommensteuerdurchfahrungsverordnungen 
Einkommensteuerrichtlinien 
Federal Fiscal Court 
Court decisions on tax law with practical 
relevance for financial reporting 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
........................................................................ 
Institute of Auditors 
: Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer 
Stellungnahmen 
: Schmalenbach Society for Business Economics 
: Schnialenbach GeselIschaftfUr Betriebswirischaft 
Stellungnahmen 
. Individual 
Experts, lawyers, auditors, academics 
Law commentaries 
Bilanzkommentare 
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Belgium 
In Belgium, the codified tradition of law has also dominated the regulation of 
accounting. In this case, however, accounting legislation is usually issued in the 
form of a decree (besluitlarretel which does not pass through parliament but is 
instead approved by members of the government. Albeit set up by the government 
for the development of accounting regulation, the activity of the Belgian standard 
setting commission has been confined to the interpretation of existing legislation. 
Table 3.5 summarises the Belgian sources of accounting regulation. 
The Central Economic Council plays a special role in the establishment of Belgian 
accounting law, advising the government and parliament on accounting matters. 
The Council, which is composed of employer and employee representatives, 
provides policy recornmendations, either upon request or voluntarily. The 
Council's advice thereby has a direct influence on the draft laws, even though the 
responsibility for the enactment of the various laws and decrees rests with the 
legislature and the executive (Lefebvre and van Nuffel, 1998). The Accounting 
Law of 17 July 19758 provides only the framework of financial reporting and the 
Royal Decree of 8 October 19769 sets out valuation rules and the format and 
content of the annual accounts. The Royal Decree of 6 March 1990'0 deals with 
consolidated accounts implementing the Seventh Directive. 
Belgian accounting legislation appears to be very detailed. According to Jorissen 
and Block (1995, p. 391), the preparers of financial statements in Belgium "prefer 
detailed rules to general legal principles which have to be applied in different 
situations. This is partly due to the fact that they are used to working under a 
codified law system. Further given the importance of taxation in accounting and 
I Loi du 17juillet 1975 relative a la comptabilid et aux comptes annuels des entreprises Wet van 
17juli 1975 op de boekhouding en dejaarrekening van de ondernemingen. 
9 Arrid royal du 8 octobre 1976 relatives aux comptes annuels des entreprisesIKoninklijk 
Besluit van 8 oktober 1976 met betrekking tot dejaarrekening van de ondernemingen. 
10 Arriti royal du 6 mars 1990 relatif aux comptes consolidis des entrepriseslKonijklijk besluit 
van 6 maart 1990 op de geconsolideerdejaarrekening van de ondernemingen. 
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the concept of dirigisme in Belgium, both demanding conformity, the exercise of 
individual judgements has been unfamiliar to accountants and preparers of financial 
statements. There is no tradition among practicioners of applying general 
accounting principles to specific cases". 
The degree of detail of extant decrees in accounting regulation may explain the 
relative unimportance of the Belgian Accounting Standards Commission 
(Commissie voor Boekhoudkundige Normen / Commission des Normes 
Comptables, CNC). In fact, even though this public body" was established with 
the purpose of advising the government and parliament and of formulating 
accounting rules by way of opinions, most of the bulletins issued by the CNC have 
been limited to the interpretation of existing accounting legislation (Jorisson and 
Block, 1995). The members of the CNC are representatives of the government, the 
Banking and Finance Conunission, the professional institutes of auditors and of 
accountants and the small business organisations as well as individual experts 
selected by the Central Economic Council. By March 1995, the CNC had 
published 34 bulletins (Bollen and van Nuffel, 1997). The rules contained therein 
are considered to be authoritative pronouncements to help companies interpret the 
law, even though these do not have the force of law. 
Apart from their membership in the CNC, the professional bodies in the field of 
auditing and accounting remain passive with regard to the regulation of financial 
reporting in Belgium. However, in accordance with their individual capacity, each 
of the three institutes exercises an indirect impact: the Institute of Auditors 
(Instituut der Bedriffsrevisorenfinstitut des Reviseurs dEntreprises) by being 
responsible for the formulation of auditing standards; the Institute of Accountants 
(Insfauut van Accountantsfinstitut des Experts Comptables), by imposing 
sanctions in cases where the rules of conduct are contravened; and the Institute of 
Bookkeepers (Instituut van Boekhoudersfinstitut Professionel des Comptables), 
by advising the accountants not represented by the two other institutes. The 
1 'Instituted under Law of 17 July 1975. 
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opinions on accounting problems issued by the professional organisations are not 
published but only communicated to their members. 
It should be noted that in order to allow Belgian companies to use IAS or US 
GAAP for consolidation, the Minister of Economics has been empowered to 
exempt, on request, such enterprises from Belgian rules for consolidated financial 
statements. However, the conditions for exemption have not yet been published 
(IASC Insight, March 1998). 
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Table 3.5 
The sources of accounting regulation in Belgium 
1. Lelzislative Sources of Accounting Regulation enacted by Parliament and Government under the advise of th 
Central Economic Council 
(i) Law 
Law of 17 July 1975 (Loi du 17juillet 1975 relative a la comptabiliti et aux comptes annuels des entreprises 
Wet van 17juli 1975 op de boekhouding en dejaarrekening van de ondernemingen) 
This law was amended by the laws of 30 March 1976,24 March 1978,1 July 1983 and 30 December 1991 and 
by the Royal Decrees of 15 December 1878 and 12 September 1983. 
(ii) Royal Decree 
Royal Decree of 8 October 1976 (Arriti royal du 8 octobre 1976 relatives aux comptes annuels des 
entreprisesIKoninklijk Besluit van 8 oktober 1976 met betrekking tot dejaarrekening van de ondernemingen) 
This Royal Decree was amended several times by the Royal Decree of 12 December 1977,7 March 1978,14 
February 1979,12 September 1983,5 March 1985,6 November 1987,30 December 1991 and 3 December 
1993. 
The Royal Decree of 6 March 1990 (Arriti royal du 6 mars 1990 relatif aux comptes consolidis des 
entreprises. lKoninklijk besluit van 6 maart 1990 op de geconsolideerdejaarrekening van de ondernemingen) 
2. Rules issued by-the Accounting-Standards Commission (Commissie voor Boekhoudkundize Normen 
Commission des Normes Comptables. CBN). 
The 34 CBN Bulletins published in 1995 interpreted articles of the 
Law of 17 July 1975 
Royal Decree of 8 October 1976 
Royal Decree of 12 September 1983 
Royal Decree of 6 March 1990 
3. Rules issued by non-authoritative bodies 
The Institute of Auditors (Instituut der Bedriffsrevisorenfinstitut des Reviseurs dEntreprises) 
Publication of auditing standards 
The Institute of Accountants (Instituut van Accountantsflnstitut des Experts Comptables) 
Rules of conduct 
Institute of Bookkeepers (Instituut van Boekhoudersfinstitut Professionel des Comptables) 
Advise other accountants 
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Spain 
In Spain, accounting regulation has become legalistic following the country'4 entry 
into in the European Union and in particular following the enactment of Law No. 
19 of 1989 which reformed Spanish corporate law in line with the European 
Company Law Directives. This development has been enforced by the 
establishment of the Accounting and Audit Institute (Instituto de Contabilidad y 
Auditoria de Cuentas, ICAC) which, as an autonomous government agency under 
the Nfinistry of Economics and Financial Affairs, has undertaken responsibility for 
developing regulation on accounting and auditing since 1989. In addition, the Bank 
of Spain (Banco de Espaga), the Commission surveying the stock market 
(Comision National del Mercado de Valores), the State Audit Agency 
(Intervencion General de la Administracion del Estado) and the Directorate 
General of Insurance (Direcci6n General de Seguros), oversee accounting 
regulation in their respective sectors of the economy in association with ICAC. 
Nonetheless, as can be seen in Table 3.6, private standard setting which, prior to 
the legal reforms, promoted the development of Spanish accounting regulation, 
continues to be influential. 
The legislative instruments governing accounting are detailed and vary in status. 
They include law (ley), royal decree (real decreto), ministerial order (orden 
ministerial), resolution (resolucion) and circular (circular). The parliament and the 
council of ministers formally approve laws and royal decrees which have been 
prepared by ICAC and the Ministry of Economic and Financial Affairs. ICAC 
makes proposals for updating the National Chart of Accounts (Plan General de 
Contabilidad, PGQ and its sectorial adaptations and for implementing other legal 
accounting rules. For instance, ICAC prepared the 1990 version of the PGC, which 
was approved by Royal Decree 1643/1990 as well as the regulations for the 
preparation of consolidated annual accounts, approved by Royal Decree 
1815/1991 (Normas para la formulacton de las cuentas anuales consolidadas). 
Royal Decree 1643/1990 empowered the Ministry of Economic and Financial 
61 
Affairs and ICAC to issue mandatory accounting regulations. Both ICAC and the 
Ministry have made use of these extended delegated legislative powers: ICAC has 
issued rules in the form of resolutions, most of which concern the valuation rules in 
the PGC; the Ministry of Economic and Financial Affairs has issued a number of 
Ministerial Orders, following the recommendations of ICAC (L6pez and Rivero, 
1995). The ICAC is advised by a Consultative Committee which has two technical 
subcommittees: the Accounting Committee and the Auditing Committee. 
In its function of controlling the activities of banks and other financial institutions, 
the Central Bank of Spain has legal power to enact accounting rules for banks. 
These are issued in the form of circulars in conformity with the European Directive 
on accounting for banks. Similarly, the Directorate General of Insurance, as an 
agency of the Ministry of Economic and Financial Affairs, has the legal power to 
regulate the preparation of financial statements by insurance companies, while the 
State Audit Agency performs the same function for public sector companies. 
Finally, the National Securities Market Commission issues mandatory accounting 
regulation for investment firms and intermediaries; that is, agencies that settle and 
clear stock market transactions. These regulatory powers do however not extend 
to listed companies themselves (Gonzalo and Gallizo, 1992). 
Tax legislation, which has traditionally been a deterministic source of accounting 
legislation in Spain, continues to be of practical importance even though the link 
between accounting and taxation has been abolished by law with the 
implementation of EC directives. A remaining link concerns the revaluation of 
certain fixed assets for both tax and accounting purposes in accordance with 
12 inflation indices published by the government . In 1996 a new tax revaluation law 
perniitted companies the restatement of fixed assets based on defined price-level 
indexation and allowed deviation from the accounting legislation which prescribes 
the historic cost principle in financial statements. 
12 Such revaluation laws were passed in the period between 1961 and 1983. 
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Standard setting by the accounting profession is inextricably linked with the 
Spanish Accounting and Business Administration Association (Asociaci6n 
Espafiola de Contabilidad y Administraci6n de Empresas, AECA) which was 
established in 1979. Its four instituted commissions cover the areas of (i) 
accounting principles and standards, (ii) company valuation, (iii) management 
accounting and (iv) organisation. and methods and have to date issued 18 
documents on accounting principles and standards (Principios y nor? nas de 
contabilidad en Espaha). The AECA documents cover all the main components of 
financial statements and in its first statement AECA defmed a conceptual 
framework for financial reporting. The standards published by AECA are 
considered to be of great practical importance. According to Canibano and Cea 
(1998) a substantial part of the 1990 PCG was based on accounting regulations 
formerly issued by AECA. The audit profession considers AECA documents to be 
valid supplements to legislative accounting regulation, particularly those 
concerning aspects which have not been dealt with by law. 
None of the three professional auditing bodies in Spain - the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (Instituto de Auditores-Censores Juados de Cuentas de Espafia), the 
Register of Economist-Auditors (Registro de Economistas Auditores) and the 
Register of Commerce Graduate-Auditors (Registro de Thulares Mercantiles 
Auditores) are directly involved in the regulation of accounting. However, by 
issuing technical standards and rules of conduct to their members these bodies 
inevitably deal with the content and presentation of financial statements and 
provide opinions. Moreover, by translating IAS into Spanish, the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants has greatly aided the influence of international standards on 
Spanish accounting. 
A further source of accounting regulation in Spain comes from university 
researchers, academics who not only have an influence through the publication of 
books and journal articles, but who also give their expert opinion to the 
committees which prepare draft statements on accounting regulation. 
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Table 3.6 
The sources of accounting regulation in Spain 
Legislation Standard Recommendations 
Law enacted by Parliament Accounting standardisation Issued by the auditing bodies 
by ICAC 
Commercial Code Institute of Chartered Accountants 
Instituto de Auditores-Censores 
Jurados 
Law 19 of 25 July 1989 
Accounting principles and 
standards by AECA 
Rpyal Decree approved by the Register of Economist-Auditors 
Spanish Council of Ministers and Registro de Economistas Auditores 
the Parliament 
Register of Commerce Graduates- 
1643 of 20 December 1990 Auditors 
Registro de Titulares Mercantiles 
Auditores de Cuentas de Espana 
1815 of 20 December 1991 
Other legislative accountin Comments by individual academics 
regglatio 
Plan General de Contabilidad. 
prepared by ICAC, approved 
through royal decree 
Ministerial Orders issued by the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance 
Resolutions published by ICAC 
Circulars issued by the Bank of 
Spain 
Insurance regulation issued the 
Directorate General of Insurance 
Security Market Law issued by 
Commission surveying the stock 
market 
State Industry Regulation by the 
the State Audit Agency 
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Italy 
Accounting regulation in Italy derives its authority solely from the state, not only 
through the provisions of the Civil Code (Codice Civile) but also in form of 
detailed legislative decrees, law decrees and presidential decrees. In addition, fiscal 
law is influential, as are clarifying orders from government n-dnistries and rulings in 
the Italian courts. The stock market regulator (Commissione Nazionale per le 
Societa e la Borsa, CONSOB) is empowered by law and in turn requires that listed 
companies follow the accounting principles of the Commissione per la Statuizione 
dei Principi Contabili (CSPC). In spite of the variety of legal instruments, a 
number of institutions assist companies in interpreting accounting law. The Italian 
regulatory regime is summarised in Table 3.7. 
Accounting legislation is contained in a number of legal instruments. The basic 
regulatory framework is codified in Articles. 2423 to 2435 bis of the Civil Code. 
Parliamentary law (legge). is enacted by parliament after a law proposal has been 
prepared by a special parliamentary committee and the bill has been discussed in 
parliament. The parliament may also empower the government to enact legislative 
decrees (decreti legislativi) through a delegating law (legge delega). For instance, 
for the revision of the Civil Code in order to implement the Fourth and Seventh 
European Directives, a proposal was prepared by the D'Alessandro Commission of 
the Ministry of Justice on 14 April 1986. Bill No. 1519 of 6 January 1989 by the 
Council of Ministers proposed that the implementation of the EC directives be 
delegated to the government. Law No. 69 of 26 March 199013 delegated to the 
government the responsibility for the incorporation of the Fourth and Seventh 
Directive into Italian law, and this was eventually enacted through Legislative 
Decree No. 127 of 9 April 1991. 
Law decrees (decreti legge) must be submitted to parliament for enactment on the 
day that they are issued and then confirmed in law within 60 days. As they become 
13 According to Riccaboni and Ghirri (1994), this law added only very few innovations to the 
1986 draft made by the D'Alessandro, Cornrnission. 
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immediately effective, such law decrees are reserved for urgent cases only, but the 
practicality of this accelerated mode of legislating has made it a frequently used 
instrument (Riccaboni, 1998). A further element of the structure of legislative 
accounting regulation in Italy are the presidential decrees which are issued as 
adjuncts to legislation. For instance, while Law No. 216 of 7 July 1974 gave 
CONSOB the power of surveillance of the information disclosed by companies 
listed on the Italian stock exchange, this law also enabled the government to enact 
rules on accounting and auditing, which were subsequently implemented by 
presidential decrees. Further legislative powers may be exercised autonomously by 
ministers. However, so called ministerial decrees (decreti ministerialt) and 
circulars (circolari) are issued with the aim of providing legal clarification and have 
less authority than the law itself. The responsibility for accounting legislation 
concerning banks and financial institutions has been delegated through a legislative 
decree 14 and a ministerial decree 15 to the Bank of Italy. 
A strong influence of tax legislation on financial reporting is evident in a number of 
accounting areas, even though contradictions within the Consolidated Law on 
Income Tax (Testo Unico delle Imposte sul Reddito, TUIR) mean that the 
dependence of corporate profit on tax rules is not straightforward. An example of 
the use of tax legislation in financial statements is the revaluation of assets which 
are issued at irregular intervals by the government with certain fiscal objectives. 
As noted earlier, CONSOB was given legal power to issue regulation with respect 
to the financial reporting of listed companies. In particular, it required the 
preparation of consolidated accounts long before the Seventh Directive was 
enacted. In 1982, CONSOB granted official recognition to the regulations issued 
by die CSPC through Resolution No. 1079. In cases where these principles were 
insufficient, CONSOB recommended the application of IAS, provided that these 
were not conflict with Italian law. 
14 Decreto legislativo 87 of 27 January 1992 
" Decreto ministerialo of 24 June 1992 
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With respect to professional self-regulation, the main contributors to the 
development of accounting rules are the national associations of auditors 
(Consiglio nazionale dei dottori commercialisti, CNDQ and of accountants 
(Consiglio nazionale dei ragionieri, CNR).. The Commission for the Establishment 
of Accounting Principles (Commissione per la statuizione dei principi contabili, 
CSPQ is composed of equal representations of both the CNDC and the CNR. The 
CSPC is supported by a large number of working committees, in which not only 
the profession, but also academics and representatives of CONSOB participate. 
Apart from the official endorsement by CONSOB, referred to above, the CSPC has 
never been given formal acknowledgement in law. However, the CSPC is 
perceived as a standard setting body in Italy (Riccaboni, 1998). 
Interpretations of extant accounting legislation are provided by a number of 
institutions, in addition to those mentioned above. Another association 
representing auditors (Associazione Italiana Revisori Contabili, ASSIREVI) has 
published research documents (documento di ricerca) dealing for instance with 
differences between the Civil Code and the CSPC regulations. The association 
representing the interests of Italian limited liability companies (Associazione fra le 
Societa Italiane per Azioni, ASSONIME) assists such companies in interpreting 
the law, particularly through its circulars (circolart). 
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Table 3.7 
The sources of accounting regulation in Italy 
... ............................................................. 
Legislation 
................................................. 
Standards 
. .. ........................................... 
Recommendations 
Parliament Commissione per la Statuizione Assonime 
dei Principi Contabili (CSPC) 
Circulars 
Circolare 
Documents Assirevi 
z Parliamentary law Principi Contabili 
Legge Research Documents 
. .. ....................... ....................... .. Documento di ricerca 
Civil Code, AA. 2423-2435 
Codice Civile ADC 
Government Rules of conduct 
Ministry of Finance 
Decred Legislativi 
............................................ 
e. g. Legislative Decree 127 of 1991 
e. g. Legislative Decree 216 of 1974 
Law Decree 
Decred legge 
Ministerial Decree 
Decred Ministeriali 
Circulars 
Circolare 
Courts 
Judicial rulings 
Ministry of Finance 
Related tax regulation 
Testo Unico delle Imposte 
sul Reddito 
(Art. 52,75) 
Revaluation laws: 
Law 576 of 02-12-1975 
Law 72 of 19.03.1983 
Law 408 of 29.12.1990 
Law 413 of 30.12.1991 
CONSOB 
Circulars (Circolare) 
Resolution No. 1079 of 1989 
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Denmark 
In Denmark, a combination of public and private institutions contributes to the 
development of accounting regulation, there being a history of explicit 
arrangements to avoid parliamentary involvement in highly technical matters 
concerning the regulation in accounting (Christiansen, 1998). It is noteworthy that 
accounting legislation for individual accounts and group accounts has been 
promulgated by different institutional powers. While. the group accounting rules 
vere incorporated in a special Financial Statements Order published by the 
Nfinistry of Industry, the accounting rules for individual accounts were enacted in 
the Financial Statements Act approved by Parliament. It is also worth noting that, 
on a number of occasions, structural reforms of the financial reporting regime 
followed cases of non-compliance and fraud in Denmark. 
The implementation of the EC directives considerably increased the degree of 
legislative accounting regulation in Denmark. The Financial Statements Act 
(Arsregnskabsloven) implemented the Fourth Directive in 1981 and was 
accompanied by a Financial Statements Order (Arsregnskabsbekendtgorelsen). The 
Bookkeeping Act (Bogforingsloven, Statutory Order No. 60) of 19 February 1986 
contains general rules concerning the keeping of books for all Danish businesses 
but no rules on the preparation of annual accounts which are dealt with in the 
Bookkeeping Order (Bogforingsbekendtgorelsen, Order No. 598) of 21 August 
1990. In 1991, the Financial Statements Act was revised for the implementation of 
the Seventh Directive. However, the basic provisions relating to the format and 
content of group accounts were adopted in a Financial Statements Order 
(Arsregnskabsbekendtgorelsen) and an accompanying Ministerial Guideline. 
According to Christiansen (1995), even though the implementation of the Fourth 
and ýeventh Directive brought significant changes in Danish accounting practice, 
Danish accounting regulation has remained fairly flexible. 
Denmark has two official accounting standard setting bodies: the Accounting Panel 
(Regnskabspanelet), which was set up as a professional standard setting body and 
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the Accounting Council (Regnskabsreidet) which has only recently been instituted' 6 
by the Government. The Institute of State-Authorized Public Accountants 
(Foreningen af Statsautoriserede Revisorer, FSR) after initially endorsing IAS, 
started to issue accounting standards (Regnskabsvej1edninger) in 1988. By 1995, it 
had published nine accounting standards and two exposure drafts. Until 1992, the 
FSR Accounting Committee (Regnskabsteknisk Udvalg) drafted the standards 
which were, after a period of discussion, eventually adopted by, the FSR. The 
Regnskabspanelet was set up by the FSR in 1992 in order to increase the 
involvement in standard setting to other parties with an interest in financial 
reporting, such as the Copenhagen Stock Exchange, which endorses standards set 
by the Accounting Panel. In particular, Information Obligations for Issuers of 
Listed Securities (Oplysningsforpligtelser for udstedere of borsnoterede 
va, rdipapirer, OUBV) require that the annual accounts of companies quoted on 
the stock exchange be prepared in compliance with Danish accounting standards 
(OUBV, section 15). 
In addition to standard setting, the Danish accounting profession (FSR) publishes 
opinions in two professional journals: the Revision & Regnkabsvasen and in the 
RevisorbWet. In addition, law commentaries (Arsregnskaber - Kommentarer til 
regnskabs-lovgivningen) by individual experts, assist companies in interpreting the 
legal provisions. The Danish regulatory regime is summarised in Table 3.8. 
16 Under Investigation Act 1994 
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Table 3.8 
The sources of accounting regulation in Denmark 
1. Legislative accounting regulatio 
(1) Laws enacted by Parliament 
Bookkeeping Act 
Bogforingsloven 
Financial Statements Act 
Arsregnskabsloven 
(ii) Ministerial Orders promulgated by the Ministry of Business and Industry 
Bookkeeping Order 
BogforingsbekendtgOrelsen 
Financial Statement Order 
Arsregnskabsbekendtgorelsen 
(iii) Ministerial guidelines issued by the Ministry of Business and Industry 
Ministerial Guideline concerning Bookkeeping 
Nfinisterial Guideline concerning Group Accounts 
(iv) information Obligation for Issuers of Listed Securities (Oplysningsforpligtelser for udstedere of 
borsnoterede vardipapirer) published by the Copenhagen Stock Exchange 
2. Rules issued by Institute o State-Authorized Public Accountants 
Fo ningen af Statsautoris! Erede Revisorer. FSR 
Danish Accounting Standards issued by the Accounting Panel (Regnskabspanelet) 
Regnskabsvejledninger 
3. Rules issued by non-authoritative bodies 
(i) Commentaries on accounting regulation 
Arsregnskaber - Kommentarer til regnskabs-lovgivningen 
(ii) Professional Journals 
Revision & Regnskabsvxsen 
Revisorbladet 
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United Kingdom 
The legislation of accounting has traditionally been rather unimportant in the UK. 
Instead, accounting regulation has been largely developed by the audit profession 
and issued as statements of 'best accounting practice'. However, in recent years 
accounting standards and legislation have become increasingly 'intertwined' in the 
UK (Bromwich and Hopwood, 1992). The Companies Act of 1985 provided for a 
much more complete codification of accounting regulation by introducing the EC 
Fourth Directive. It was, however, the Dearing report, published in 1988, which 
introduced the radical reforms to the UK accounting regulatory system in 1990, 
when the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) together with a set of constituted 
bodies took over responsibility for the preparation of accounting standards from 
the Accounting Standards Committee (ASC). The present regulatory arrangements 
are described below. 
The Companies Act 1981 implemented the EC Fourth Directive which introduced 
legal requirements in company law concerning the form and content of accounts, as 
well as basic accounting principles such as accruals, consistency and prudence. 
Hence, a substantial part of accounting regulation that had previously been 
delegated to the accounting profession was now regulated by company law 
(Gordon and Gray, 1994). Like the Fourth Directive, the Seventh Directive, 
implemented by the Companies Act 1989, extended the scope of company law into 
areas which had previously been the preserve of accounting standards. Also, it 
incorporated the legislative changes that the Dearing Report recommended and this 
resulted in an enhanced position for accounting standards. In particular, the 1989 
Companies Act introduced a requirement for the directors of large companies to 
state whether the annual accounts are in accordance with applicable accounting 
standards and to indicate details and reasons for any material departures. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the British government, in implementing 
the legal reforms to the status of accounting standards, explicitly avoided giving 
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statutory force to accounting standards and instead endorsed the view that 
standard setting should remain a private sector activity in the UK 17 . 
As shown in Figure 3.3, the present regulatory structure is placed under the 
umbrella of a Financial Reporting Council (FRC) which is responsible for the 
general guidance of the ASB with regard to policies and work programme and for 
securing sufficient financing for the regulatory system's. The Chairman and the 
three deputy chairmen are representatives from the profession, the Stock Exchange 
and the industry and are all appointed by the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry and the Governor of the Bank of England. It is important to note, that 
formally the FRC has no say in the development of specific policies for inclusion in 
any individual standard (Turley, 1992). The actual responsibility for setting 
standards goes to the members of the Accounting Standards Board (ASB), 
appointed by the FRC. The Board publishes standards on its own authority and 
these are not subject to formal approval by the FRC or other groups. The ASB is 
supported by a full-time Chairman and a technical Director as well as by ten part- 
time members. 
The element which is concerned with the enforcement aspects of the system, is the 
Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP). This Panel is independent of the ASB 
and was established by the FRC to examine the non-compliance of accounting 
standards by large companies. The Panel is headed by a lawyer and has 20 
members appointed by the FRC. The actions of the Review Panel have so far been 
confined to obtaining the agreement of the companies concerned that they will 
amend non-compliance in subsequent years (Cooke and Wallace, 1995). However, 
the Panel also might ask that accounts be reissued, and if necessary, might even 
17 The Dearing recommendations on presumption of support for standards in the courts, and that 
the burden of proof should be on those justifying departure'frorn standard accounting practice 
were also rejected by the Governrnent because, similarly, they were considered too close to giving 
standards statutory authority (Turley, 1992). 
" The FRC's finances are provided to one third from the Department of Trade and Industry, to 
one third from the Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies (CCAB), with the balance 
provided by the London Stock Exchange and the banking community. 
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institute court proceedings to require the company concerned to do so. By 1996 no 
such court action had been taken, although preliminary steps had been initiated 
(Hopwood and Vieten, 1998). 
A further element in the regulatory structure for financial reporting in the UK, is 
the Urgent Issues Task Force (UITF) which was created in 1991 as a committee of 
the ASB. Its duty is to respond to urgent issues not covered satisfactorily by 
existing company law and accounting standards, either in the case of new and 
emergent areas of accounting or where controversial interpretations of extant 
regulations are developing. Albeit subject to acceptance by the ASB, the 
conclusions of the Task Force are published in abstract form. These abstracts are 
not mandatory, but are expected to be observed, as they form the basis for what 
determines a 'true and fair view'(Gordon and Gray, 1994). 
Since FRS 5, 'Reporting the Substance of Transactions', was issued in April 1994, 
accountants have been required to assess and report the 'economic reality' of the 
reporting entity. The perceived need for a standard to regulate the reporting of the 
substance of transactions has followed the growth of multidivisional firms and off 
balance sheet financing schemes. Rather than formalising innovations ex post, the 
ASB attempts to shape accounting in the name of a wider set of principles 
(Tweedy and Whittington, 1990). However, even though the economic impact of 
new accounting rules has been explicitly integrated as an argument in the rule- 
making process by the ASB, it would be incorrect to generalise that economic 
substance prevails in the totality of UK accounting rules. In fact, only recent rules 
have been issued by the ASB, while the majority of standards are those issued by 
the old ASC. 
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Figure 3.3 
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Ireland 
Traditionally, Ireland has closely linked the regulation of accounting to the UK 
regulatory framework and this dependence was maintained to a large extent after 
the recent reforms of the UK accounting system and the establishment of the ASB 
in London. 
In fact, Ireland is represented via both the Government and the accountancy 
profession in the UK! s FRC, although it is not a member of the ASB. However, 
there appears to be substantial informal contact between the ASB and the Irish 
accountancy profession - particularly the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Ireland (ICAI) which promulgates the ASB's standards in Ireland with the 
approval of the Irish Government (Cahill, 1998). 
It should be noted, however, that there are important differences in the regulatory 
frameworks of accounting between Ireland and the UK, and these have 
implications for the monitoring and enforcement of accounting standards in 
Ireland. Firstly, unlike the Companies A cts in the UK, Irish Company Law does 
not legally endorse the standards issued by the'ASB. In fact, in Ireland, even 
though the standards issued by the ASB are applicable, there is no equivalent 
statutory support. The authority of ASB standards is based only on the legal 
requirement that accounts must give a true and fair view as provisioned in the Irish 
Company Act of 1986 (Quinn and Sorensen, 1997). Secondly, the UK's Review 
Panel does not monitor Irish companies and as there is no corresponding Irish 
Review Panel, the function of enforcing standards remains with the auditor. 
it is worth mentioning, however, that Irish listing rules require public companies to 
comply not only with national company law but also with UK accounting 
standards, as well as US GAAP and IAS. Figure 3.4 summarises the framework of 
accounting regulation in Ireland. 
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The Netherlands 
in the Netherlands, accounting regulation is based on two principal sources: 
Parliamentary legislation and the Guidelines (Richtlijnen) published by the Council 
on Annual Reporting (Raad voor de Jdarverslaggeving). The Enterprise Chamber 
(Ondemehmingskamer) has contributed jurisprudence to a number of financial 
. reporting cases. Also, the theoretical works of individual accountants have played 
an influential role in reporting practice, while other, regulatory bodies such as the 
stock exchange are relatively unimportant. Table 3.9 summarises the Dutch 
financial reporting regime. 
The legislative source of financial reporting regulation is the Dutch parliament 
which enacts, upon the initiative of the Ministry of Justice, relevant legislation in 
Title 9, Book 2 of the Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek). The Social and Economic 
Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad, SER), which represents employers and 
employees as well as individual experts, has the function of providing advice on 
draft legislation. In parliament, draft law passes through the second chamber 
(Tweede Kamer) before the first chamber (Eerste Kamer) decides upon the final 
approval of the proposed legislation. Large sections of the Civil Code relating to 
financial reporting are, however, restricted to disclosure requirements, while the 
code contains only some general clauses concerning the valuation of assets and 
liabilities (Klaassen and Heekers, 1995). In order to comply with European 
Company Law Directives, the Ministry of Justice has issued a number of 
administrative orders containing more detailed rules with regard to the layout of 
the financial statements" and the application of current value accounting20. 
With regard to the financial sector, sections of company law dealing with the 
financial reporting of banks and insurance companies were included in Title 9 of 
19 Besluit tot vaststelling van model schema's voor de inrichting van jaarrekening, Staamblad, 
30.12.1983, no. 666. 
20 Besluit houdende regels voor de inhoud, de grenzen en de wijze van toepassing in de 
jaarrekening van waardering van activa tegen actuele waarde, Staatsblad , 30.12.1983, no. 665. 
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Book 2 of the Civil Code in 1993. In the same year, an administrative order 
implemented further detailed regulations concerning the financial statements of 
bankS21. 
Compliance with the law is enforced by a special court, the Enterprise Chamber 
(Ondemeluningskamer, OK), which is a chamber of the Court of Justice in 
Amsterdam, and specialises in disputes between companies and other parties with 
an interest in financial reporting. Since it was instituted in 1977, the Chamber has 
given its verdict in approximately fifty complaints. However, in recent years the 
number of new cases has declined. In fact, most of the complaints had been put 
forward by the Foundation to Investigate Company Reporting (Stichting 
Onderzoek Bedriffs-Infonnatie, SOBI), a public interest group concerned with the 
quality of financial reporting, but which has withdrawn from this activity in the last 
few years". The judicial rulings of the OK, especially when they enjoy general 
application, have the status of law in the Netherlands (Zeff et aL 1992). 
The lack of comprehensive and detailed accounting legislation in the Netherlands, 
has provided the initiative for the Council on Annual Reporting (Raad voor de 
Jdarverslaggeving, RJ) and its predecessor, the Tripartite Accounting Study 
Group (Tripartite Overleg, TO) to define accounting regulations that are 
4 23 acceptable in the economic and social climate' . Without granting legal 
recognition to the RJ, this view was confirmed by the Minister of Justice in the 
Explanatory Memorandum which accompanied the draft law on the 
implementation of the Fourth Directive 24 . However, even though self-regulation 
has been stimulated by the Ministry of Justice in the Netherlands and, moreover, 
the SER still provides two-thirds of the RJ's financial support, neither the 
21 Besluit houdende bepalingen voor de balans, de winst-en verliesrekening en de toelichtingen 
daarop van banken, Staatsblad, 27 May 1993, no. 259. 
22 Of the 45 cases dealing with financial reporting that were adjudicated by the Enterprise 
Chamber in 1991,21 had been brought by SOBI (Zeff et al. 1992). 
23 The Ministry of Justice suggested in 1969 that "organised business" and the organisation of 
auditors take an "inventory of valuation principles that are considered to be acceptable in the 
economic and social climate" and judge their acceptability (Zeff et al. 1992, p. 366). 
24 Bijlagen Handelingen Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1979-1980,16326, No. 3. 
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government nor the SER have become involved itself in the RJ's policies or 
monitored its operations. 
Formally, the RJ was instituted in 1981 by the Foundation on Annual Reporting 
(Stichting voor de Jaarverslaggeving) and in particular by industry organisations, 
employer's federations, trade unions and the Dutch Institute of Registered 
Accountants (NivRA)', to issue pronouncements and recommendations on financial 
reporting (Buijink and Eken, 1998). Before final guidelines are issued, exposure 
drafts are published to permit comments by all interested parties. The Guidelines 
may have either the status of affirmative pronouncements (if printed in bold type- 
face) which companies should not depart from, or that of advisory statements, 
which are less authoritative. However, it is worth mentioning that if a company 
does not comply with an affirmative pronouncement, it is not obliged to mention or 
justify this departure in the notes to the accounts. Even though it is the policy of 
the Council on Annual Reporting to include relevant decisions of the Enterprise 
Chamber as part of its Guidelines,. the Chamber itself does not acknowledge the 
Guidelines in its verdicts. Finally NIvRA, although contributing to the set up of the 
Ri and representing the Dutch audit profession in negotiations on the drafting of 
the Richtlijnen, has never required its members to follow the Guidelines. But it 
encourages the use of them in a more informal waY25. In summary, no authority 
enforces the compliance with the Guidelines issued by the RJ and the status of the 
Guidelines is a contentious question 26 
Although the Royal Netherlands Institute for Registered Accountants (Koninkiijk 
Nederlands Instituut van Registeraccountants, NIvRA) is member of the RJ, the 
influence of the Netherlands Order of Accountants and Administrative Consultants 
(Nederlandse Orde van Account-Administratie consulenten, NOVAA) on 
accounting regulation has not been established, as it is only since 1993, when the 
Dutch parliament passed a law implementing the Eighth EC Directive, that 
25 NIvRA's Consultative Committee on Published Auditors' Reports has sought to use quiet 
ersuasion with auditors concerning apparent departures. 
6 See Zeff et al. (1992) pp. 335-337. 
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accountants who are represented by NOVAA have been able to carry out the 
statutory audit of large and medium-sized companies (Buijink and Eken, 1998). 
Theodor Limperg Jr. (1879-1961), professor of business economics 
(bedrffseconomie) and auditing, had a profound influence on auditors and 
accountants with his theory of replacement value. In fact, replacement value 
accounting had been established in reporting practice (Muis, 1975) long before the 
Dutch legislature made it a statute when implementing the Fourth Directive in 
1983. 
The Stock Exchange Association (Vereniging voor de Effectenhandeo has issued a 
number of rules for financial reporting of companies quoted on the Amsterdam 
Stock exchange, which are not referred to in Company Law. These regulations are, 
however, limited to the publication of an interim financial statement and a 
prospectus as well as the obligation to reveal significant information which could 
impact on share prices. But the Association does not impose additional rules on the 
layout and the content of the annual financial statements. 
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Table 3.9 
The sources of accounting regulation in the Netherlands 
.............................................. 
Legislation 
.. ................................................. ..... 
Standard 
....................................................... 
Recommendation 
Parliament Council for Annual Reporting Royal Netherlands Institute 
(Raad voor de Jaarverslaggevingfi for Registered Accountants 
Social and Economic Council 
NUnistry of Justice Netherlands Order of 
Accountants and 
Administrative Consultants 
Civil Code, Title 9, Book 2 Guidelines for Annual Reportini. Individual contributions 
: (Burgerlijk Wetboek) ' '. (Richdiinen voor de 
Jaarverslaggeving) I..... ......................................................... 
Administrative Order on the 
formats for financial statements 
(Besluit tot vaststelling van 
mode1schema's voor de 
inrichting van jaarrekening) 
Staatsblad, 30-12.1983, no. 666 
Administrative Order on the 
valuation of assets 
(Besluit houdende regels voor 
: de inhoud, de grenzen en de 
wijze van toepassing in de 
jaarrekening van waardering 
van activa tegen actuele waarde):: 
Staatsblad, 30.12.1983, no. 665 
Enterprise Chamber 
Court Rulings 
...................................... 
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3.5 Summary 
Across Europe, there are vast differences in the regulatory regimes of accounting. 
Even though all the countries make use of law for the regulation of accounting, the 
intensity of legal rules and their relative importance in comparison to the influence 
of the standard setting agencies varies from country to country. Within Europe, 
there are countries where accounting legislation is confined to a single source; that 
is, legislation enacted by parliament, while other countries employ a hierarchy of 
laws and delegated legal instruments. With regard to standard setting bodies, the 
spectrum ranges from agencies of the government, whose rules are accepted as 
part of the law, to private bodies set up by the profession whose standards have no 
legal status. However, such standards may have been granted formal authority by 
other institutions including the stock exchange. In addition, the scope and 
relevance of recommendations varies from country to country and fill a regulatory 
vacuum, particularly in countries where the standard setting body is either 
unimportant or absent. Despite attempts to harmonise the accounting rules 
between countries, firstly, in the form of EC Company Law and currently in the 
form of International Accounting Standards, the institutional structures and forms 
of accounting regulation continue to differ from one nation state to another. 
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PART 11 
ACCOUNTING DIVERSITY IN EUROPE: 
THREE REPRESENTATIVE AREAS OF 
ACCOUNTING POLICY 
94 
CHAPTER4 
REGULATORY STRATEGIES IN INDIVIDUAL 
ACCOUNTING AREAS 
Notwithstanding national differences in the institutional arrangements of 
accounting regulation, the diversity of regulatory strategies in accounting can be 
more completely understood when specific areas of rule-making are compared. 
Each instance of accounting policy emerges from a different constellation of 
actors, theories and external economic and political factors, all of which affect the 
rule-making process. Moreover, the regulatory structures of accounting are subject 
to transformation over time, which results in the involvement of different 
institutions and alterations in the allocation of power. This has implications not 
only on the authority of a rule but also on its design. 
In this study, three representative accounting areas have been chosen to describe 
the diversity of institutional structure and regulatory design of European 
accounting regulation: asset revaluation, accounting for foreign currency 
translation and the definition of a subsidiary for consolidation. Through 
examination of these areas, it can be seen how the regulatory instruments 
governing a specific issue can vary from law to standards and recommendations 
and, in addition, how their design may differ from one jurisdiction to another. From 
the comparison of different accounting policies rather than different national 
accounting regimes, it can be concluded that regulatory strategies vary not only 
between countries, but also between different instances of accounting policy within 
the same country. 
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These three instances of accounting policy have been chosen because they 
represent considerable differences in regulatory form when regulating similar 
accounting problems between European countries. They comprise both individual 
and consolidated financial statements and affect measurement and recognition in 
the financial statement. All three areas have been described as potentially falling 
into the devices of . 'window dressing' and off-balance sheet financing (Naser, 
1994). They also have been subject to harmonisation efforts through the EC 
company law's Fourth Directive (revaluation of fixed assets) and Seventh Directive 
(definition of a subsidiary). In contrast, foreign currency reporting was not dealt 
with in EC company law, but, instead was dealt with in the harmonisation 
programme of the IASC (IAS 21). 
Furthermore, these three areas are fundamental to accounting research and 
academic theorisation. Firstly, asset valuation has been central to accounting theory 
throughout the 20th century as evidenced in the debate on the 'correct' method to 
account for inflation (Schmalenbach, 1921; Schmidt, 1,921; Limperg, 1937; 
Edwards and Bell, 1961; Watts and Zimmermann, 1978). Secondly, and related to 
the issue of valuation, the effects of currency fluctuations on financial statements 
have generated extensive theoretical and empirical studies on the consequences of 
different translation methods with regard to both foreign subsidiaries and foreign 
transactions (Busse van Colbe, 1972; Nobes, 1980; Gebhardt 1987; Rezaee, 1990; 
Soo and Soo, 1994; Flower, 1995). Finally, the scope of consolidated accounts, 
and hence the definition of a subsidiary has been subject to theorisation and 
discussion in the accounting literature (Petite, 1984; Odenwald, 1992; Hadden, 
1992). 
Mosi importantly, all three areas of accounting policy have been subject to 
controversial regulatory debates, both within and among nations. Asset valuation 
has a long history of regulatory debate centring on prescriptive (price-level- 
adjustment) as opposed to more judgemental methods (current value, replacement 
value) of asset valuation which took place for instance in the UK (PSSAP7, 
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SSAP16, SSAP19, ED 51, FRS 5, FRED 17) but also, as will be seen, in other 
European countries. In the Fourth Directive, the issue of revaluation remained 
optional and open to definition by individual member states. 
The degree of contention on foreign currency reporting rules in Europe can be 
demonstrated by the fact that the issue was not included in the EC company law 
harmonisation programme (Accounting Advisory Forum, 1995). In particular, the 
accounting for foreign currency transactions remains unresolved among European 
member states (Accountancy; April - 1998, p. 7 1). As will be seen, translation rules 
are a particularly good example of the different authoritative sources of accounting 
regulation to which reporting companies are subject in Europe. 
The third area of accounting, the definition of a subsidiary company for 
consolidation, is a prime example of regulatory disagreement with regard to legal 
(formal) group control as opposed to actual economic Oudgemental) group 
control. Indeed, the topic was described as one of the most controversial during 
the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Seventh Directive (van Hulle and 
van der Tas, 1995). It was not possible for the national regulators to reach a 
satisfactory solution but only a compromise in which consolidation was made 
compulsory under legal control, while econon-dc control was retained as a member 
state option. 
Part Two of this thesis is concerned with the different regulatory approaches in 
Europe for these three areas of accounting policy. The preceding historical 
perspective on the origins of rule development serves to explain the current diverse 
strategies between nations. Furthermore, for each area, the different regulatory 
forms are related to observed European reporting practices. 
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CHAPTER5 
FIXED ASSET REVALUATION 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the development of different revaluation strategies and 
compares, across European countries, the current regulatory framework with 
respect to both the sources and the design of ffixed asset revaluation rules. It then 
considers how the different regulatory forms are interpreted and consequently 
affect the content of accounting practices in the policy notes published in the 
annual reports of European companies. 
5.2 A historical perspective 
An early instance of asset revaluation in Europe is to be found in Denmark where 
the assessment of land and buildings for tax purposes, which dates back to the 
1840s, led to the introduction of such values into the annual accounts of Danish 
companies (Christiansen, 1995). However, throughout Europe, the factor which 
brought about proposals for an alternative to historic cost accounting was the 
incidence of inflation itself. In fact, the theoretical foundations as well as the 
practical application of accounting for the effect of changing Prices both evolved in 
Germany during the period of hyperinflation after the first world war. In these 
circumstances the inadequacies of financial statements based on historic cost were 
already self evident by the beginning of the 1920's. The experience of exceptionally 
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high price increases led to not one but two solutions in Germany: purchasing 
power accounting on the one hand and current cost accounting on the other. That 
is, while the German accounting theorists Schmalenbach (1921) and Mahlberg 
(1923) were the proponents of indexing, based respectively on a price index and 
the gold standard, it was another German (Schmidt, 1921) who advocated current 
values in the form of replacement cost. 
These two fundamentally different approaches to revaluation were taken up and 
further developed by accountants in other countries. The German experiments with 
purchasing power indexation based on the gold standard influenced French 
accounting thought, as the work of Delavelle (1924) and Faure (1926) shows. It is 
now known that Schmidt's replacement cost accounting ideas were taken up in the 
Netherlands some time before 1925 (Carrifferman and Zeff, 1994) and they were 
provided with a rigorous analytical framework by the Dutch accountant Limperg 
whose theory of current value was published in the 1930s as part of his broader 
treatise on bedriffseconomie (Limperg, 1937). 
Under the conditions of hyperinflation that persisted during the 1920s, 
contemporaneous accounting practices in Germany and in France were such that 
the conversion of the currencies into gold as a standard value was usually confined 
to balance sheets. The German Goldmarkbilanzgesetz of 1924 was the first legal 
attempt to 'stabilise' the balance sheet (Sweeney, 1927), in this instance with 
respect to the value of gold. A similar regulatory approach was taken by the fiscal 
authorities in France in 1930 when the Direction des Contributions accepted the 
practice of revaluing depreciable fixed assets on the basis of the relation between 
the franc and the dollar price of gold (franc-or) for each year from 1914 to 1928. 
It mziy be noted that this decision was reversed by the Conseil d' Etat in a Decree 
dated 14 November 1938 which required that depreciation should be calculated 
only on the basis of historic cost (Collins, 1994). 
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In the Netherlands, the legislation of 1928/29, although not prescribing a valuation 
method, acknowledged the existence of alternatives in practice by requiring 
companies to disclose the method used (Zeff et al., 1992). 
In Denmark during this period, a different approach to accounting for the effect of 
changing prices was adopted in law, based on the longstanding practice, which had 
developed beyond the law, of using taxable values for revaluation in the accounts. 
The Aktieselskabslov (Companies Act) of 1930 contained the first Danish 
authorization to revalue fixed assets that had experienced a permanent increase in 
value (Christiansen and Elling, 1993). However, as the valuation basis was not 
defined in the law, the outcome was to legitimate the use by companies of tax 
assessments as a basis for asset valuation in annual accounts (Christiansen, 1995). 
The aftermath of the Second World War 
Accounting for changing prices soon reemerged as an important issue throughout 
Europe following the Second World War. Germany experienced yet another 
currency collapse which led to the introduction of the Deutsche Mark on 20 June 
1948. A new law, the Deutsche Mark Er6ffnungshilanzgesetz, was ratified on 21 
August 1949, and required all balances to be restated in the new currency for both 
financial reporting and tax purposes. Companies were given the right to use current 
values as at the end of August 1949 or alternatively one year earlier as at August, 
31,1948 (Most, 1977). Following this, the German legislator returned to historical 
cost accounting and has not authorized any departure since then. 
In France, following the Second World War, revaluation based on purchasing 
pow6r accounting continued and was now promoted by the Government as well as 
official accounting bodies such as the Ordre des Experts Comptables and the 
Conseil National de la Comptabiliti (CNC). In fact, if a company did not revalue, 
it had to pay a tax penalty of 2% on turnover (Collins, 1994). An Ordonnance 
issued on 15 August 1945 and a Law dated 14 May 1948, gave companies the 
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right to revalue their assets. This right was eventually cancelled by the Law of 28 
December 1959, but companies were given the possibility to carry out further 
revaluations up until 31 December 1962. The revaluation of each specific category 
of depreciating fixed asset as well as its accumulated depreciation was based on the 
application of published indices. 
In the Netherlands during this period, although there were no changes to the 
regulations, Limperg's system of vervangingswaarde (replacement value) 
accounting was adopted in practice by some of the larger Dutch companies, 
notably Phillips from the period 1945-46 onwards (Brink, 1992). 
The effect of inflation on accounts was also considered in the UK at this time by 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) which put 
forward two proposals, N12 'Rising price levels in relation to accounts' in 1949 
and N15 'Accounting in relation to the purchasing power of money' in 1952. 
However, the proposals rejected any form of inflation accounting, whether by 
replacement cost or by general index methods, and recommended that historical 
cost should continue to be the basis of published accounts. Instead, the ICAEW 
advocated appropriations of profits to reserves, rather than charges against profits, 
as a means of recognising in the accounts the excess of reported profits over 
inflation-adjusted profits. However, by the time the propos. als were made public, 
the rate of inflation and interest in the subject had both fallen. Nevertheless, the 
ICAEW continued to discuss the problem of accounting under inflationary 
conditions and, in 1968, published its report entitled 'Accounting for Stewardship 
in a Period of Inflation'. The report argued in favour of the current purchasing 
power method and strongly influenced subsequent developments on this issue in 
the fJK (Westwick, 1980). 
Elsewhere in Europe, the impact of inflation on accounting was invariably 
regulated by the national tax authorities using price-level adjustments to accounts. 
In this context, fiscal revaluation laws were enacted in Italy and Spain, Greece and 
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in each case the treatment required or permitted for tax purposes was also made 
mandatory in the annual accounts. In Italy several price-level adjustment laws were 
adopted (RD No. 2325 in 1936, DL No. 436 in 1946, DL No. 49 in 1948, Law No. 
91 in 1949 and Law No. 74 in 1952) which authorized the revaluation of different 
categories of fixed assets. In Spain, the Ministry of Finance enacted Law 76 in 
1961 which permitted the restatement of fixed assets, but this had little effect on 
accounting practice due to a possible increase in tax liability (Fernandez Pefla, 
1992). In 1964, a new revaluation law No. 41 was issued which provided, that 
there would be no tax penalty for companies- which -complied, thus finding 
widespread acceptance in practice. 
Inflation in the 1970s 
The third wave of inflation to hit Europe was during the early 1970s and, as noted 
by Mumford (1979), this brought about a revival of the debate concerning the 
appropriate method of , accounting 
for price changes. This took place in the 
Netherlands and in the UK, and there was a radical change in policy in the UK 
from the purchasing power approach, which was originally favoured, to current 
cost accounting (Tweedie and Whittington, 1984). 
In the Netherlands, current cost accounting in the form. of replacement value 
accounting had been favoured by the Rijkens Committee and its follow-up 
committee, the Hamburger Comn-dttee, which was established by the employers' 
organisation in order to study the annual financial reporting of listed companies. 
The Committees proposed a valuation of fixed assets according to current values, 
if it was anticipated that the relevant assets would be replaced in future. 
Furtfiermore, the Committees recommended that depreciation on the basis of 
current value was necessary in order to calculate profits accurately. However, the 
Verdarn Committee, which was appointed by the Government to make proposals 
for a revision of company law did not share the view that current value accounting 
was superior to historic cost accounting but, instead, recommended both valuation 
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concepts. But although there was recognition of the need to account for increasing 
asset values, Dutch legislation in the 1970s continued to be imprecise with respect 
to the valuation method to be used in annual accounts. In fact, the laws on annual 
accounts of both 1970 and 1976, only required the minimum of disclosure 
regarding the valuation of assets and the measurement of profit. The law was 
centred on the notion -of a 'true and fair view' of income and capital based on 
principles satisfying criteria considered to be "acceptable in the economic and 
social life' (van Hoepen, 1984, p. 69). Muis (1975), reports that by 1972/73,4 out 
of a sample of 50 large companies published current value financial statements, 8 
applied a mixture of current value and historic cost and 38 reported on a historic 
cost basis with occasional supplementary current value information. 
In the UK, rising price levels had caused the newly-formed Accounting Standards 
Steering Committee (ASSC) to consider inflation accounting as one of the first 
priorities of its programme. Indeed, it was in 1971 that the ASSC Plenary 
Committee published its discussion paper entitled 'Inflation and Accounts' which 
advocated the current purchasing power method, although only as supplementary 
to historic cost accounting. This report eventually formed the basis for the 1973 
exposure draft ED 8 'Accounting for changes in the purchasing power of money' 
which again suggested current purchasing power. However, the apparent 
consensus on the use of a price index system in preference to current cost 
accounting was overturned by the British Government. Just before the discussion 
period for ED 8 was due to expire, it was announced that an independent 
committee of enquiry (the Sandilands Committee) would be set up. Nevertheless, 
the accelerating inflation rate prompted the ASSC to issue in 1974 a provisional 
accounting standard PSSAP No. 7 'Accounting for changes in the purchasing 
power of money' based on ED 8, although this standard was itself abandoned in 
1975 in favour of the Sandilands recommendations which had Government 
backing. The Sandilands, Report rejected the use of general purchasing power 
indices in favour of current cost accounting as the best form of accounting in a 
period of inflation. Furthermore, the report proposed the use of current cost 
93 
accounting as the basis for the main published accounts, and not merely for 
supplementary statements, thus expressing outright opposition to the approach 
seen-dngly favoured by the profession at the time. On the basis of the Sandilands 
Report, the professional standard-setters were given the task of producing an 
inflation accounting standard. ED 18 'Current Cost Accounting' was issued by the 
-Inflation Accounting 
Steering Group in 1976. However, this exposure draft was 
rejected soon afterwards by a resolution of a special meeting of the ICAEW in July 
1977 when its members were opposed to the compulsory character of current cost 
statements as well as to their complexity and, finally, their application to all 
companies irrespective of size. - In response, the ASC issued interim 
recommendations on inflation accounting known as the 'Hyde Guidelines' in 
November 1977, before producing its next exposure draft ED 24 in 1979. This 
eventually became the first British current cost accounting standard, SSAP 16 
'Current Cost Accounting', in 1980. The essential features of the compromise in 
the Hyde Guidelines, such as the gearing adjustment and the minimum requirement 
of current cost accounts as supplementary financial statements for leading 
companies only, were retained in SSAP 16. However the accounting standard was 
short-lived and was eventually suspended in 1985, due to widespread non- 
compliance and also as a result of the decreasing rate of inflation. 
In Germany, in 1975 in the light of renewed discussions brought about by the oil 
price rise and the world-wide inflationary shock, the Haupyachausschuss of the 
Institut der Wirtschaftspriifer (the Main Technical Committee of the IdW) issued a 
recommendation 'Zur BerUcksichtigung der Substanzerhaltung bei der Ermittlung 
des Jahresergebnisses' (Accounting for capital maintenance in the measurement of 
company profits) for companies to provide supplementary information restricted to 
certain adjustments to reported income. These adjustments were limited to those 
assets which were equity-financed (Coenenberg and Macharzina, 1976). The 
opinion was influenced by a number of voluntary disclosures at the time (Portland 
Zement Heidelberg AG, Siemens AG and Mannesmann AG etc. ) and followed 
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Schmidt's organische Tageswerthilanz (organic current value balance sheet) 
approach (Coenenberg, 1991). 
In France, interestingly, some companies carried out asset revaluations even when 
these were not initiated by a specific Government law. It seems that these were 
tolerated by the authorities even though the Commercial Code did not permit 
revaluation except under explicit authorization. However, since these 
rUvaluations libres (free revaluations) incurred a tax penalty on the unrealized 
gain, they were usually applied only by loss-making companies, as profitable 
companies were reluctant to revalue assets unless under fiscally-neutral 
Government action (Scheid and Walton, 1992). The CNC became involved in 
1974, when it disallowed the practice of offsetting losses against the revaluation 
reserve, and expressed the view that the Government should bring to an end the 
legal uncertainty with respect to revaluation. In response, the Government initiated 
a new revaluation in 1977, again using a price-level adjustment approach. The 
effect on company accounts was spread over two years by the Finance Acts of 
1977/1978 which, although permitting companies some discretion in revaluing all 
their fixed assets (tangible, intangible and financial) at "utility value", specified that 
the revalued amounts could not exceed the ceilings obtained by applying the 
appropriate published indices (Collins, 1994). 
Elsewhere, in both Italy and Spain, the inflation of the 1970s resulted in further 
price-level adjustments, which were regulated as before by the national tax 
authorities. While Italy saw only one further price-level adjustment, Law No. 576 
in 1975, in Spain there were several revaluation laws during this period (Law 12 in 
1973, Law 50 in 1977, Law I in 1979, Law 74 in 1980 and Law 9 in 1983) which 
adjusted tangible and other fixed assets in accordance with the general price level. 
It is interesting to note that the Spanish company Telef6nica revalued its tangible 
fixed assets virtually each year from 1967 to 1987 based on specific rights given by 
the State and had also done so before in 1946. However, a change in the 
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contractual arrangements between Telef6nica and the State has prevented such 
revaluations since 1988 (Fernandez Pefia, 1992). 
The impact of the 4th Directive 
The implementation of the Fourth Directive in the European Community had the 
effect of forcing national legislators to re-consider their position with respect to the 
method of valuation to be used in annual accounts. Article 33 of the Directive 
authorized countries to allow or to require 'alternative valuation methods' and 
therefore to depart from historic cost accounting. However, the Directive did not 
specify the method to be used to account for the effect of either general or specific 
price increases, clearly a result of the variety of approaches existing in Member 
States at the time (van Hulle and van der Tas, 1995). Instead, in those cases where 
the option of 'alternative valuation methods' was to be allowed or required by 
local law, the text of Article 33 delegates the definition of revaluation methods and 
their mode of application to each country. 
In the final version of the Directive, enacted in 1978, Article 33(l) makes reference 
to alternative valuation methods as follows, 
e (a) the replacement value method for tangible fixed assets with limited useful 
economic lives and stocks 
(b) valuation methods other than that provided for in (a) which are designed to 
take account of inflation for the items shown in the annual accounts, including 
capital and reserves 
e (c) revaluation of tangible fixed assets and financial fixed assets 
According to van Hulle and van der Tas (1995, P-999-p. 1003), the replacement 
value method mentioned in (a) above was specified in the Directive at the request 
of the Netherlands in 1968 as it was applied by a number of Dutch companies at 
this time. With respect to (b), the option to allow "valuation by methods other than 
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the replacement value method, which take into account current values" was 
included in the draft Directive in 1974, notably at the request of the UK. Finally, in 
the case of (c), it was the Belgian delegation which proposed the option for 
companies to "revalue tangible fixed assets at fair values". In fact, during the 
discussions leading to the final text of the Directive, the scope of application of the 
'alternative valuation methods' was considerably narrowed, but opposed only by 
Germany. 
In Belgium, the Law of 17 July 1975 with its associated Royal Decree of 8 
October 1976 was the first national accounting law to be based on the Fourth 
Directive, in this case a draft of the Directive (Lefebvre, 1984). Previously, 
Belgium had little accounting legislation (the principal exception was the 1973 
Royal Decree on financial and economic information for industrial relations 
councils). The Royal Decree of 1976 authorized companies "to revalue in the case 
of certain and permanent surplus values, fixed assets, intangible assets and fixed 
financial assets (Art. 34)" and "to use replacement values for recording tangible 
fixed assets and inventories (Art. 35)"; however, the adjustment of accounts for 
inflation was prohibited (Lefebvre, 1984, p. 17). The reason for not adopting 
inflation accounting was given in the Report to the King as "having regard to the 
general practice both in this country and abroad, as well as to the fiscal provisions, 
the decree retains acquisition cost as the principal valuation rule. In the absence of 
accepted opinion or tried and tested methods of inflation accounting, the 
government does not intend to permit, still less enforce, their adoption before 
practical experience, particularly abroad makes a proper appreciation of the 
advantages, disadvantages and risks possible. " (Lefebvre and Flower, 1994, 
P. 100). 
Belgian companies were only able to use replacement cost for a few years because 
the Royal Decree of 12 September 1983 removed this option, as it appeared that 
few enterprises were using replacement cost and '$elgium felt incapable' of 
defining the replacement cost method, "given the lack of a consensus at the 
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international level to which reference could be made in determining the principles 
and the means of applying this method". Lefebwe and Flower (1994, p. 101) 
indicate that companies that wanted to use the replacement cost method could 
submit a request for derogation to the official Commission for Accounting 
Standards. In fact, as replacement cost accounting was not accepted by the tax 
authorities for the purpose of determining taxable income, Belgian companies 
generally opted generally for a valuation at acquisition cost, which was also 
accepted for tax purposes (Jorissen and Block, 1995). Thus, after initially allowing 
replacement cost accounting, the Belgian lawmakers eventually adopted the 
general notion of Art. 33.1 (c) of the Directive without specifying a 'revaluation 
method'. 
Denmark was the first country to base its company law on the final version of the 
Fourth Directive in 1981 and, like Belgium, exercised the option contained in Art. 
33.1 (c); that is, the revaluation of tangible and financial fixed assets. Similarly, the 
Danish legislature did not specify the revaluation method in law. The revaluation of 
assets had been allowed in Denmark since the 1930 Companies Act, but now 
depreciation had to be based on the revalued amount. This was not a general 
practice at the time (Elling and Hansen, 1984). In 1994, a draft accounting 
standard ED 11 (Sec. 69) mentioned that assets may be revalued if their utility 
value is significantly higher than their book value (Christiansen and Hansen, 1995, 
p. 817). 
The UK, by including the provisions of the 4th Directive in the 1981 amended 
Companies Act, for the first time gave statutory support to current cost accounting 
which had previously been a matter of professional standards (Nobes and Parker, 
1984). As a result of this legislation, companies could prepare pure historic cost 
accounts or alternatively incorporate certain assets at revaluation, or they could 
prepare pure current cost accounts. With respect to fixed assets, the Companies 
Act permits the valuation of intangible fixed assets (other than goodwill) at current 
cost, tangible fixed assets either at market value or current cost and fixed 
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investments at either market value or on a basis which appears to the directors to 
be appropriate (Gordon and Gray, 1994). Companies are not required to value on 
a regular basis and may revalue individual assets only. As a result of "lobbying" by 
the property industry (Gordon and Gray, 1994, p. 127), SSAP 19 "Accounting for 
Investment Properties" was issued in 1981 which requires revaluation of such 
assets at open market value and specifically exempts investment property from 
depreciation. In May 1990, the ASC issued ED 51 "Accounting for Fixed Assets 
and Revaluations" which suggests that management should decide whether to 
apply historic cost or current value for each class of asset. In the case where 
current value is used, it should be kept up to date and no valuation more than five 
years old should be used. With respect to the valuation basis, the exposure draft 
proposes the open market value except where it cannot practically be determined, 
in which case the depreciated net replacement cost should be used. ED 52 is 
limited to intangible fixed assets and proposes that these assets may be carried at 
depreciated replacement cost if they satisfy certain recognition criteria (see Ernst 
and Young, 1994, p. 516). 
Similarly, the Netherlands put current value accounting onto the legal statute upon 
implementing the Fourth Directive in 1983. In fact, even though replacement cost 
accounting is traditionally assumed to have developed in the Netherlands, no 
reference to it existed in law until the 1983 revision of the Dutch Civil Code (van 
Hoepen, 1984). The legislators' original intention was to give preference under 
certain circumstances to current value accounting either in the financial statements 
or in the notes, but this was rejected by the Dutch parliament (Klaassen and 
Hekers, 1995). The final legal provision (Art. 384 (1)) allows the application of 
current values only for tangible and financial fixed assets and stocks in the annual 
accoilnts. Different definitions of current value were included in a separate general 
Administrative Order with a legal authority, issued by the Ministry of Justice on 22 
December 1983. These regulations distinguish between three types of current 
value; namely, (i) replacement value, which must be used if it is assumed that the 
asset will be replaced in due course, (ii) economic value, which ought to be applied 
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if replacement of the asset is unlikely and, finally, (iii) net realizable value which 
should be used if the business will not continue in future. However, according to 
Klaassen and Hekers (1995, p. 2132), the administrative order does not specify 
how to determine the replacement value. 
In France, since the implementation of the 4th Directive in 1984, Article 12 (4) of 
the Commercial Code authorizes the revaluation of tangible and financial fixed 
assets. The Government has thereby legitimised the previously 'tolerated'. 
rUvaluations libres (free revaluations) which some companies carried out beyond 
the scope of revaluation laws. By adopting Art. 33 (c) of the Directive, France 
seems to have changed from price-level accounting (enacted in 1945,1959 and 
1977n8) to a form of cur-rent value accounting. However, French law does not 
specify the revaluation method although guidance on valuation has been issued by 
the COB and the CNC in line with the earlier regulations issued in 1977; that is, 
'the amount which any prudent manager of a business would be prepared to pay 
for such an asset with regard to its usefulness to the business'. The utility value 
(valeur d'utilite) may be the "current value in an appropriate market or the 
restatement of the purchase price by either a general or a specific price index" 
(Griziaux, 1995, p. 1246). 
In contrast to the above, Germany remained resolute in support of historic cost, 
when the Fourth Directive was implemented in 1985. Indeed, in the minutes of the 
Council meeting at which the Fourth Directive was adopted in 1978, the German 
delegation explained that: "for reasons of monetary and economic policy, the 
Federal Government cannot accept valuation methods designed to take account of 
inflation as authorized by the Fourth Directive Art. 33 by way of derogation from 
the purchase price principle laid down in Art. 32. It will therefore not permit such 
valuation methods in the Federal Republic of Germany"' (Council Declaration 
No-10 entered in minutes of EC Council meeting 25 July 1978; see van Hulle and 
van der Tas, 1995, p-999). 
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When Spain implemented the Fourth Directive in 1989, the legislator's position did 
not change with respect to asset revaluation, as the new accounting regulations and 
the amendments to the PGC indicated that a company may revalue only if there is 
authorisation under a special revaluation law (L6pez Dfaz and Rivero Torre, 
1995). A further asset revaluation law in Spain was implemented in 1983 pursuant 
to the General State Budget law 9/1983. In June 1996 the Spanish Government 
issued again a fiscal revaluation law which authorises companies to revalue fixed 
assets according to inflation levels and involves a tax liability of 3% on the 
revaluation surplus. It is worth -mentioning that before 1996 several asset 
revaluations have taken place in the Basque country where companies are subject 
to regional tax regimes. Indeed, even though these independent revaluations have 
been questioned in court by the Spanish Government, the legal decision was in 
favour of the regions. 
Italy, the last EU country to implement the Fourth Directive, had seen further price 
level adjustment laws in 1983 (Law No. 72), in 1990 (Law No. 408) and 1991 (Law 
No. 413). Upon implementation of the Directive in 199 1, the opportunity for 
companies to revalue was restricted by the Codice Civile to special revaluation 
laws for years after 1992. 
In summary, the implementation of the 4th Directive had different effects on 
Member State company laws. It resulted in statutory reference to current values in 
a number of countries where there had been no mention beforehand in the law, in 
spite of its use in practice, and led to the adoption of current value accounting in 
some countries where previously only price indexing had been used. Other 
jurisdictions stipulated on implementing the Directive that revaluation is restricted 
to inflation indexing and authorisation by a special tax law. In only one case was 
Art. 33 not implemented in national law. The situation is summarised in Figure 5.1 
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53 The revaluation rules in Europe 
Although there are similarities in the ways rules have developed to account for 
changing prices, the current regulatory structures of revaluation rules differ with 
respect to both their design and sources. 
With regard to regulatory design, European countries are divided on the degree of 
formalism in revaluation rules. - In-Italy and Spain price-level-index laws authorise 
the revaluation of defined assets, during a limited time, in line with prescribed 
inflation indices, while in the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, France, Belgium and 
Denmark, regulations permit current value accounting or revaluation at the 
discretion of companies, which are allowed to judge the basis and timing of the 
revaluation of individual fixed assets. 
This diversity with respect to the revaluation of fixed assets can be explained in 
two ways. First, in those countries adopting price-level indexing, such revaluations 
have depended to a great extent on national fiscal policies. Second, in the 
remaining countries (except Germany where revaluation is not allowed), national 
legislators did not follow Art. 33 of the Directive in defining the "content and 
limits" of valuation methods nor the "rules for their application". Indeed, the 4th 
Directive gave countries considerable flexibility in determining revaluation 
methods, and commercial law typically only contains broad reference either to 
current cost or to revaluation. For instance, while the Companies Acts in the UK 
and Ireland refer to the three revaluation concepts of market value, current cost 
and directors' valuation, the approach adopted by the Dutch Civil Code is that of 
current value (actuele waarde) only. Even less precise on the issue is accounting 
legislation in Denmark, Belgium and France, where the laws refer only to 
revaluation, opskrivning in Denmark and rUvaluation in Belgium and France. 
Not only the policy design but also the authoritative sources of revaluation rules 
differ among European countries. In addition to parliamentary law, interpretative 
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documents that have been issued in some of these countries have led to further 
conceptual conflict: particularly, statements by the accounting profession in the UK 
and Ireland (SSAP 19, ED 5 1, ED 52) and in Denmark (ED 11), the ministerial 
order in the Netherlands and, in France, the guidelines issued by the accountancy 
bodies OEC and CNCC. In contrast, the source of revaluation rules in Belgium is 
confined to government decree and in Spain and Italy to fiscal law issued by the 
Ministry of Finance. 
The co-existence of different regulatory sources does not necessarily affect the 
regulatory detail of revaluation rules. For example, in the UK, the accounting 
profession does not define the revaluation concept contained in the Companies 
Act. Instead, the ASB requires the valuation of land and buildings by external 
valuers, and proposes in ED 51 the open market value, except in circumstances in 
which this cannot be determined (in which case the depreciated replacement cost 
should be used). The Danish exposure draft ED 11, which is limited to the 
valuation of tangible fixed assets, defines revaluation with respect to their utility 
value. The Dutch ministerial order defines three types of current value: 
replacement value, economic value and net realizable value, where current value 
is generally interpreted as replacement value unless the firrn will discontinue 
operations in future. In France, the CNCC and OEC issued further rules with 
respect to specific categories of assets, which include market price (prix du 
marche) or replacement value (valeur de reconstitution) for tangible fixed assets. 
According to Raffegeau et al. (1989) the legal interpretation suggests that 
revaluation should be based on the concept of utility value (valeur d'utiliti) as 
applied on the occasion of the last legal revaluation in 1977. In order to determine 
this value, the enterprise may use the most appropriate of the following: (i) a 
market price, (ii) a specific price index or (iii) a general price index. In Belgium, 
revaluation remains obscure. In fact, the Government has objected not only to 
inflation accounting (comptabilite d'inflation), as evident in the Report to the King 
introducing the Royal Decree of 1976, but also to replacement value (valeur de 
remplacement), which was officially repealed in 1983. Therefore, the only 
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renmrung definition to guide revaluation is contained in Art. 34 of the 1976 
Decree; that is, 'usefulness to the enterprise' (Flower and Lefebvre, 1994, p. 264). 
The interaction between revaluation and taxation 
Although it is clear that high inflation in Europe stimulated a debate concerning 
accounting for changing prices which still continues, the current situation regarding 
the rules of revaluation is also strongly influenced by national fiscal policies which 
directly affect accounting practices. Indeed, the view that the interrelation between 
accounting and taxation may be the principal explanatory factor that divides 
Europe on the issue of asset revaluation appears to be largely confirmed, as shown 
in Figure 5.2. That is, in all countries where published earnings do not serve as the 
basis for corporate taxation (the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands and Denmark), 
revaluation is dealt with by specific asset revaluation methods, while in two of the 
countries (Spain and Italy) where the financial accounts do form the basis for 
taxation, general price-leveI indexing is authorised by the tax authorities through 
specific revaluation laws. However, in three further countries (Belgium, France and 
Germany), the relationship is not so clear, and it is worthwhile reexamining each of 
these in turn: 
In Belgium, where the published annual accounts serve as the basis for corporate 
taxation and yet general price-level indexing has never been applied, the 
government has in fact authorised individual asset revaluation. However, a special 
tax law exempts the surplus on revaluation from taxation, with depreciation for tax 
purposes being limited to acquisition cost (Lefebvre and Flower, 1994, p. 102). 
In France, the policy has changed from one of price-level indexing towards 
individual asset revaluation, whereby the use of mandatory indexing revaluation as 
an instrument of fiscal policy has progressively been abandoned. While the first 
attempt to limit the strong fiscal influence dates back to the creation of the PCG in 
1947, it was in 1960 that the French government took the first steps to abolish 
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fiscal revaluation by authorizing companies to use accelerated depreciation of 
assets for tax purposes (Scheid and Walton, 1992, p. 208). This was followed in 
1977 by a fiscally-neutral revaluation law and, finally, specific asset revaluation 
was introduced in commercial law upon the implementation of the 4th Directive in 
1984. Today, in contrast to Belgium, the French fiscal authorities tax the 
revaluation surpluses as income but permit companies to charge increased tax 
depreciation on revalued assets against profit (Griziaux, 1995, p. 1247). 
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In Germany, the legislature has always avoided the link between fiscal policy and 
revaluation, as departures from historic cost are prohibited. It is generally assumed 
that the reluctance to adopt revaluation accounting results from the historical 
experience of severe inflation in Germany, but it is also influenced by the earlier 
legislation on asset revaluation. In fact, the upper valuation limit of acquisition cost 
for fixed assets was enshrined in German accounting legislation in the Aktiengesetz 
amendment of 1884. The preceding legislation, the Allgemeines Deutsches 
Handelsgesetzbuch of 1861 (General Commercial Code), required all assets and 
liabilities to be stated at their 'attributable value' (beizulegender Wert) which was 
interpreted as the current value at the balance sheet date (Ballwieser, 1995). 
However, this quickly led to abuses which became apparent in a number of frauds 
and bankruptcies, and which brought about the return to historic cost in 1884. The 
current situation in Germany is one in which historic cost accounting is seen as 
reducing uncertainty both with respect to balance sheet values and corporate 
taxation. 
The analysis of Belgium, France and Germany suggests that the separation on the 
basis of tax accounting is too simplistic. VVWle the Belgian and French decision to 
introduce revaluation in commercial law has relaxed the link between accounting 
and taxation, the Germans have remained resolute supporters of historic cost 
accounting. 
The interaction between revaluation and accounting practice 
A final explanation of the current diversity in the regulatory structures of asset 
revaluation in Europe is the effect on rulemaking of accounting practice itself. 
Inde6d, the revaluation of assets is a good example of an area of accounting 
regulation where the rules implied by accounting practices go beyond the text of 
company legislation. In fact, in some jurisdictions, the regulation of asset 
revaluation has followed the 'rules in action' rather than anticipating them. In 
particular, in countries which allow individual asset revaluation, the development 
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of the regulatory framework was able to take account of generally accepted 
reporting practices. In the Netherlands and the UK, for instance, current cost 
revaluation had occurred in practice and had been considered by the accounting 
profession, but was not acknowledged in the letter of the company law until the 
implementation of the Fourth Directive. 
The relationship between practice and the development of accounting rules in law 
can also be seen in other circumstances. In some cases, revaluation practices which 
occurred beyond regulatory legitimisation, have been tolerated and have then 
become the law. For instance, in Denmark, the Company Law of 1930 legalised 
revaluation accounting but the practice of using public assessment valuations for 
accounting purposes was established long before this law. In France, the 
Government's regulatory action in this area emanated on several occasions from 
the effective use of revaluation in accounting practice, and these illegal revaluations 
were eventually legitimised when the Fourth Directive was implemented. 
A further example of the influence of the rules in action on the law itself is to be 
found in Belgium where the abandonment of replacement cost valuation by the 
1983 Royal Decree was a consequence of its rare application in practice. 
In summary, the current rules with respect to the revaluation of fixed assets vary 
considerably across European countries. This diversity emanated from (i) the lack 
of rigorous regulation by both the EC and national legislators, (ii) the international 
variations with respect to the degree of connection between accounting and 
taxation for profit measurement in this area and, finally, (iii) the individual 
accounting practices interpreting the discretionary rules beyond the letter of the 
law. 'Table 5.1 provides a detailed analysis of the regulatory framework with 
respect to the form and content of revaluation rules for fixed assets in European 
countries. 
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5.4 Asset revaluation in practice 
The foregoing discussion indicates the varying degree of discretion a European 
company might have when interpreting the rules to revalue fixed assets. In fact, in 
countries where individual asset revaluation is allowed, a company decides 
whether, when and how to revalue which fixed assets. On the other hand, in 
countries where price-level indexation is authorized, companies may decide 
whether to revalue but, in doing so, have to follow the law which indicates the 
revaluation basis in terms of price indices as well as the assets subject to 
revaluation. In order to investigate the exercise of this varying degree of discretion 
in reporting practice, in this study annual reports of multinational European 
companies have been analysed with respect to their valuation policies adopted for 
fixed assets. 
The following analysis of reporting practice attempts to illustrate the different 
valuation approaches that have been reported under the different authoritative 
sources and the alternative rule design of revaluation regulations to which 
European companies are subject. 
Based on an earlier investigation (Ebbers, 1997a) for the years 1987 and 1993, 
Table 5.2 indicates the frequency of asset revaluations of the -companies included in 
the sample of this thesis which have multiple listings in Europe. For the years 1987 
and 1993,118 and 191 companies respectively, disclosed that the valuation of 
tangible fixed assets was based on either (i) historic cost, (ii) individual asset 
revaluation or (iii) a book value which could include past fiscal revaluations. For 
many companies, revaluation was limited to land and buildings only and, 
accordingly, a distinction is made in the table between the revaluation of land and 
buildings and the revaluation of other tangible fixed assets. 
With respect to land and buildings, in 1987,53% of the companies used historic 
cost, 35% applied revaluation and 12% made a price-level adjustment to the book 
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value. In 1993,43% of the reporting companies valued land and buildings at 
historic cost, 34% at a revalued amount and 23% indexed the book value of land 
and building to a general price level. 
With respect to other tangible fixed assets, the proportion of companies which 
used historic cost valuation was higher for both years. In 1987,74% of companies 
valued other tangibles at historic cost and 17% at revaluation, while 9% revalued 
on the basis of a price level index in accordance with a fiscal law. In 1993,67% of 
companies valued other tangibles at historic cost, 13% revalued under commercial 
law and 20% under a fiscal revaluation law. 
The table presents evidence that some of the Italian companies revalued in addition 
to fiscal price-level indexation laws, and did so seemingly without the specific 
authorization of the national legislator. In France, the second country where 
reporting practice applied both forms of revaluation, the reference in some 
instances to the last fiscal revaluation law in 1977 can be regarded as an element 
from the past. 
The following examples have been selected to illustrate the different interpretation 
of revaluation rules in each country, indicating the consequences of different 
regulatory strategies with regard to both source and design of rules to which 
European companies are subject. 
In Denmark, companies frequently apply the public value assessment of land and 
buildings as a guide for revaluation. This policy is illustrated by the company ISS: 
ISS (1993): 
"Fixed assets are recorded at historical cost prices except for certain land and buildings 
in Denmark, which were revalued to market value in accordance with public valuation. " 
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In France, the valuation at the time of the last government-initiated price-level 
adjustment (in 1977) was still being reported by some companies. A feature of 
French practice is that a company might value at historic cost in the individual 
accounts, while fted assets might be subject to revaluation in the group accounts. 
This policy which is illustrated by the company Pernod Ricard, is in accordance 
with French law and is a result of the tax implications with respect to individual 
accounts. 
Pernod Ricard (1993): 
In the notes to the individual accounts the company reported: 
"Properi)ý plant and equipment are valued at acquisition cost (purchase price plus 
ancillary expenses, excluding acquisition expenses on ftred assets), with the exception 
offixed assets acquired prior to December 31,1976, which have been revalued " 
In the notes to the consolidatedfinancial statements the valuation policy was described as 
follows: 
"Property, plant and equipment are valued at cost, or when applicable, at a revalued 
cost in compliance with legal requirements. 
In Italy, fixed assets have been subject to several price-level accounting laws in 
recent years, the revalued amount generally being included in the book value of 
balances in Italian annual accounts. Some companies such as Tamoil used to 
revalue beyond the scope of the fiscal revaluation laws. This was seemingly in 
accordance with the Commercial Code and was allowed until the 4th Directive was 
implemented in 199 1. 
Tamoil (1993): 
"Fixed assets are stated at their purchase price including directly attributable ancillary 
costs, and have been increased in line with monetary revaluation pursuant to law no. 72 
of March 19,1983 and law no. 413 of December 30,1991, and adjusted by any 
accumulated depreciation. In accordance with art. 10 of law no. 7211983, we confirm that 
revaluations other than those mentioned above have been carried out, in accordance with 
art. 2425, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code, which article was no longer applicable after 
December 31,1992. ( ... ) Capital surpluses arising from revaluations were utilised prior to 
1986 to cover losses with the exception of the reserve deriving from Law No. 413191. " 
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In the Netherlands, revaluation may take the form of the use of current cost 
valuation in the balance sheet, generally in the form of replacement value, as in the 
case of Oce van Grinten, or alternatively through the disclosure of supplementary 
current cost information in the notes, as in the case of Akzo: 
Ocd van Grinfen (1993): 
"Land, buildings, plant, etc. are valued on a current cost basis. Normally this is the same 
as the replacement value. In a few cases the current cost is taken to be the lower of the 
value to the business or the net realizable value. In determining the current cost, 
allowance is made for the nature and location of the assets involved The valuation also 
takes technological considerations into account. Price-indexfigures are used to determine 
the replacement value; the revaluations are verified periodically by experts. Adjustments 
to current cost are credited or debited to the revaluation "serve a . 
fter deduction of 
deferred taxation. " 
Akzo (1993): 
"The principles of valuation and determination of income used in the consolidated 
financial statements are based on historical cost. Due to the low level of inflation in key 
industrial countries, the disclosure of supplementary current value information has lost 
much of its significance and will therefore be discontinued effective this fiscal year. 
Property plant and equipment are valued at cost less depreciation. " 
In Spain, all companies made reference to assets which had been subject to the last 
fiscal revaluation law in 1983, as illustrated by Repsol: 
Repsol (1993): 
"Property, plant and equipment acquired prior to December 31,1983, are carried at cost 
restated pursuant to the applicable enabling legislation in order to reflect the inflationary 
conditions prevailing in those years. Subsequent additions are carried at cost. " 
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In the UK and Ireland, companies may value in annual accounts either under the 
historic cost convention, or alternatively under historic cost as modified by the 
revaluation of certain fixed assets, as illustrated here by GKN, or alternatively 
under the current cost convention, as illustrated by British Gas. The revaluation of 
specific items refers usually to land and properties and is carried out by 
independent surveyors. 
GKN(1993): 
"Major freehold land and long leasehold properties were revalued at 31st December 
1990 by chartered surveyors in the employment of the Group on the basis of open market 
value assuming existing use or, for specialist properties, at depreciated replacement cost. 
The original cost of land and buildings at 31st December 1993 was R80.9m; the notional 
net book value on that basis would have been V26. Im. " 
British Gas (1987): 
"77te accounts have been prepared under the current cost accounting convention. Under 
this convention provision is made in the accounts for the effects of specific price changes 
on the resources necessary to maintain the operating capability of the business. " 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has been concerned with the diversity that now exists under different 
European accounting regimes with respect to the revaluation of fixed assets in 
company accounts. Although some common features of accounting for price 
changes can be identified, the situation at the present time is that the regulatory 
approaches concerning fted asset revaluation vary considerably among European 
countries. 
The development of regulatory strategies with respect to accounting for the effect 
of changing prices have been influenced (i) by the existence of inflation itself, (ii) 
by accounting theorists, who formulated accounting solutions to the problems of 
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changing purchasing power, (iii) by governments which linked accounting 
revaluations to fiscal policies and finally (iv) by innovations in accounting practice 
which tended to precede legal change. Indeed, the regulation of asset revaluation 
has had a long history of following the 'rules in action' in some countries rather 
than anticipating them. For instance, illegal practices have been tolerated and then 
have become the law. While in some countries there has been a tendency to 
legislate in broad terms, other jurisdictions have varied the detailed prescriptive 
rules from time to time as part of general fiscal policy. 
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CHAPTER 6 
FOREIGN CURRENCY REPORTING 
6.1 Introduction 
In accounting, whether regulation is by legislation, professional standard, or by 
recommendation, and whether these are drafted in precise terms or in general 
principles, there appears to a borderline between regulation that is facilitative and 
regulation that is onerous, and those affected will be motivated to determine the 
regime which best meets their aims. 
The widespread acceptance in Europe of the rules on the consolidation of foreign 
financial statements, in FAS 52 and IAS 21, which favour the 'cheap and easy' 
closing rate method, illustrates one approach to the construction of international 
accounting law, that of transplanting rules into jurisdictions with or without prior 
regulations in this area in a manner which seems to be cost-effective for both the 
regulators and the regulated. 
In contrast, with regard to accounting for foreign currency transactions, a less 
harmonious regulatory process can be observed which is characterised by instances 
in which the regulations are ignored in practice (as seems to be the case with 
respect to the treatment of unrcalised exchange gains) or circumvented through 
reintýrpretations of the rules within the scope* of legality (in the choice of 
translation rates, for example, and in the distinction between the long term and 
short term), by partial regulation (of utilities in this case, which could undermine 
the notion of equal treatment of all enterprises). and by the creation of legal voids 
(regarding currency hedging). 
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As as result of fluctuations in exchange rates, the translation of assets and liabilities 
denominated in a foreign currency can have a significant effect on a company's 
financial statements. Nevertheless, the only mention of this issue in the EC 
directives is the requirement that a company should disclose the basis of any such 
translation (Fourth Directive Art. 4 1, para. 1 (1); Seventh Directive Art. 34, para. 1). 
This chapter compares the development of rules in a number of European countries 
relating, firstly, to accounting for foreign currency transactions and, secondly, to 
the translation of foreign financial statements. It then considers the current 
regulation for both aspects of foreign currency reporting, not only with regard to 
the content of such rules 
' 
but also with regard to the regulatory strategies adopted 
in nation-states. The diversity of policies found in individual accounts regarding the 
treatment of foreign currency transactions and the consensus found in consolidated 
accounts regarding the translation of foreign financial statements are illustrated by 
examples from the published accounts of European companies. 
6.2 The historical development of foreign currency reporting rules 
Although it is widely recognised that the development of accounting regulations 
for foreign currency reporting in Europe has to a great extent followed IAS 21, 
which itself was based on FAS 52, it appears nevertheless that in several countries 
(France, Spain, Belgium, Germany and Italy) the rules regarding the two aspects 
involved, namely accounting for foreign currency transactions and the translation 
of foreign financial statements, have developed along different paths. 
In France, for example, the regulations governing foreign currency transactions 
were already established in the first Plan Comptable Gengral (PCG) of 1947, re- 
affirmed in the PCG of 1957 and extended in the PCG of 1982 (PCG, p. II. 12). 
However, until 1986, no accounting plan had referred to the translation of foreign 
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financial statements. In fact, it was not until the requirement for consolidation was 
incorporated in the 1986 amendment of the PCG that rules for the translation of 
foreign company accounts were introduced in France (PCG, p. 11.155-157). 
In Spain, on the other hand, the first Plan General de Contabilidad (PGQ of 1973 
and the tax regulations in force at that time required companies to adjust foreign 
balances in their accounts using exchange rates established by Government decree 
(Gonzalo and Gallizo, 1992). This continued until 1977 when the Government 
ended its policy of fixing the rate of exchange of the Peseta. A few years later, in 
1983, the Associacion Espafiola de Contabilidad y Administraci6n de Empresas 
(AECA) statement No. 4 on 'Exchange Differences' was published. The rules 
contained in that statement are now in the current PGC of 1990 (part V, 14a). 
Subsequently, in 1991, rules for translating foreign financial statements were issued 
together with the legal requirement to con. solidate (Real Decreto 1816 of 20 
December 1991, Art. 54-59). 
In Belgium, accounting for foreign currency transactions was first dealt with in 
1987 in Opinion No. 20 issued by the Belgian Accounting Standards Commission 
(Commissie voor Boekhoudkundige Normen / Commission des Normes 
Comptables), but there is no provision in law. On the other hand, the translation of 
foreign financial statements was codified in 1990 as part of the Decree on 
Consolidated Accounts (Art. 42-43). 
In Germany, accounting for foreign currency transactions has developed solely on 
the basis of the German Grundsdtze ordnungsmd, 6iger Buchfdhrung (GoB; the 
general principles in the Articles 264(2), 252(l) No. 2-4,253(l) and (2), 279(l) of 
the Handelsgesetzbuch of 1985 (HGB)), but there is no accepted convention with 
respect to group accounts (Ordelheide and Pfaff, 1994). The main technical 
committee of the MW (Hauptfachausschuß des Instituts der Wirtschaftsprüfer) 
published a proposal with respect to foreign currency reporting in 1977 (revised in 
1986) in which the IdW confirmed the principle of accounting for foreign currency 
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transactions, but without giving specific guidance on the issue of translation of 
foreign financial statements. The HGB regulates neither the reporting of foreign 
currency transactions, nor the translation of foreign financial statements, the only 
legal provision being the EC disclosure requirements which are codified in Art. 
284(2) No. 2. and Art. 313(l) S. 2 No. 2, respectively. 
In Italy, accounting for foreign currency transactions was first dealt with under tax 
regulations in 1973 (Presidential Decree No. 597) and later in 1986 (Art. 72 of 
Income Law 917/1986). In 1988 the Commissione per la Statuizione dei Principi 
Contabili del Consiglio Nazionale dei Dottori Commercialisti e Ragionieri 
(CSPQ, issued Document No. 9 'Conversione in Moneta Nationale delle 
Operazioni et delle Partite in Moneta Estera' which deals with accounting for 
transactions in a foreign currency in the individual accounts. However, the CSPC is 
currently discussing a draft document concerning the translation of foreign 
financial statements. The Codice Civile does not deal in any detail with either 
accounting for foreign transactions or the translation of foreign financial statements 
except for the minimum disclosure requirements enforced under the EC Directives. 
In contrast to the above, in the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands and Denmark, foreign 
currency reporting with respect to translation both of transactions and of financial 
statements has coincided not only in content but also in time with the accounting 
principles established in the USA (FAS 52,1981) and mirrored by the IASC (JAS 
21,1983). FAS 52 "Foreign currency translation" replaced FAS 8 which had been 
published in 1975 and, in so doing, introduced the 'functional currency concept' 
for the translation of foreign currency statements (para. 5-14) and laid down rules 
for foreign currency transactions (para. 15-21). It has remained the effective 
standard since its introduction in 1981. On the other hand, IAS 21 was revised in 
1993 to narrow some of its options. 
In the UK, even though the Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) had issued 
several exposure drafts on the topic (ED 16,1975; ED 21,1977; ED 27,1980), 
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accounting standard, SSAP 20, was not published until 1983 when it followed 
closely the American position in FAS 52 (Taylor, 1995). It should be noted, that 
SSAP 20 applied in Ireland from the same date as in the UK. 
In the Netherlands, apart from a brief treatment of the provisions for exchange rate 
losses in 1979 (Zeff et aI., 1992), no regulation or guideline existed until October 
1983, when the Raad voor de Jdarverslaggeving (RJ; Council on Annual 
Reporting) issued its first draft statement on accounting for foreign currencies, 
which followed the FASB approapfi (Dijksma and Hoogendorn, 1993). The 
definitive guideline was issued in April 1986 (RJ 1.03.906-12 and RJ 1.03.913- 
936). 
In Denmark, no rules existed for foreign currency translation until 1994 when the 
issue of Accounting Standard No. 9, which reflects the revised IAS 21, was made 
mandatory for listed companies starting from I July 1995 (Christiansen and 
Hansen, 1995). However, since 1983, the Foreningen af Statsautoriserede 
Revisorer (FSR; Institute of State-Authorized Public Accountants) had 
recommended the original IAS 21, together with a Danish translation, which could 
be deviated from if necessary to give a true and fair view. 
63 The current regulations 
Foreign currency transactions 
Generally, foreign currency transactions are recorded at the date the foreign 
transaction is recognised and, at the end of each accounting period, foreign 
payables and receivables which increase or decrease with a change in exchange 
rates may be restated, whereupon transaction differences will arise. Comparing the 
relevant regulatory positions across European countries, it is clear that, while there 
is relatively little controversy concerning the exchange rate to be used to translate 
unsettled foreign currency accounts at the balance sheet date, disagreement centres 
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on whether and to what extent unrealised exchange gains and losses arising from 
such restatements should be included in income. As shown below, differences in 
the accounting treatment of these gains and losses are based to a great extent on 
principles of accruals and prudence which differ in interpretation across countries. 
I The transaction date 
A foreign currency transaction may be recorded initially by applying the exchange 
rate ruling at the date of the transaction (the so-called 'actual rateý. However, the 
actual rate is rarely well-defined and it may be the rate operating on the date of 
negotiation, the date when the contract was agreed, the date of delivery, the date 
when the invoice was recorded or the date of payment. Depending on the length of 
period between negotiations, contracting, delivery, invoicing and payment and the 
volatility of exchange rates, this choice may have significant impact. Already, there 
exist differences between FAS 52, IAS 21 and SSAP 20 on this point: Whilst FAS 
52 refers to the rate at the "date when the transaction is recognised", IAS 21 
considers the rate at the "date of the transaction" and, finally, SSAP 20 refers to 
the rate on the "date on which the transaction occurred". Given the differences in 
contract law across Europe, this is an area where detailed specification in 
accounting rules may lead to a conflict of laws. 
II The exchange rate used to translateforeign payables and receivables 
Foreign currency payables and receivables at the balance sheet date might be 
translated at either the closing rate (the rate prevailing at the balance sheet date), 
the historic rate, or a combination of both. The general rule of using the closing 
rate is followed in most countries, but not in Germany and, in some circumstances, 
not in Italy, as indicated in Table 6.1 
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The exchange rate used to translate unsettled foreign receivables and payables; Table 6.1 
Countries Translation at closing rate Translation at historic rate or 
closing rate 
Belgium x 
Denmark x 
France x 
Germany x 
Ireland x 
Italy x 
Netherlands x 
Spain x 
UK x 
In Germany, even though the HGB does not regulate the translation of foreign 
transactions but contains. only a disclosure requirement in Art. 284 (2) No. 2, a 
generally accepted accounting principle has been established which applies the 
same valuation rules (GoB) to foreign currency assets and liabilities as to balances 
that are valued in national currency. In particular, the historic cost principle (HGB 
Art. 253 (1)), the realization principle (HGB Art. 252, . (4)) and the prudence 
principle (HGB Art. 252, (1) No. 4) require the use of the closing rate for the 
accrual of unrealised losses but forbid the recognition of unrealised gains. Hence, 
assets denominated in a foreign currency are valued at the lower of the historic rate 
and the closing rate, while liabilities are valued at the higher of the historic and 
closing rate. 
The situation is less clear in Italy. While Art. 72 of the Income Tax Law refers to 
foreign currency monetary items translated at the official closing rate published by 
the Minister of Finance, the CSPC considers alternative procedures for translating 
monetary items. In fact, even though the CSPC recornmends the use of the closing 
rate to translate all foreign payables, and receivables at the balance sheet date, it 
allows companies to value long term monetary items at the historic rate, if they 
wish. 
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III Exchange gains and losses on foreign payables and receivables 
There is consensus within the Community that losses arising from the restatement 
of foreign debtors and creditors at the balance sheet date should be taken to 
income. In contrast, unrealised gains are not accounted for in the same way across 
countries. In fact, as shown in Table 6.2, three different approaches to the 
. recognition of gains on unsettled foreign balances exist in Europe. Those countries 
that require the recognition of unrealised currency gains as a profit in the income 
statement are Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the UK. Conversely, those 
countries which require companies to defer unrealised translation gains in the 
balance sheet are Belgiun-4 France, Italy and Spain. Finally, in Germany, unrealised 
foreign currency gains are not recognised at all; that is, are not taken into account, 
as the receivables (payables) continue to be valued at the lower (higher) historical 
exchange rate. 
The recognition of translation gain on unsettled foreign receivables and payables Table 6.2 
Countries Gain taken to income Gain deferred in Gain not recognised 
balance sheet 
Belgium x 
Denmark x 
France x 
Germany x 
Ireland x 
Italy x 
Netherlands x 
Spain x 
UK x 
Within the above categories, some differences appear to exist with respect (i) to 
the distinction between short term and long term monetary items, (ii) to the 
setting-off of positive and negative translation differences and (iii) to the treatment 
of hedged foreign currency positions, as shown in Table 6.3. 
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(i) Short term versus long term gains and losses 
The IASC has changed its position on the issue of distinguishing between short 
term and long term transactions. While the original IAS 21 (1983, para 28) 
authorised the optional deferral not only of exchange gains but also of losses on 
long term transactions, in the revised standard (1993) neither losses nor gains on 
long term foreign transactions may be deferred. 
In -the UK, Ireland and Denmark, the requirement to take unrealised gains to 
income applies to all such exchange gains. However, in the Netherlands it is 
restricted to short term gains. Dijksma and Hoogendorn (1993, p. 169) report that 
the Dutch Council on Annual Reporting (RJ 1.03.908/10) allows companies to 
defer unrealised exchange gains on long term transactions to maturity, while 
unrealised gains on short term transactions should be taken to income. Subsequent 
exchange losses on long term transactions in the same currency should then be 
deducted from the deferred gain. 
Exchange differences on short term and long term transactions may also be treated 
differently in jurisdictions in which positive translation differences are generally 
deferred while exchange losses are generally taken to income. For instance, in 
France, the PCG (p. II. 13) indicates that for foreign currency transactions covering 
more than one accounting period (opirations affectant plusieurs exercises), 
unrealised exchange losses may be amortised to maturity (Raffegeau et al., 1989, 
p. 545). In Italy, the CSPC allows companies not to restate long term monetary 
items at the close of the balance sheet, in which case neither gains nor losses on 
such unsettled balances are recognised (Accounting Advisory Forum, 1995, p. 55). 
In contrast, rules in Spain, Belgium and Germany do not distinguish between short 
term and long term monetary items for the recognition of translation differences. 
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(ii) Setting-offpositive and negative translation differences 
The setting-off of positive and negative translation differences is an indirect way of 
recognising gains in income in countries where gains are not, as a general rule, 
taken to the profit and loss account. However, the rules with regard to the set-off 
of gains and losses on unsettled foreign transactions are not always unambigous 
and appear to vary within the Community. While some countries allow a full set-off 
between all positive and negative translation differences, other countries require 
separate set-offs between short term items and between long term items, or other 
jurisdictions - require a separate set-off between gains and losses in individual 
currencies. An alternative point -of view is that a set-off should be restricted to 
short term transactions only. Indeed, the Accounting Advisory Forum (1995, para 
12) considers it appropriate to set-off all translation differences on short term 
items, irrespective of the currency in which they are expressed. 
In the UK and Ireland, SSAP 20 (para 60) suggests that all Positive translation 
differences should be fully set-off against negative translation differences. A similar 
approach has been adopted in Denmark in the DRV 9 (Christiansen and Hansen, 
1995, p. 815). 
In the Netherlands positive and negative exchange differences are set-off against 
each other for each foreign currency, with a further distinction being made between 
those exchange differences arising from short term and those arising from long 
term transactions. Where long term gains have been deferred, which is optional 
(Dijksma and Hoogendoorn, 1993, p. 169), future exchange losses on long term 
transactions should be deducted from deferred unrealised gains in the same 
currincy. 
In Belgium, on the other hand, the set-off of unrealised gains and losses by 
currency is permitted, but no separation between short term and long term 
translation differences is made (Jorissen and Block, 1995, p. 
_ 
473). The Spanish 
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rules go one step further and require that the maturities of the assets and liabilities 
involved must coincide exactly. According to Lopez Diaz and Rivero Torre (1995, 
p. 2283) exchange differences must be classified by maturity and currency and 
unrealised gains may be credited to profit up to the amount of the losses within 
each homogeneous group. Furthermore, unrealised gains may be credited to profit 
up to an amount of unrealised exchange losses which have been charged to 
previous years' profits, and gains deferred in prior years may be credited to income 
up to an amount of the current year's exchange losses. In France, the setting-off of 
positive and negative translation differences may be carried out with the remaining 
balance being shown in the balance sheet as a provision (Griziaux, 1995, p. 1242). 
In Germany, even though the set-off between positive and negative translation 
differences is accepted under certain circumstances, there remains controversy with 
respect to the extent to which the item by item valuation may be departed from 
(Ordelheide and Pfaff, 1994, p. 148). According to the IdW's revised proposal 
(1986) netting between positive and negative differences is allowed as long as 
hedged positions exist (von Wysocki, 1987). 
(iii) Hedged positions 
The contrast in points of view on the issue of foreign currency transactions is also 
reflected in the area of hedged foreign currency positions. It may be noted 
however, that the issue of accounting for financial instruments used to hedge 
balances in a foreign currency is currently under international discussion. 
The relevant rule adopted in the original IAS 21 (1983, para 26) suggested that 
"for short term transactions, the forward rates specified in the related foreign 
exchange contracts may be used as the basis for measuring and reporting the 
transactions. " However, the revised IAS 21 (1993, para 14) now states that it does 
not deal with hedge accounting other than the hedge of a net investment in a 
foreign entity. Instead the standard indicates that "other aspects of hedge 
accounting, including the criteria for the use of hedge accounting and the 
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requirement for the recognition of exchange differences and the discontinuance of 
hedge accounting, will be dealt with in an IAS on financial instruments". The 
Accounting Advisory Forum considers it "common practice to use the exchange 
rate specified in the hedging instrument as the basis for translation and to defer any 
resulting translation difference until the expiry of the position. " (1995, para 23). 
At present, the degree of discretion with respect to the use of the forward rate 
varies across. countries. In the UIC, for instance, SSAP 20 (1983, para 6) suggests 
that "where there are related or matching forward contracts in respect of trading 
transactions, the rates of exchange specified in those contracts may be used". For 
the Netherlands, Dijksma and Hoogendoorn (1993, p. 168) indicate that the RJ's 
position (RJ 1.03.907) is that, in cases where the foreign exchange rate risk is 
hedged, "it is preferable to value those receivables or payables at the relevant 
forward rate". In France, the PCG (p. II. 13) provides in the circumstance of 
hedging an exception from the general requirement to record a provision for 
exchange differences (Griziaux, 1995, p. 1241). In Germany, the IdW's opinion is 
that the use of the forward rate or the closing rate is optional under the specific 
circumstance of a hedge (von Wysocki, 1987, p. 225). 
In Belgium, on the other hand, the regulations are less flexible. The 
recommendation issued in 1987 by the Commission on Accounting Standards 
indicates that "when a forward contract was entered into as a hedge the 
commercial transaction will be recorded at the exchange rate stipulated in the 
forward contract and no exchange results are recognised under thii treatment. If 
however, the company takes out a forward contract for trading purposes, the 
accounting treatment is the same as for an unhedged transaction" (Jorissen and 
Block, 1995, p. 473). Similarly, in Denmark, the DRV 9 (sections 74-78) deals 
explicitly with forward cover. Exchange rates relating to a hedged transaction must 
be adjusted, if adjustments for the corresponding receivables and payables were 
made. "Both exchange rate adjustments must be entered in the profit and loss 
account" (Christiansen and Hansen, 1995, p. 815). 
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Finally, it may be noted that the reporting on hedged positions has not been dealt 
with at all in Italy. 
A further aspect on the issue of reporting foreign exchange differences concerns 
partial regulation in response to special economic conditions. In Spain, companies 
in regulated industries have been the subject of a number of ministerial orders 
concerning the treatment of translation differences drf foreign receivables and payables, 
as a result of the substantial devaluation of the peseta against the ECU in 1992 and 
1993 which affected companies with high foreign currency debt. Whilst the regulators 
refused to authorize price increases to absorb the exchange losses, they introduced new 
accounting rules which allowed the amortization of exchange losses over the life of 
the foreign payable or receivable. 
A final point of difference is related to the specific topic oi foreign debt. Where a 
loan has been raised in a foreign currency in order to finance a fixed asset, there are 
specific regulations concerning the accounting treatment of the effects of exchange 
rate movements in Spain (PGC Art. 14) and France (PCG, p. II. 13). In Spain the 
unrealised gain or loss on foreign loans may be capitalised and included in the cost 
of the assets financed, while French law allows the capitalization and amortization 
of unrealised losses arising from loans in a foreign currency. 
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Table 6.3 demonstrates that even though countries may be divided into three 
principal groups with respect to the 'general' treatment of the recognition of 
translation differences, at a detailed level the regulatory positions appear to be 
quite diverse. 
Translation offoreign flnancial statements 
I Principal methods of translating foreign financial statements 
Various methods of translating foreign financial statements for incorporation into 
the consolidated accounts have been developed, of which the principal will be 
briefly characterised. Under the closing rate method all balance sheet items are 
translated at the rate prevailing at the balance sheet date (the 'closing rate'). No 
agreement exists with respect to the translation of items in the income statement, 
which may be either translated at the closing rate, or alternatively the rate ruling 
when revenues and expenses are recognised (the 'actual rate') which might be 
approximated by an average rate. Translation gains and losses under the closing 
rate method are transferred to the balance sheet and included under reserves. 
The monetarylnon-monetary method translates monetary assets and liabilities at 
the closing rate, and all other balance sheet items at the historic rate. Income and 
charges are translated at their date of recognition ('historic rate), for which the 
average rate for the financial year is often used as an approximation. The 
translation of depreciation, however, always follows the treatment of the 
corresponding assets. The translation differences are recognised in the profit and 
loss account. 
Under the temporal method the relevant translation rates depend on the 
measurement basis of the assets and liabilities. Balances valued at historic cost are 
translated at the relevant historic rate, balances carried at present value (i. e. 
replacement cost or net realisable value) or future value (i. e. value of future 
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receipts) are translated at the closing rate or appropriate future rate. The 
translation of the income statement and the reporting of the translation difference 
corresponds to the monetary/non-monetary method. 
Under a system of historic cost accounting, the monetary/non-monetary method is 
almost identical to the temporal method, since balances which are measured at 
historic cost (generally non-monetary items) are translated at the historic rates, 
while balances which are valued on a current basis (generally monetary items) are 
translated at the closing rate, with the exception of inventory measured at net 
realisable value. Under a system of current cost accounting, the temporal method is 
identical to the closing rate method. 
The currentlnon-current method uses the closing rate for current balances, and 
the historic rate for all other assets and liabilities. The translation of the income 
statement and the reporting of the translation difference corresponds to the 
monetary/non-monetary or temporal method. 
A combination of the closing rate method and the temporal method is prescribed in 
FAS 52, the choice of method being determined by the 'functional currency' in 
which the foreign subsidiary fforeign entity) operates. The functional currency is 
"the currency of the primary economic environment in whicý that entity operates" 
(para 5). FAS 52 defines the local currency as the functional currency if the 
subsidiary's operations are "relatively self-contained and integrated within a 
particular country" and for these entities the use of the closing rate method is 
prescribed. If a foreign subsidiary (Ioreign operation') is a "direct and integral 
component or extension of the parent company's operations", the functional 
currency is the parent's currency and in this case the use of the temporal method is 
required. It might be noted, that FAS 52 does not use the term temporal method, 
but refers to it as 'remeasurement' and provides in its appendix guidance for 
remeasurement into the parent's functional currency. IAS 21, which followed FAS 
52 in time and in content, similarly divides subsidiaries into the 'two categories' 
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and prescribes the closing rate method for 'foreign entities' and the temporal 
method or monetary/non-monetary method for 'foreign operations that are an 
integral part of the operations of the parent. 
II The current regulatory position in Member States 
With the exception of Germany, the regulatory position in all Member States, has 
been greatly influenced by IAS 21 and thus by FAS 52 in this area, as a similar 
choice is generally allowed between the closing rate method for independent 
subsidiaries and the monetary/non-monetary method or the temporal method for 
subsidiaries which are integrated into the parent company's operations. 
It may be noted that, in advising the European Commission on this matter, the 
Accounting Advisory Forum (1995, para 34) suggests a similar distinction between 
integrated operations and non-integrated operations and the translation of financial 
statements of non-integrated foreign operations using the closing rate method and 
integrated foreign operations using the temporal method. 
In some countries, the rules on translating the accounts of foreign subsidiaries have 
been given the force of law. In Belgium, for instance, the Royal Decree of 1990 
refers (in Art. 42-43) to the closing rate method and the monetary/non-monetary 
method to translate foreign subsidiaries into consolidated statements - without 
specifying the conditions of their use - although another method may be applied if 
it is more likely to provide a true and fair view. However, the Report to the King 
(included as an appendix to the law) suggests the use of the monetary/non- 
monetary method in particular for foreign subsidiaries which constitute an 
integrated part of the parent company and the closing rate method for 
econon-dcally and financially independent subsidiaries (Aerts and Theunisse, 1995). 
It should be noted that in Belgium, the translation gain under the monetary/non- 
monetary method have to be recorded in the profit and loss account but can 
alternatively be treated in the same way as unrealised exchange differences in the 
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accounts of individual companies; that is, by deferral to the balance sheet. 
Interestingly, the same option is provided to companies in Spain, where the Real 
Decreto of 1991 prescribes the closing rate method except when the activities of 
the foreign company are so closely linked to those of a Spanish group company 
that it can be considered as an extension of its activities, in which case the 
monetary/non-monetary method is applied (L6pez Diaz and Rivero Torre, 1995). 
In France, the Conseil National de la Comptabiliti (CNQ formulated the relevant 
regulations in the revised PCG (1986), which, although not mandatory, proposed 
the use of the closing rate method for independent subsidiaries and the 
monetary/non-monetary method, referred to as "historic rate method" (Scheid and 
Walton, 1992, p. 247), for subsidiaries which are integrated into the parent 
operations. An alternative treatment for translation differences under the 
monetary/non-monetary method exists, as profit and loss on long term monetary 
items may be amortized, similarly to the treatment in the individual accounts. 
In Italy, the CSPC has drafted a document in which it recommends rules similar to 
IAS 21. In the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Denmark where standards of 
accounting practice have been issued by professional bodies in this area, these also 
closely reflect the suggestions in IAS 21. 
It appears that only in Germany has there been no regulatory solution with respect 
to the translation of foreign financial statements and, in contrast to the accounting 
for foreign transactions, there is no accepted convention. The guidelines issued by 
the IdW and the Schmalenbach Gesellschaft differ and do not represent a binding 
or accepted standard. The IdW suggests in its revised proposal (1986) the use of 
the closing rate method and the temporal method, without however linking their 
use lo the degree of integration of the foreign subsidiary into the parent 
undertaking. Furthermore all of the methods described earlier are permitted and 
prominent in practice. Ordelheide (1995, p. 1596) comments that "the variety of 
methods used in practice impairs fundamentally the comparison between groups on 
the basis of their annual accounts, notably for quoted undertakings". 
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The following diagram (Figure 6.1) demonstrates the dominant influence of IAS 21 
/ FAS 52 with respect to the translation of foreign financial statements through the 
different regulatory modes - law, standard or recommendation - in Europe, and 
contrasts the German position to the regulatory consensus. 
A final point to note is that, in spite of the near unanimiy on this issue, it is 
superficial. At the detailed level, there are differences with respect to the 
translation of profit and loss items, as is shown in Table 6.4 below. In fact, the 
Accounting Advisory Forum (para. 33) allows the alternative of using either the 
closing rate, or the rate existing at the time of the transaction (which might be 
approximated by an average rate) to translate the income statement under the 
closing rate method. A similar approach has been adopted in France, the UK, 
Ireland, Germany and the Netherlands. It may be noted that IAS 21 has changed its 
position on this particular issue, as in 1993 it limited the translation of profit and 
loss items under the closing rate method to the use of the exchange rate at the date 
of the transaction which may be for practical purposes an average rate (para. 30). 
This position is now consistent with FAS 52 (para. 12). 
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6.4 Foreign currency accounting in practice 
In order to investigate the effect, if any, of the different regulatory strategies of 
European countries with regard to the sources of authority and the degree of 
formalism in rules on the foreign currency accounting policies adopted in practice, 
the annual reports of European companies were analysed. The results presented are 
based on an earlier investigation (Ebbers, 1997b) for the financial years 1987 (120 
companies) and 1993 (182 companies) of the thesis sample which comprises 
European multinational companies. 
Foreign currency transactions 
Table 6.5 shows (i) the different exchange rates reported by companies to translate 
foreign payables and receivables at the balance sheet date and (ii) the treatment of 
exchange gains and losses in the annual accounm 
(i) 7he exchange rate 
The closing rate was the dominant rate used to adjust foreign currency receivables 
and payables in the sample, with the exception of German companies which applied 
a combination of the historic rate and the closing rate. 87 (73%) out of 120 
companies in 1987, and 146 (80%) out of 182 companies in 1993 disclosed the use 
of the closing rate to translate foreign receivables and payables, while 25 German 
companies in 1987 and 24 in 1993 applied the closing rate only if this led to the 
recognition of an exchange loss. Companies reported the use of the forward rate to 
measure foreign transactions which were effectively hedged by forward contracts. 
These results are in line with a study carried out by the Federation des Experts 
Comptables (see FEE, 1991, p. 242) for the year 1989, where in 198 (71%) out of 
278 cases the closing rate was reported. The results indicate a high level of 
uniformity with respect to the valuation basis of foreign transactions among 
Member States, the exception being Germany. 
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(ii) Reporting exchange differences 
All exchange differences (both unrealised losses and unrealised gains) were taken 
to income by about half the sample companies in both years, namely 87 (48%) 
companies in 1993 and 62 (52%) companies in 1987, a similar finding to the study 
by FEE for the year 1989 (FEE, 1991, p. 243). The use of separate methods for 
gain and loss (unrealised gain deferred in the balance sheet and unrealised loss 
taken to, income) was found in the accounting policies of 63 (34%) companies in 
1993 and 40 (33%), companies in 1987. In line with national regulations, other 
treatments of exchange rate differences were observed, such as the deferral of 
unrealised exchange losses in the case of Spanish utility companies and the separate 
treatment of translation differences for long term transactions and short term 
transactions in the case of Dutch companies. However, in several instances, the 
reported treatment of the translation difference was not in conformity with national 
regulations. These departures from the local rules will be illustrated next. 
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The use of the closing rate to adjust foreign receivables and payables at the balance 
sheet date is, with the exception of Germany, uniform across Europe both in terms 
of regulations and practices. Moreover, the use of a forward rate in those cases 
where a foreign transaction is specifically hedged appears to be standard 
accounting practice, even though its use has an optional character in some Member 
States' regulations. 
German reporting is in line with the strict interpretation of the GoB (Grundsdtze 
ordnungsmdj3iger BuchAhrung), referred to earlier, in particular the prudence 
principle and the historic cost principle, and thus inducing an understatement of 
receivables and an overstatement of payables. The accounting policies of Dain-der 
Benz and Henkel illustrate this principle, whereby Henkel indicates its policy in the 
case of hedged or closed positions. 
Daimler Benz (1993): 
"Foreign currency receivables are translated in the individual financial statements at the 
bid price on the day they are recorded or at the spot rate on the balance sheet date if 
lower. Foreign currency payables are translated at the asked price on the day they are 
recorded or at the spot rate on the balance sheet date if higher. " 
Henkel (1993): 
"Accounts receivable and payable in foreign currency are translated in the financial 
statements of individual companies at the rates of exchange in force when they first 
originated. If, however, translation offoreign currency items at the rate in force on the 
balance sheet date produces a lower amount for receivables or a higher amount for 
liabilities, then foreign currency items are translated at the rates in force on the balance 
sheet date, unless amounts receivable and payable in a particular currency balance each 
other out or the amounts involved are covered byforward exchange transactions. " 
As it is indicated in Table 6.5, the treatment of exchange differences observed in 
the sample was diverse. This observance concerned not only discrepancies between 
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European regulations as explored above, but also between national regulations and 
corresponding reporting practices. 
Even though the Belgian Commission des Normes Comptables recommends the 
deferral of unrealised. exchange gains, 2 Belgian companies included unrealised 
exchange gain in the income statement, as illustrated by the following extract from 
Sipef. 
Sipef (1993): 
"The items of the assets and liabilities expressed in foreign currencies are converted into 
Belgian francs at the average monthly date of their booking. 
On the closing date of the balance sheet: 
- non-monetary items of the balance sheet, such as formation expenses, intangible and 
tangible fixed assets, jinancial fixed assets and stocks (on the assets side) and the items 
under own fiinds (on the liability side), are maintained at their acquisition value 
expressed in BEF, whatever the value at the balance sheet date of the currency in which 
the acquisition price was paid 
- monetary items of the balance sheet, such as amounts receivable after more than a 
year or within one year, cash investments, cash at bank and cash in hand and deferrals 
and accruals (on the asset side) and the provision items for liabilities and charges, 
amounts payable after more than a year or within one year and deferrals and accruals 
(on the liability side) are evaluated at the exchange rates retained for the foreign 
currencies at the date of closing the balance sheet. 
The exchange variances resulting from these evaluations are odccumulated per currency. 
The book keeping of these exchange variances is done using the method of integral 
accounting of the variances whereby the positive as well as the negative variances are 
booked into the result. The variances per currency are booked under the otherfinancial 
charges or income. " 
In France, several companies indicated different accounting policies in the parent 
company and consolidated accounts, by including only exchange losses in income 
in the parent company accounts while taking both losses and gains into the 
consolidated income statement. However, France made use of Art. 29.2 of the 7th 
Directive which provides Member States with the option to permit the use of 
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valuation methods in consolidated financial statements other than those used in the 
annual accounts of the parent undertaking. As indicated by FEE (1993, p. 116), this 
alternative treatment is applicable to French companies in the particular case of 
foreign exchange adjustments. The examples of Pernod Ricard and Matra Hachette 
illustrate this practice: 
Pernod Ricard (1993): 
Note to the parent companyfinancial statements: 
"Income and expenses arising from currency translation differences are recorded at their 
exchange value on the transaction date. Payables, receivables and cash equivalents in 
foreign currency are recorded on the balance sheet at their year-end exchange rates. The 
differences arising from the discounting of payables and receivables at these rates are 
recorded on the balance sheet as currency translation adjustments. Unrealized exchange 
losses are subject to a provision for risks, atfull value. " 
Note to the consolidatedfinancial statement 
"Foreign currency transactions are translated at the exchange rate prevailing at the 
transaction date. Gains and losses resulting fiom foreign currency translation up until 
December 31,1993 are recorded in the statement of income. " 
Matra Hachette (1993): 
Note to the consolidatedfinancial statement: 
"Receivables and payables in foreign currencies are translated into the local currency 
of each company on the basis ofyear-end exchange rates. Unrealised gains and losses are 
credited or charged to income. However when a transaction in foreign currency is 
hedged, the contracted rate will be used " 
In Italy, a number of companies recorded all unrealised exchange differences in the 
profit and loss account, even though the CSPC recommends the deferral of 
unrealised exchange gains. 
Sogeft (1993): 
"Accounts receivables and payables denominated in a foreign currency are translated at 
the exchange rate ruling at the year end and the resulting exchange gains and losses are 
charged to the income statement. " 
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The exceptional discretion which the Spanish Government accorded to utilities as a 
result of the peseta devaluations in 1992 and 1993 was described in Part Three of 
this chapter. The policy of defering and amortising not only unrealised exchange 
gains but also losses is illustrated by the Spanish company Endesa: 
Endesa (1994): 
"Foreign currency balances are recorded at the exchange rates prevailing at the transaction 
date. At December 31 of each year, the outstanding balances of these transactions are reflected 
in the balance sheet at the then current exchange rate. Exchange differences were recorded as 
follows: as stipulated by the Ministry of Economy and Finance Order dated March 1Z 1993, 
adapting the Spanish National Chart of accounts for regulated entities, the exchange 
differences on each transaction arising in the year had to be allocated by the interest method 
over the transaction terni 77te exchange losses financially calculated as allocable to future 
years are recorded as "deferred charges " on the asset side of the balance sheetfor allocation to 
income in future years on the basis of the financial calculation method used Exchange losses 
allocable to the current year or to prior years are recorded as afinanFial expense in the year in 
which they arise, per the aforementioned Ministerial Order,. recognition of the exchange gain 
revenue on each transaction is generally deferred until maturity thereof However, the exchange 
gains arising in the current year which based on the flnancial calculation, are allocable to 
prior years are recognized as revenues up to the limit of exchange losses arising on the same 
transaction which were allocated to income in prior year, the excess, if any, being recorded on 
the liability side of the balance sheet as deferred revenues. ( .. )A Ministry of Industry and 
Energy Order dated December 3,1993, implemented by a subsequent resolutiom specifled the 
procedure for recovery of the exchange differences which arose in 1993 and 1994 through the 
electricity rate during the periodfivm 1993 to 199Z " 
In the Netherlands, a similar exception exists for unrealised exchange gains on long 
term transactions. However, in contrast to Portugal, this policy is optional and the 
probable reversal of the unrealised gain is not a necessary condition for its 
adoption. Instead, the relevant gains are amortised until maturity and future 
unrealised losses can be offset against them. Such treatment for unrealised 
exchange gains and losses on long term transactions was reported in the annual 
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report of Royal Nedlloyd, which also indicates the valuation of hedged transactions 
at the corresponding contracted rate: 
Royal Ned1loyd (1993): 
"Short-term receivables and payables in foreign currencies are translated into guilders at 
the rates prevailing on the balance sheet date, unless in specific cases the foreign 
currency position has been hedged by forward contracts. In that case the short-term 
receivables and payables are valued at the relevantforward rates. Exchange differences 
resulting from these short-term receivables and payables in foreign currencies a" 
recognised in the operating result in the period in which they arise. 
Profits on exchange arising in respect of long-term receivables and payables in foreign 
currencies other than fi-om/to foreign subsidiaries a" credited to the 'Equalization 
account currency exchange differences' forming part of 'Current liabilities. Losses on 
exchange in respect of these assets and liabilities a" charged to result unless they can be 
offset against prior-year gains on the same currency with the 'Equalization account 
currency exchange differences. The profits credited to this equalization account a" 
systematically allocated to the results during the remaining term of the receivables and 
payables concerned. " 
Foreign financial statements 
European practice reflects the regulatory harmony that exists with regard to the 
content of translation methods for foreign financial statements. As shown in Table 
6.6, the reporting practice in the sample confirms the dominant use of the closing 
rate method in each country, reported by 92 companies (76%) in 1987 and 149 
companies (82%) in 1993. Few companies distinguished between integrated and 
non-integrated subsidiaries, where the temporal or monetary/non-monetary method 
must be applied to the former, while only the latter was translated using the closing 
rate method. Most groups that translated the balance sheet at the closing rate, 
translated revenues and expenses at average rates for the financial period (referred 
to as the 'modified closing rate method'). This increased from 71% of the 
companies using the closing rate method in 1987 to 83% in 1993, a trend which 
anticipated the regulatory move in the revised IAS 21. Since 1993, this standard 
has no longer recommended the use of the closing rate to translate the income 
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statement of foreign subsidiaries. It may be noted that some of the companies 
which translated the income statement at the closing rate (referred to as the 'pure 
closing rate method'), did so even though its use is not permitted in national 
regulations. Finally, German practice deviated from the relatively uniform pattern 
throughout Europe, not only because German companies applied a variety of 
methods but also because they combined them in many ways, as will be illustrated 
next. 
The diversity which exists in German consolidated statements in this area is 
illustrated by the following examples: (i) the functional currency approach, 
including a "modified" temporal method which was reported in one case by BASF; 
(ii) a version of the temporal method where the translation difference is not 
recognised in the profit and loss account, as reported by Bayer; and (iii) the use of 
the current/hon-current method by Daimler Benz. In fact, translation methods are 
individualised by companies. For instance, Daimler Benz transfers translation 
differences to reserves and translates "borrowed capital" (presumably long-term 
loans) at the current rate, which is not consistent with the current/non-current 
method. BASF translates inventories at the closing rate under the "Modified" 
temporal method. However the relevant note to the accounts remains silent on the 
treatment of the translation difference. 
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BASF (1993): 
"Currency translation was based on the principle offunctional currency. Because of the 
low direct or indirect effect of the German mark on the trading operations of our 
subsidiaries and affiliates in North America, Japan and Korea, the local currency is to be 
regarded as the functional currency. The financial statements of these companies are 
converted to German marks asfollows: 
-all income and expense and the profMoss, at quarterly average rates - 
-all assets, liabilities and provisions at year-end current rates; (... ) 
. -the equity 
is carriedforward at the rates at the date of payment or accumulation; the 
adjustment to the values converted at year end current rates is shown separately in the 
balance sheet as translation adjustment in the equity. 
The other companies, whose business operations are more markedly influenced, directly 
or indirectly, by changes in the parity of the German mark are converted in accordance 
with the modified temporal method This also applies in principle to companies in high 
inflation countries, or if the financial statements are influenced by national regulations 
regarding inflation accounting. In these cases, the financW statements are converted to 
German Mark asJollows: 
-fired assets, except loans, at rates in effect at the date of acquisition or production 
(historical rates) 
-all other assets, liabilities and provisions at year end current rates 
-paid in capital at the rate at the date of payment or acquisition; the earned surplus is 
determined as a remaining balance in the balance sheets converted in accordance with 
these principles. 
Bayer (1993): 
"Foreign consolidated companies'financial statements are translated into DM according 
to a temporal method which does not affect net income. Foreign currency translation is 
made asJollows: 
-fixed assets, intangibles, investment in affiliated companies and other securities 
included in investments at the average DM exchange rate in the year of addition 
(historical average rate) 
-all other balance sheet items and net income at the year-end rate 
-all income and expenses at the weighted average ratefor the year. 
Bayer's portion of the adjustments resulting from the translation of foreign currency 
items in the balance sheet is included in capital reserves, while the minority 
stockholders'ponions are included in minority interest. 11 
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Daiinler Benz (1992): 
"The accounts of all foreign companies are translated to DM on the basis of historical 
exchange rates for non-current assets, and at the year end exchange rates for current 
assets, borrowed capital, and unappropriated profit. Stockholders' equity in DM is the 
remaining difference between translated assets less translated liabilities and 
unappropriated profit. The difference resultingfrom the translation of balance sheet items 
is recorded in consolidated retained earnings. Expense and income items are essentially 
translated at average annual exchange rates. To the extent that they relate to fixed assets 
(fExed asset depreciation, profit or loss from disposal offixed assets), they are translated 
at historical cost. Net income, additions to retained earnings, and the unappropriated 
profit are translated at year end rates. The difference resulting from the translation of 
annual net income, between annual average rates and the exchange rate at the balance 
sheet date is reflected in other operating income. " 
In the Netherlands several companies translated foreign financial statements in a 
manner that departs from the rules established by the Annual Reporting Council. 
Although the groups DAF and van Onuneren use the temporal method, van 
Ornmeren transfers the exchange difference to reserves, which is not in agreement 
with the regulatory guidelines, while DAF recognises the translation difference 
correctly in the profit and loss account. However, DAF translates inventories at the 
closing rate with is not consistent with the temporal method. Neither company 
applies the temporal method only to integrated subsidiaries; both appear to apply it 
to independent subsidiaries as well, which is another difference between practice 
and regulation. 
Van Ommeren (1993): 
"For the purpose of consolidating annual accounts denominated in foreign currencies, 
fixed assets are generally translated at historical rates of exchange, that is at the rates 
applicable at the year of acquisition. 
Other assets and liabilities of consolidated group companies are translated at the closing 
exchange rates. Income and expenses in the annual accounts denominated in foreign 
currencies are translated at the closing rate of exchange, except in the case of tangible 
fixed asset depreciation for which historical exchange rates apply. 
Exchange differences relating to the opening balance of net investments in foreign 
consolidated participating interests are taken direct to reserves. " 
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DAF (1993): 
"Forforeign subsidiaries expenditure on fixed assets is translated at the exchange rates 
ruling at the moment of acquisition. Expenditure on financW assets, current assets and 
liabilities denominated in foreign currency relating to both foreign subsidiaries and to the 
Company are translated at the exchange rate ruling on the balance sheet date. 
Exchange differences arising from the use of the exchange rates ruling at the balance 
sheet date for translating capital components denominated in foreign currency (excluding 
ftxed assets) andfrom the use of the average rate of exchange for translating profit and 
loss accounts denominated in foreign currency are incorporated directly in the profit and 
loss account. " 
In the UK, from 1987 to 1993, a significant proportion of the companies changed 
the translation of the income statement from the closing rate to the average rate for 
the financial period. While in 1987 the proportions of both rates were about 50150 
in the UK sample, by 1993 the proportion of the companies using the average rate 
was 76% and only 24% indicated the closing rate. A company which reported such 
a change in policy was Whitbread: 
R%itbread (1987 and 1993): 
in 1987 
"Assets and liabilities located overseas or denominated in a foreign currency and profits 
and losses offoreign subsidiaries and branches are translated into sterling at the foreign 
exchange rates ruling at the balance sheet date. Exchange differences arising from the re- 
translation of the opening net investment in foreign subsidiaries and branches at the 
closing rates of exchange are recorded as a movement on reserves. " 
in 1993 
"Assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currencies are translated into sterling at 
the rates of exchange quoted at the balance sheet date. Trading results are translated into 
sterling at average rates of exchange for the year. ( .. )Currency gains and losses arising 
from the retranslation of the opening net assets of overseas operations, less those arising 
from related currency borrowings to the extent that they are matched, are recorded as a 
movement on reserves. " 
153 
Although regulations in Denmark refer to the use of the 'exchange rate at the dates 
of transactions' to translate the income statement of foreign subsidiaries, the use of 
the closing rate was observed in some Danish annual reports and is here illustrated 
by the company Danisco: 
Danisco (1993): 1 
"Assets and U abilities as well as accounts offoreign subsidiaries inforeign currencies are 
translated into DKK at the rates of exchange ruling at the balance sheet date or at 
forward rates. Exchange adjustments are included in the profit and loss account 
Exchange gains or losses arising from the translation of the subsidiaries' net asset values 
at the beginning of the accounting year are included di"ctly in capital and reserves. On 
direct hedging of investments abroad, exchange adjustments of such hedging are also 
dealt with in capital and reserves. " 
The use of historic rates to translate equity capital was generally reported by 
Spanish groups. This reporting policy, which is in line with national regulations is 
illustrated by the Spanish company Metrovacesa. 
I 
Metrovacesa (1993): 
"The fuzancial statements of the group companies abroad were translated to pesetas at the 
exchange rate ruling at the year en4 exeptfor. ' 
1. Capital and reserves, which were translated at the historical exchange rates 
Z Statements of income, which were translated at the average exchange rarefor the year 
7he exchange difference arising as a result of application of this translation procedure is 
included wider the "shareholder ý investment translation gains" caption in the accompanying 
consolidated balance sheet. " 
6.5 Concluding remarks 
A key factor in the regulation of foreign currency reporting has been the 
harmonising effect of IAS 21 which has Progressively gained acceptance 
throughout Europe without the force of legislation. Instead, market forces appear 
to have led to the widespread adoption of this regulatory initiative of US origin, 
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which was taken up by the IASC and has been applied by multinational companies 
in Europe. This was made possible by the lack of other international regulatory 
positions on this issue, particularly by the European Comn-dssion, although it may 
be noted that recently the Accounting Advisory Forum has recommended rules in 
line with IAS 21 for the translation of foreign financial statements. However, 
because of the linkage between accounting and taxation and because of the 
emphasis on prudence in many Member States, the harmonising influence of IAS 
21 has been limited to consolidated accounts. 
This chapter has attempted to compare the regulations governing foreign currency 
reporting in different European countries. It demonstrated the widespread 
consensus with respect to the use of the closing rate method to translate foreign 
financial statements in the consolidated accounts on the one hand and the diversity 
in accounting for foreign transactions in individual accounts on the other. With 
respect to the regulations concerning the recognition of unrealised exchange gains, 
countries could be divided into three groups - those which recognise unrealised 
exchange gains in income, those which defer it and those which do not recognise 
such gains. However, at a detailed level, differing regulatory positions were 
observed with regard to short term and long term monetary items, currency 
hedging, and setting-off positive and negative translation differences. 
Examples from the published accounts of European companies confirmed the 
relative uniformity in consolidated accounts and the diversity in individual accounts 
in this area. It remains to be seen whether this difference in the reporting of foreign 
currency balances will continue in the future. In a number of instances, there was 
evidence of reporting practices which depart from local regulations. These included 
variation in the treatment of unrealised exchange gains and the use of a number of 
company specific translation methods. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE DEFINITION OF A SUBSIDIARY 
7.1 Introduction 
The distinction between formalism and anti-formalism was at the roots of 
controversy surrounding the drafting of the criteria defining group companies 
included in the Seventh Directive (van Me and van der Tas, 1995). The defacto 
'economic' criteria rely on the recognition of broader notions of unified decision- 
making and a dominant influence by the parent undertaking over a subsidiary, while 
the more precise de jure 'legal' criteria reqpire the existence of legally-defined 
rights to control another company. 
Following the implementation of the Seventh Directive, differences in regulatory 
strategy across countries are clearly evident. Economic control was not adopted in 
France, Spain and Italy. It was adopted in addition to legal control in the UK, 
Belgium and Denmark, but without detailed definition. In Germany, on the other 
hand, the conditions under which economic control may be presumed were 
specified in some detail in the law. Finally, in the Netherlands, where both forms of 
control were also implemented, economic control takes precedence over legal 
control. 
As for the effect of the Seventh Directive on member state law, it was either 
impldmented in commercial legislation (Germany, the UK and the Netherlands) or 
in a separate consolidation decree (Belgium, Denmark and Ireland) or in both 
(France, Italy and Spain). In addition to the law, supplementary standards have 
been issued in the Netherlands, the UK and Ireland. 
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It is evident that some countries have been very imaginative in their interpretation 
of the Directive and the resulting differences in regulatory strategy have given rise 
to various ways in which the boundaries of a group may be demarcated. In fact, at 
the present time, no two countries apart from the UK and Ireland have an identical 
accounting group concept. To some extent, the differing industrial structures and 
organisational forms which have developed in European nations over time have 
resisted accounting harmonisation. 
In an attempt to explore the different regulatory structures in European group 
accounting, this chapter first deals with the accounting traditions that influenced 
the development of Article I of the Seventh Directive. The analysis then considers 
the current legal framework in the EU by identifying and comparing the sources 
and design of consolidation rules concerning the definition of a subsidiary in each 
member state. The definition of a subsidiary adopted in practice is then examined, 
with particular reference to any changes in regulatory approach that might have 
taken place at the time of the implementation of the Directive. This is based on a 
review of annual financial statements for the years 1987 and 1993. 
7.2 The definition of a subsidiary in European company law 
The first country requiring consolidated accounts in Europe was the UK. The 
growth of large public corporations in the mid-1930s and the emerging separation 
of control from ownership (Bircher, 1988) led eventually to the first legal 
requýrement for consolidated accounts in the Companies Act 1947. In this Act, the 
definition of a parent-subsidiary relationship was on an entirely legal basis (de jure 
control), specified (in section 154) as either a 'majority of the equity' or 'control of 
the composition of the board'. These two legalistic consolidation criteria were 
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mirrored in SSAP 14 issued in 1978 and also remained unchanged in the 
Companies Act 1985 (section 736). 
In Germany, consolidated accounts were also published by groups long before 
there was a legal requirement (Ordelheide, 1995). In 1950, the allied occupation 
authorities required newly created companies in the coal and steel industry to 
publish -an audited consolidated balance sheet and income statement following 
American disclosure requirements, specified in Art. 16 (3) of the model articles of 
association (Mustersatung). This influenced. the voluntary publication of 
consolidated accounts by other companies which preceded the first legal 
consolidation requirement for corporations as set out in the 1965 Aktiengesetz 
(Busse von Colbe and Ordelheide, 1993). The Aktiengesetz, or AktG, adopted the 
concept of economic control of a group (Le. defacto control), specifying that a 
company with the legal form of a Aktiengesellschaft (AG) or 
Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien (KGaA) had to prepare consolidated financial 
statements if a subsidiary existed under 'unified management' (einheitliche 
Leitung, Art. 18). The Aktiengesetz did not define 'unified management' but 
specified that a majority-owned enterprise (in Mehrheitsbesitz stehendes 
Unternehmen, Art. 16(l)) is presumed to be a dependent undertaking (abh4Ungiges 
Unternehmen, Art. 17(2)) and that any dependent undertaking is presumed to be a 
group undertaking (Konzemuntemehmen) under 'unified management'. 
Furthermore 'unified management' is presumed to exist in the relationships of 
integration (Eingliederung, Art. 319) or contractual control 
(Beherrschungsvertrag, Art. 291). However, whilst consolidation is required if 
either integration or contractual control exist, majority ownership is not a 
necessary condition for consolidation. That is, in the case where there is majority 
ownership but there is not 'unified management', consolidation is not required. In 
the German Publizitdtsgesetz (PubIG), which extended the requirement to 
consolidate to large groups irrespective of their legal form in 1969, an identical 
definition of the parent-subsidiary relationship in terms of 'unified management' 
was codified. It should be noted that the consolidation requirements in the 
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Aktiengesetz and PubliziOugesetz were limited to the consolidation of the 
accounts of German subsidiaries only, a particular feature of German financial 
reporting until recently. 
In Ireland, the Irish Companies Act of 1963 introduced the requirement to 
consolidate and defined a subsidiary undertaking. in close accordance with the UK 
dejure control concept. However, the legal criteria given in this Act were not only 
the 'control of the composition of the board and a 'majority holding of the equity 
capital', but also 'majority holding of voting rights'. 
In Denmark, a Parliamentary Commission in 1964 defined a subsidiary in terms of 
a 'majority of shares' as well as a 'bestemmende indflydelse' (dominant influence), 
the latter being based on 'a majority of shares, voting rights or other rights in the 
articles of association or agreements. These definitions eventually formed the basis 
of the 1973 Companies Act which contained the notion of a group for the first time 
in Danish accounting legislation, although it may be noted that proposals for group 
accounts actually date back to 1934, when the Nordic countries attempted to 
harmonise company law. This project was never completed because of the Second 
World War. According to Christiansen and Hansen (1995, p. 841), these initial 
proposals were based on de facto economic control and, they suggest, were 
influenced by the prevailing German definition of a group. The Financial 
Statements Act 1981, which implemented the 4th Directive, did not change the 
definition of a group, although it made obligatory the requirement to publish group 
accounts. 
In the Netherlands, the definition of a subsidiary was referred to for the first time in 
the 1971 Wet op de jaarrekening van ondernemingen (Annual Accounts Act) 
which required (in Art. 13 para. 1) parent companies to include, in the explanatory 
notes on the financial statements, either consolidated statements or the financial 
statements of all subsidiaries, combined or individually. The definition of a 
subsidiary was based on a direct or indirect "majority share capital participation" 
159 
(YJaassen and Hekers, 1995, p. 2153). It only became obligatory to prepare 
consolidated accounts in the Netherlands in 1984 as a result of the legislation 
introducing the EC 4th Directive (through the Act of 7 December 1983). 
In Belgium, regulations on consolidation evolved from the late 1960s until the mid- 
1980s as a result of initiatives by the Banking Commission and pressure from 
workers' councils, but they were related - only to holding companies 
(portefeuillemaaachappijen / sociltis ii portefeuille) at that time. Holding 
companies had been institutionalised under a separate legal statute (the 1967 Royal 
Decree), which defined holding companies as companies which hold shares in one 
or more companies and which "enable them (de facto or de jure) to direct the 
activities of the- dependent companies" (Aerts and Theunisse, 1995, p. 500). 
However, this Decree did not contain any requirement with respect to group 
accounts. 
The first legal requirements in Belgium on the disclosure of group-related 
information were contained in the Royal Decree of 27 November 1973 concerning 
the economic and financial information to be disclosed to workers' councils. 
Although this legal text does not define group structures, it is interesting to note 
that trade union representatives and employer representatives disagreed on the 
issue of de jure and de facto control. VVhilst the trade union representatives 
favoured economic control, legal control inherent in the 'majority participation' 
criterion was preferred by the employers' organisations. The notion of economic 
control was specified by the union representatives as "a lower limit of 10% of the 
equity capital, 10% of the voting rights, or the nomination of more than 25% of the 
number of delegates on the board of directors with negative proof of association to 
be provided by the company concerned" (Aerts and Theunisse, 1995, p. 502). A 
Royal Decree in 1977 established the first legal requirement for consolidation. In 
the law of 20 January 1978, the definition of a subsidiary that was previously 
included in the Royal Decree of 1967 was modified to that of a company in which 
a holding company had "a majority in the capital or voting rights at the present or 
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the last -annual general meeting, or exercised control through a contract or other 
measures" (Lefebvre and Lin, 199 1, p. 140). 
In France, no legal consolidation requirements existed in company law before the 
adoption of the Seventh Directive through Law 85-11 of 3 January 1985 and 
Decree No. 86-221 of 17 February 1986. However, groups had begun to publish 
consolidated accounts from the 1960s onwards and, in the absence of legislation, 
decided to apply U. S. standards (Richard, 1995). In fact, the Commission des 
Opirations de Bourse (COB, Stock Exchange Commission) since 1961 has 
required group accounts for any company that sought permission to issue shares or 
bonds for the first time (Pham, 1993). The National Accounting Council had 
published the first official French text on consolidation on 20 March 1968: Rapport 
sur la consolidation des bilans et des comptes (Report on the Consolidation of 
Balance sheets and Accounts), which was optional however. The COB issued a 
reporting guideline for quoted companies in 1980. 
In Spain, the 1973 Standard National Chart of Accounts called for information 
about group companies and defined a group as existing when "one company has a 
direct holding in the capital stock of another company of 25% or more" (Corona, 
1992, p. 229). A non-binding Ministerial Order of July 1982 concerning the 
preparation of consolidated accounts was based on the draft Seventh Directive and 
was issued by the Institute of Accounting Planning, the predecessor of the ICAC 
(L6pez Diaz, Rivero Torre, 1995). In fact, consolidation regulation had existed for 
the purpose of computing tax on consolidated income since the Royal Decree Law 
No. 15 was issued in 1977, and consolidation requirements were introduced by the 
regulatory bodies for the electricity industry in 1984 and for the banking industry in 
1989*. The legal obligation for all groups to consolidate was incorporated in 
commercial law with the implementation of the EU Directive following the 
publication of the Real Decreto No. 18 15 (Royal Decree) in 199 1, which approved 
the Normas para lafonnulaci6n de las cuentas anuales consolidadas (standards 
for the preparation of consolidated annual accounts). 
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In Italy, there was no legal obligation for companies to prepare consolidated 
accounts until the Seventh Directive was incorporated into legislation (Riccabboni 
and Ghirri, 1994, p. 102). 
The Seventh Directive 
The coexistence of different approaches to group accounting within the EU and, at 
the same time, the lack in many Member States of specific regulations dealing with 
consolidated accounts led to action by the Community resulting in the adoption of 
the 7th Directive in 1983. The European Commission originally preferred an 
economic group approach, derived from German law, which was implicit in 
published drafts in the 1970s (Diggle and Nobes, 1994), but eventually, in the final 
text of the Directive, consolidation was made compulsory under legal power of 
control, and economic control was retained as a Member State option. 
In fact, in the first draft of the Directive prepared by the European Commission 
(which resulted from the proposals of the Groupe dEtudes Droit des Socigtis des 
Experts Comptables de la CEE) in 1971, consolidation was required F 
"if more than 50% of the shares were held or if the shareholding was less than 
50% but was combined with dominant influence" (van Hulle and van der Tas, 
1995 p. 1054). 
A second draft was published in 1974, following discussion with national experts 
from the member states, after the UK, Ireland and Denmark had joined the EC. 
Indeed, the criteria changed as a result of lobbying by the 'Anglo-Saxon' countries. 
Consolidation was now required 
"where an undertaking, directly or indirectly held the major part of the 
undertaking's subscribed capital, or where it controlled the majority of votes 
162 
in the undertaking, or where it could appoint more than half of the board 
members" (idem, p. 1054). 
After further discussion, the first published proposal for the Seventh Directive was 
issued by the Commission on 4 May 1976. The proposal revealed the strong 
German influence, as it defined a group in terms of dominance and dependence as 
follows: 
"A dominant undeftaking was stated to be any undertaking which exercised in 
practice its dominant influence to the effect that dependent undertakings were 
managed on a central and unified basis. The proposal laid down certain 
situations in which dominance and dependence would be presumed to exist 
(majority of the capital held, majority of the voting rights, appointment of 
more than half of the board members)" (idem, p. 1055). 
On 14 December 1978, the Conunission issued an amended proposal after the 
European Parliament and Economic and Social Committee had given their 
opinions. In 1979, there were further amendments by the Council Working Party 
which led to the avoidance of the term 'group' in the text of the Directive in favour 
of 'the undertakings to be consolidated taken as a whole', to a change in its title 
from 'group accounts' to 'consolidated accounts' and to an agreement to introduce 
a Est of circumstances in which consolidated accounts must be prepared. It was at 
this point that agreement was reached to make consolidation compulsory under 
legal power of control. 
The Seventh Directive (83/349/EEC) was adopted by the Council of Ministers on 
13 Jqne 1983. In Article 1 of the final published text, the Directive specifies seven 
parent-subsidiary relationships. In accordance with this, Member States must 
require consolidation where a parent undertaking has the "legal power to control" 
another undertaking (van Hulle and van der Tas, 1995, p-1083), which is presumed 
in four cases: 
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e the holding -of the majority of the voting rights (Art. 1.1 (a)); 
* the right to appoint or to remove a majority of the board members 
(Art. 1.1 (b)); 
9 the right to exercise a dominant influence pursuant to a contract or a 
provision in articles of association (Art. 1.1 (c)); and 
e the holding of a majority of the voting rights pursuant to an agreement 
with other shareholders (Art. 1.1 (d)(bb)). 
The final version of the Directive also specifies a further case in Article 1.1 where 
Member States may require consolidation on the grounds that a parent has the 
power to control which is not necessarily dependent on holding legal rights but, 
rather, as a matter of historical fact, evidenced by 
* the appointment of a majority of the board members during two 
consecutive years, solely as a result of the exercise of voting rights 
(Art. 1.1 (d)(aa)). 
According to van Hulle and van der Tas (1995, p. 1086), during the negotiations of 
the Directive, Art. 1.1 (d)(aa) was "strongly advocated by France, but opposed by 
many other countries. " 
Two other cases of de facto control are included in a separate article, as Member 
State options which may or may not be included in national law. Here, de facto 
control exists if a parent undertaking has a participating interest in the subsidiary 
and either 
e the parent actually exercises a dominant influence on the subsidiary 
company (Art. 1.2(a)); or 
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the subsidiary and the parent undertaking are managed on a unified basis 
(Art. 1.2(b)). 
The inclusion of one de facto criterion in Art. I-I along with the de jure criteria 
seems to have resulted in ambiguity in what is now understood by defacto control. 
For instance, the term de facto is used by companies in their financial reports (and 
also in texts on financial reporting) to refer to all three criteria, or alternatively to 
the two criteria in Art. 1.2 or, indeed, to the specific criterion for which a Member 
State has opted. Furthermore, the dejure and de facto control concepts are not the 
same as the original legal and economic control criteria which used to distinguish 
the UK and Germany. In conclusion, as van Hulle and van der Tas (1995, p. 1064) 
remark: 
"It is difficult to say whether the Directive finally adopts the legal or the 
economic approach. Although the Directive requires consolidation in the case 
of legal power of control, in its definition of the mandatory cases of 
consolidation, it goes beyond the traditional legal power of control approach. 
Consolidation is indeed also required in cases where the parent does not hold 
the majority of the voting rights. By allowing Member States to require the 
consolidation of certain minority shareholdings, the Directive has clearly 
borrowed from the economic approach. " 
Throughout the rest of this chapter, the term de jure control will be used to refer 
to the Directive's four criteria presuming legal control, and de facto control will 
refer to the three cases where effective control is presumed. 
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73 The current regulations 
An overview of the implementation of the Seventh Directive into national company 
law is provided in Table 7.1. This shows the various ways in which the seven 
parent-subsidiary relationships have been treated in national laws and, hence, 
reveals the differences in the scope of a consolidated group between European 
states. The alternative combinations of the seven criteria result in the definition of 
the scope of an accounting group being unique in each country, except that the UK 
and Ireland have adopted the same definition. 
Dejure ctiteria 
Majority of voting rights 
Art. 1.1 (a), requiring consolidation when there is a majority of voting rights in a 
subsidiary, is a compulsory criterion which has been implemented by all countries. 
Right to appoint board members 
Art. 1.1 (b), which requires consolidation when the parent has the right to appoint 
or remove the majority of board members, was implemented 
* 
in all countries except 
France and Italy. Even though it was compulsory under the Seventh Directive, the 
argument that has been put forward in France is that this right to appoint or 
remove board members is anyway consequent in French law to the holding of the 
majority of the voting rights (Pham, 1993). Elsewhere, there is evidence that such 
rights of appointment and removal may exist even in the absence of a majority of 
votiýg rights because they are attached to preferential shares in Belgium (see Aerts 
and Theunisse, 1995, p. 516) and in the Netherlands (see Petite, 1984, p. 90), or by 
articles and agreements in Germany, in particular for limited liability companies as 
indicated by Ordelheide (1995, p. 1583). 
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Contractual right to exercise a dominant influence 
In the final text of Art. 1.1 (c), consolidation is required when a parent undertaking 
has the right to exercise a dominant influence over a subsidiary, pursuant to a 
contract or to a provision in its memorandum or articles of association. Art. 1.1 (c) 
is compulsory except in cases where a Member State's law does not provide for 
such contracts and clauses, although a further option given in the Directive is that 
Member States may indicate that this criterion only applies if the parent is a 
shareholder in the subsidiary. It appears that this criterion was only included in the 
Directive after lengthy debate (Petite, 1984, p. 90). 
All Member States, with the exception of Spain, implemented the requirement to 
consolidate when there is"a dominant influence pursuant to a contract or clause, 
and Belgium, Denmark and France chose to limit it to those cases where the parent 
is a shareholder. 
With regard to the nature of contracts giving the right to exercise a dominant 
influence, there seem to be significant differences in law across European 
countries. In Germany, a subordination contract (Beherrschungsvertrag), where 
one undertaking has the right to give direct instructions to the management of 
another undertaking, is subject to strict conditions in the case of 
AktiengeselIschaften (AktG Art. 293,294 - see Ordelheide, 1995, p. 15 84). 
Although such contracts are illegal in certain other countries and German law 
appears to be unique in providing for such contracts (see FEE, 1993, p. 80), other 
Member States were motivated nevertheless to adopt the criterion because a parent 
undertaking might conclude such a contract with a foreign subsidiary in a country 
where such contracts are lawful. In fact, in Belgium, the Report to the King 
accompanying the Consolidation Decree states explicitly that, although the type of 
contract "known in Germany as Beherrschungsvertr4ge cannot be legally enforced 
in Belgian subsidiaries, it can however be relevant for foreign subsidiaries, 
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especially for German group enterprises" (Aerts and Theunisse, 1995, p. 516). In 
France, where dominant control by means of statutory clauses is also forbidden, 
the new law was written "to take account of conventions which are used abroad, 
especially in Germany" (Richard, 1995, p. 1319). In Italy, where contratti di 
dominazione are again illegal, the same argument has been advanced (Riccaboni 
and Ghirri, 1994, p. 158). Indeed, even though the Italian Civil Code (Art. 2359 
para. 3) refers to the subsidiary definition in terms of a dominant influence based 
on contractual ties (influenza dominante di un'altra sociela in virtý di particolari 
vincoli contrattuah), legislative decree-No. - 127-explicitly excludes this provision 
for consolidation purposes (Art. 26). 
Thus, in countries such as Belgium, France -and -Italy, where subordination 
contracts are illegal, they are nevertheless recognised in law in the context of group 
accounting due to their legitimacy in other jurisdictions. The situation is not so 
clear cut in the UK and the Netherlands, where such contracts were not in conflict 
with established commercial law, yet appear not to be commonplace. 
In the UK, for instance, there may be a risk that acceptance by directors of a 
contractual right of 'dominant influence' over them would be in breach of the 
common law duty to act in the best interest of their company (para 70, FRS 2). 
Gordon and Gray reason (1994, p. 160) that "the general fiduciary duty of directors 
to conduct the affairs of the company in accordance with its own best interests 
makes it most unlikely that consolidation by virtue of a control contract will have 
much practical effect unless the power to enter into control contracts is explicitly 
conferred by a company's memorandum and articles. " 
The 'Contractual right of group control is also referred to in the Netherlands (RJ 
2.03.103), as noted by Klaassen and Hekers; (1995), although the potential conflict 
in laws is not discussed by these authors. 
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Majority of voting rights through agreement with others 
Art. 1.1(d)(bb) requires consolidation where a single shareholder controls the 
majority of voting rights in a subsidiary undertaking pursuant to an agreement with 
other shareholders or members. However, no detail concerning the form and 
content of such agreements is provided in Art. 1.1 (d)(bb) and, instead, the option to 
introduce more detailed provisions into the national law is granted to Member 
States. 
It would appear that this article has been introduced in all Member States. 
However, according to the Fidgration des Experts Comptables Europiens (1993, 
p. 8 1), no country took up the option of providing more information concerning the 
form and content of such agreements. 
Defacto criteria 
Appointment of a majority of board members by exercise of voting rights 
Art. 1.1(d)(aa) allows Member States to require consolidation where a parent 
company has appointed the majority on the supervisory board of a subsidiary 
undertaking during two consecutive years solely by exercising its voting rights. The 
article contains the option for Member States to make this criterion dependent on a 
holding of at least 20 % of the voting rights in the subsidiary. The provision has 
been implemented as a consolidation requirement in company law by France, 
Belgium and Spain. 
Whifst the French Assembly adopted this de facto control criterion (see Scheid and 
Walton, 1992, p. 328), French law was further refined such that a company's claim 
to have appointed the majority of the board is substantiated if two conditions are 
fulfilled: (i) the parent undertaking has held more than 40% of the voting rights 
during the two years and (ii) no other shareholder has held a higher proportion 
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(Raffegeau et al., 1989). As noted by Richard (1995, p. 1318): "as the nomination 
of directors frequently results from a secret vote of the shareholders, the proof of 
the origin of the votes can be difficult to show. " Thus, as there may be no clear 
evidence, the presumption of contrOle defait (defacto control) has led to a unique 
definition of control in France. 
Similarly in Belgium, the presumption attached to Art. 1.1 (d)(aa) is articulated in 
law, where defacto control is based on the exercise of a majority of voting rights 
of the shares represented at the last and previous general assemblies. 'This 
presumption, which may be refuted if there is evidence to the contrary, can lead to 
an enterprise being classified as a subsidiary in some years and in others nof' 
(Lefebvre and Flower, 1994, p. 136). 
Spain also adopted Art. 1.1(d)(aa) but did not exercise the option to make the 
obligation to consolidate dependent on the ownership of 20 % of the voting rights 
(Gonzalo and Gallizo, 1992, p. 227). 
Actual exercise of a dominant influence andlor unified management 
Art. 1.2 allows Member States the option to make consolidation compulsory where 
a parent undertaking holds a participating interest (as defined in Article 17 of the 
Fourth Directive) in a subsidiary undertaking and either (a) the parent actually 
exercises a dominant influence over the subsidiary or (b) the parent and the 
subsidiary are managed on a unified basis. 
- Dominant influence only 
Denmark chose to implement only the criterion in Art. 1.2(a) that a parent- 
subsidiary relationship exists when the parent actually exercises a dominant 
influence. Reference to dominant influence (bestemmende indflydelse), which 
already existed in law, occurs again in the krsregnskapsbekendtgorelsen of 1990 
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(ARL, section 1(2) No. 6). However, the notion of dominant influence is not 
defined in Danish law. Furthermore, as the option in Art. 1.2(b) was not taken up, 
the law does not refer to 'unified management'. 
- Unified management only 
Germany, on the other hand, was the only -country to implement just the second 
criterion that de facto control exists if the parent and the subsidiary are managed 
on a unified basis (Art. 1.2(b)).. The notion of unified management existed already 
in German law (Art. 18 AktG) and its interpretation has not changed since 
(Odenwald, 1992). In Germany, de facto control continues to be based on the 
unified management of the parent and the subsidiary (Art. 290(l) HGB; Art. 11 (1) 
PublG. ). The additional requirement for there to be a participating interest, which 
is defined as a 20% shareholding (Art. 271(l) HGB), is only applicable if the 
parent is a corporation under the HGB. For enterprises of other legal forms, 
unified management creates a parent subsidiary-relationship even if there is no 
shareholding (as defined in Art. 27 1 (1) HGB). 
The law states (Art. 18 AktG) that a Konzem exists if the controlling enterprise 
(herrschendes Untemehmen) and a dependent enterprise (abhdngiges 
Untemehmen) are under unified management. The law (Art. 17 AktG) also states 
that there is a presumption that a majority-owned enterprise will be dependent, 
although it is possible for unified management to be refuted (Art. 18 (1) S. 3 AktG). 
In fact, unified management is not defined in detail in the law, although the AktG 
1965 specified conditions under which unified management may be presumed. 
These are where a dependent undertaking is controlled by a subordination 
agreement (Beherrschungsvertrag) or if it is integrated into the controlling 
enterprise (Art. 291,319 AktG), and in these cases the existence of unified 
management cannot be refuted (Art. 18(1)S. 2 AktG). The specific circumstance of 
integration (Eingliederung) of one AG into another AG in Germany, requires a 
100% ownership of the share capital by the controlling AG (Art. 319 AktG). 
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(MZL, section 1(2) No. 6). However, the notion of dominant influence is not 
defined in Danish law. Furthennore, as the option in Art. 1.2(b) was not taken up, 
the law does not refer to 'unified management'. 
- Unified management only 
Germany, on the other hand, was the only -country to implement just the second 
criterion that de facto control exists if the parent and the subsidiary are managed 
on a unified basis (Art. 1.2(b)).. The notion of unified management existed already 
in German law (Art. 18 AktG) and its interpretation has not changed since 
(Odenwald, 1992). In Germany, de facto control continues to be based on the 
unified management of the parent and the subsidiary (Art. 290(l) HGB; Art. I1 (1) 
PublG. ). The additional requirement for there to be a participating interest, which 
is defined as a 20% shareholding (Art. 271(l) HGB), is only applicable if the 
parent is a corporation under the HGB. For enterprises of other legal forms, 
unified management creates a parent subsidiary-relationship even if there is no 
shareholding (as defined in Art. 27 1 (1) HGB). 
The law states (Art. 18 AktG) that a Konzem exists if the controlling enterprise 
(herrschendes Untemehmen) and a dependent enterprise (abhangiges 
Untemehmen) are under unified management. The law (Art. 17 AktG) also states 
that there is a presumption that a majority-owned enterpri se will be dependent, 
although it is possible for unified management to be refuted (Art. 18 (1) S. 3 AktG). 
In fact, unified management is not defined in detail in the law, although the AktG 
1965 specified conditions under which unified management may be presumed. 
These are where a dependent undertaking is controlled by a subordination 
agreiment (Beherrschungsvertrag) or if it is integrated into the controlling 
enterprise (Art. 291,319 AktG), and in these cases the existence of unified 
management cannot be refuted (Art. 18(1)S. 2 AktG). The specific circumstance of 
integration (Eingliederung) of one AG into another AG in Germany, requires a 
100% ownership of the share capital by the controlling AG (Art. 319 AktG). 
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A legal commentary (AktG Art-18) by Kropff (1965, p. 33) states that "unified 
management must actually exist (factual unified management). However, it is not 
necessary that all important business segments are under unified management nor 
does the control depend on the right to give directions to the management of the 
dependent enterprise. Instead, it is sufficient if the group management coordinates 
the general business policy of the group undertakings. In fact, this may take the 
looser form of regular consultation or it can result from personal interaction 
between managers" (Odenwald, 1992, translated from original). 
- Dominant influence and unifled management 
The countries which implemented both Art. 1.2 (a) and Art. 1.2 (b) were the UK, 
Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium. 
In the UK, the Companies Act 1989 (sec. 258) introduced de facto control on the 
grounds of both dominant influence and unified management (see Gordon and 
Gray, 1994, p. 245). The ASB (Accounting Standards Board) defined 'dominant 
influence' and 'unified management' in FRS 2 "Accounting for subsidiary 
undertakings" published in 1992. 'Dominant influence' is defined as 
"influence that can be exercised to achieve the operating and financial 
policies desired by the holder of the influence, notwithstanding the rights or 
influence of any other party. " 
FRS 2 defines 'unified management' where 
"two or more undertakings are managed on a unified basis, if the whole of 
the operations of the undertakings are integrated and they are managed as a 
single unit. Unified management does not arise solely because one 
undertaking manages another". 
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In Ireland, the application of FRS2 in 1992 anticipated the implementation of the 
Seventh Directive and hence the definition of a subsidiary. The Irish Regulation 
4(l), Group Accounts Regulations 1992, followed the UK approach and adopted 
the two defacto control criteria of dominant influence and unified management. 
In the Netherlands, there exists a difference between a group company and a 
subsidiary company which does not appear to mirror the distinctions between legal 
and economic control in the Seventh Directive. In fact, it seems confusing that 
under Dutch law, a subsidiary may not be included in the consolidated financial 
statements if it is not a group company, and a group company may be consolidated 
even though it is not a subsidiary (Art. 406 Civil Code). While a subsidiary is 
defined (Art. 2: 24(a)) in accordance with de jure control in Articles 1.1(a) and 
1.1(b) of the Seventh Directive, a group is defined (Art. 2: 24(b)) as an economic 
whole (economische eenheid) in which legal entities are united, although the term 
deconomic whole' is not defined in the legislation. The Guidelines of the Council 
on Annual Reporting (RJ 2.03.103) specify that complementary economic activities 
and a collective financial policy indicate the existence of an 'economic whole' 
(Klaassen and Hekers, 1995, p. 2162). 
In Belgium, group control adopted in legislation is de jure or de facto and Art. 1.2 
of the Seventh Directive has been implemented in Art. 2(l) Royal Decree of 6 
March 1990 (Lefebvre and Flower, 1994, p. 241). In fact, de facto control is 
presumed in Belgium when a company has exercised a majority of the voting rights 
represented at the last two general shareholders' meetings. It is suggested by Aerts 
and Theunisse, however, that the group concept in Belgium is "mainly an economic 
one, ' (1995, p. 515). "If legal control is effectively exercised, group accounts 
should be prepared. If a legal control relationship exists, but some circumstances 
prevent effective economic control, this can be a reason for non-consolidation. If 
no legal control relationship exists but de facto control can be presumed, 
consolidation is compulsory. " 
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In conclusion, the three criteria under which de facto control is referred to in 
Article 1 of the Seventh Directive (appointment of majority of board, dominant 
influence and unified management) have been implemented into national laws with 
considerable diversity. France and Spain do not refer to de facto control in terms 
either of dominant influence, or of unified management and instead, as has been 
stated, consider de facto control only with respect to Art. 1.1(d)(aa) of the 
Directive; that is, the case where a parent has appointed during a two year period a 
majority of the subsidiary's board. Denmark accorded the actual exercise of a 
dominant influence to defacto control, and thus enacted Art. 1.2(a) only. German 
law refers to de facto control where a parent and a subsidiary are under unified 
management and thus enacted only Art. 1.2(b). Both, 'unified management' and 
'dominant influence' comprise de facto control in Dutch, British and Irish 
accounting legislation. On the other hand, de facto control includes all three 
criteria in Belgium. It appears, that Italy is the only country, which adopted none 
of the three criteria specified as de facto control in. the- Seventh Directive (see 
Riccaboni and Ghirri, 1994, p. 230). 
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The diversity between Member States in the adoption of the de facto control 
criteria is clearly a result of the optional character accorded to them by the 
Directive. Moreover, the different interpretations of the dejacto control concept 
are also attributable to the lack of definition of the terms 'unified management' and 
'dominant influence' used in the Seventh Directive. The fundamental difference in 
Europe on the issue seems to be, however, that de facto control is referred to in 
some countries as the actual exercise of voting rights in the past, while in other 
countries dejacto control signifies the effective existence of an economic group 
control relationship. 
Implications 
The different combinations of the de jure and de facto control criteria, discussed 
above, show the variability with which the Directive has been interpreted in the 
development of regional regulations for group accounting in Europe. 
It appears that the development of different organisational group structures in 
Europe and their legal frameworks have created tensions between the national 
legislations. In fact, the differences in interpretation of Article I of the Seventh 
Directive have given rise to various ways in which the boundaries of a consolidated 
group may be demarcated. Below, this elusive concept of a group is further 
discussed with respect to 
(i) confusion between the 'legal' and the 'economic'; 
(ii) resistance to harmonisation; 
(iii) subsequent developments in individual countries. 
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(i) Confusion between the 'legal' and the 'economic' 
The distinction between 'legal' and 'economic' control is not always clear, 
particularly as economic control may be presumed in the light of certain legal 
relationships. For example, the German Aktiengesetz specifies the economic 
criterion of unified management by reference to legal parent-subsidiary 
relationships (namely the existence of integration or contractual control, or 
majority ownership of share capital, according to which the power to exercise 
economic control is presumed). Thus, in Germany, economic control may operate 
through legal criteria. 
Alternative examples of this source of confusion exist where dejure control in one 
country operates as de facto in another. That is, while a certain parent-subsidiary 
relationship might be considered in one country as a legal criterion, it might be 
classified in another country as an economic criterion. For instance, in France the 
use of the term contrble exclusive for consolidation purposes implies ntattrise 
juridique (legal power of control) only with respect to each of the different control 
concepts included in the amendment of 1985 (Art. 357.1), i. e. contrble de droit, 
contr6le contractuel and contr6le de fait (Raffegeau et al. 1989, p. 93). In each 
case, the definition relies upon voting power. Contr6le de droit simply involves a 
majority of voting rights. Furthermore, contr6le contractuel recognises only 
conventions de vote; that is, voting conventions in the collective interest of 
shareholders (Richard, 1995, p. 1319). Finally, contr6le de fait depends on the 
appointment of the majority of the board during two consecutive years, which in 
this case is presumed with the exercise of 40% of the votes, while at the same time, 
no other shareholder has hold a higher proportion. Hence, although the French 
legislator refers to contr6le de fait which is usually translated as de facto control, 
the concept is entirely legal since it is based on voting rights which either exist at 
present or were exercised in the past. 
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The ambiguity with which parent-subsidiary relationships might be classified as de 
jure or as de facto is in fact rooted within the Directive itself. In particular, 
confusion arises from Art. 1.1(d)(aa) which, although being a Member State 
option, was included as de facto control criterion in Art. 1.1 along with the 
mandatory dejure consolidation requirements. This ambiguity is acknowledged by 
van Hulle and van der Tas (1995, p. 1086): "Ibis gives this case the appearance of 
a requirement but also makes the text of the Seventh Directive Article I difficult to 
interpret. " Indeed, this particular de facto control criterion (whereby an 
undertaking has during two consecutive financial years effectively appointed a 
majority of the board members in another undertaking solely as a result of the 
exercise of its voting rights) does not imply an economic parent-subsidiary 
relationship but, instead, a historical fact. 
Finally, although the 'true and fair view' principle is excluded from the scope of 
consolidation and the Seventh Directive has made it clear in Art. 16(5) that the true 
and fair view does not relate to its Art. 1, in some specific instances the exclusion 
of subsidiaries from the consolidated accounts may be linked to the presentation of 
a true and fair view of a group's affairs. Thus, a de facto relationship may take 
precedence over a de jure relationship. Ibis may depend not only on different 
definitions of 'true and fair' in Member States (Alexander, 1993), but also on the 
specific circumstances of the company concerned. Indeed, it may be noted that Art. 
14, paras I and 2 which require exclusion of subsidiaries with dissimilar activities 
from the consolidated accounts where their inclusion would impair a true and fair 
view of the group accounts, has been identified as being in conflict with IAS 27 
which does not allow such an exclusion (van Hulle and van der Tas, 1995, p. 1089). 
(ii) Resistance to hannonisation 
Following the implementation of the Directive, some resistance to harmonisation 
has been observed arising from well-established institutional structures to which 
the new regulations could not easily be adapted. One example of this relates to the 
179 
contractually-based group relationship known as Vertragskonzeme, developed in 
Germany in the inter-war period (Hadden, 1992), which could not transfer readily 
to other jurisdictions. As mentioned earlier, the legal provisions for contractual 
groups are still an important feature of German group law, whereas their 
acceptance within European company law has created major difficulties. Although 
the obligation to consolidate where control is exercised through a contract or a 
provision in the memorandum or articles of association (Article 1.1 (c)) has been 
implemented in most jurisdictions, some national legislation still prohibits 
subordination contracts. Nevertheless, contractual control based on clauses in the 
articles of association has become a legal criterion for control in most Member 
States. 
A further example is found in the Netherlands, where economic group control 
takes precedence over legal power to control. In fact, even though the Seventh 
Directive has explicitly treated defacto control as a secondary criterion and has 
accorded primacy to legal control as the principal consolidation requirement (van 
Hulle and van der Tas, 1995, p. 1085), the Duch legislator has made it clear that 
the requirement for consolidation refers only to 'group companies' which form an 
economic whole. Indeed, it follows that if no economic control exists, "no 
obligation to consolidate a subsidiary would exist" (Klaassen and Hekers, 1995, p. 
2158). Thus, legal control is subordinated to economic control in the Netherlands 
which seems clearly to be in conflict with Community law. 
A final instance of resistance to harmonisation can be seen where the concept of de 
facto control already existed in law. Here, a single notion was usual, as in the case 
of dominant influence (bestemmende indflydelse) in Denmark and uniform 
management in Germany (einheitlich Leitung). Neither country widened the scope 
of de facto control, as Germany has not included reference to dominant influence 
as a de facto criterion for control and Denmark has not included reference to 
unified management. 
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(iii) Subsequent developments in individual countries 
Although the approach adopted in the Directive does not allow for further parent- 
subsidiary relationships beyond those specified in Article 1, there is evidence that 
the de facto control criteria have been extended by national regulators. The UK 
(and Irish) standard setters widened the definition of a subsidiary, using what has 
been progressively termed 'non-subsidiary subsidiaries' (ED 42,1988), 'controlled 
non-subsidiaries' (ED 49,1990) and 'quasi-subsidiaries' (FRS 5,1994). The 
intention was to respond to changing economic circumstances, allowing for 
'substance over form' (Taylor, 1995). The ASB defined a 'quasi-subsidiary' (which 
should be accounted for as if it were a subsidiary) as a 
"... a company, trust, partnership, or other vehicle which, though not 
fulfilling the definition of a subsidiary, is directly or. indirectly controlled by 
the reporting entity and gives rise to benefits for that entity that are in 
substance no different from those, that would arise were the vehicle a 
subsidiary" in (para. 7) FRS 5 "Reporting the substance of transactions". 
The UK definition of a quasi-subsidiary is clearly beyond the seven parent- 
subsidiary relationships specified in Article I of the Directive. 
In summary, the different interpretations of de jure and de facto control in Europe 
imply that the boundaries of consolidated financial statements appear to vary 
internationally. While some jurisdictions such as France defined group control in a 
detailed (legal) manner, which depends solely on the existence or effective exercise 
of voting rights, other countries such as the Netherlands adopted a solely economic 
approach to group control, which indeed may exclude de jure relationships in 
certain circumstances. In contrast, a broader concept of group control has been 
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adopted in countries such as the UK and Germany, where both effective economic 
control and the existence of certain rights of control are consolidation criteria. 
7.4 The criteria used in practice to define a subsidiary 
In order to. investigate the definition of a subsidiary adopted in practice and to 
relate this to the differences which exist in regulations between member states, the 
accounting policies reported in the annual reports of European groups have been 
analysed with respect to the inclusion of subsidiaries in group accounts. 
This analysis is based on an earlier investigation (Ebbers, 1997c) for the thesis 
sample of companie's with multiple listings in Europe. The financial years 1987 
(117 companies) and 1993 (223 companies) were chosen for the analysis as, during 
this period, most member states enacted the Seventh Directive in national laws. 
Table 7.2 indicates the frequency with which consolidation criteria were reported 
in the sample. In 1993,172 (87%) companies disclosed, with different degree of 
detail, criteria used to consolidate subsidiaries and 99 (85%) in 1987. As some 
groups stated that two or more criteria were applied to the definition of 
consolidated subsidiaries, the results for the different criteria do not add up to the 
total. In 1993,159 (80%) companies specified one or more -of the de jure control 
criteria, whilst 27 (14%) companies specified one of the de facto control criteria. 
In 17 (9%) cases, de jure and/or de facto consolidation was indicated but without 
specifying which criteria. These proportions did not change significantly between 
1987 and 1993. Also, there were several discrepancies between reporting practices 
and requirements in law. These are indicated in Table 7.2 by the shaded boxes; that 
is, where a criterion is used in practice although it is not in the current national 
legislation. 
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Dejure cyiteria 
Majority of voting rights (1.1(a)) 
A majority of shareholders' voting rights was the dominant criterion used to define 
consolidated subsidiaries for both years. This was disclosed by 95 out of the 117 
companies (8 1 %) in the 1987 sample and 159 out of 198 companies (80%) in the 
1993 sample. 
Right to appoint majority of board members (I. I (b)) 
The right to appoint the majority of board members was reported by 6 companies 
in 1993, of which 5 were Dutch and I was a UK company. It may be noted here, 
that in the Netherlands a subsidiary is defined in accordance with the de jure 
control criteria in Articles 1.1(a) and 1.1(b) of the Directive, whilst a group is 
defined as an 'economic whole in which legal entities are united' (Art. 2: 24 (b) Civil 
Code). Only subsidiaries which are group companies are consolidated. This can be 
seen in practice as in the following extract from the annual report of Bols 
Wessanen: 
Bols Wessanen (1993): 
"( .. ) Group companies are 
deflned as: 
-companies of which more than half of the voting rights can be exercised in the annual 
general meeting, or 
-companies of which the majority of the statutory directors or supervisory directors can 
be appointed or dismissed, 
but only if these companies form an integral part of the economic entity. 
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Right based on a contract or clause 1. I(c) 
The obligation to consolidate in cases where a dominant influence is exercised 
through a contract or clause was disclosed by 4 groups in 1993 (1 in 1987). 
Although the earlier discussion suggested that this is a special feature of German 
company law, it was not disclosed as a consolidation criterion by any of the 
German groups. This is in accordance with an earlier Treuarbeit study (Treuarbeit, 
1990, p. 44) in which 51 out of the 95 analysed groups disclosed their criteria for 
consolidation but none reported that consolidation was based on a contract. 
However, the mention of contractual rights was found in 4 annual reports in other 
countries: in Italy (2 companies), where such contracts are illegal for consolidation 
purposes, and in the UK (2 companies), where the existence of the contract may 
give rise to the risk of being "in breach of the directors' duty to act in the best 
interest of their company' (FRS 2). This reference to contractual rights may be 
illustrated by the following extracts from the consolidation policies of the Italian 
group Montedison and the UK group Sema: 
Montedison (1987): 
'The consolidated financial statements include the accounts of Montedison S. p. A. and 
subsidiaries in which it has a direct or indirect interest of more than 5001o. They also 
include the accounts of companies where the Group, although*possessing 50% or Iess of 
the equity, has contractual power to controlfinancial and operating policies. " 
Sema (1993): 
"The Group's 50% holding in BAeSEMA limited and its 49% holding in Tibet SA have 
been Mly consolidated as Group undertakings as defined by the Companies Act 1989. 
BAeSEMA is consolidated on the basis of a shareholders' agreement which gives the 
Group control of the board of directors. Tibet SA is consolidated on the basis of actual 
dominant influence exercised by the Group by virtue of a control contract. " 
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Agreement with other shareholders (I. I(d)(bb)) 
The obligation to consolidate subsidiaries where control of a majority of voting 
rights is based on an agreement with other shareholders, was found in 8 annual 
reports in 1993 (3 inl987), comprising 3 (1) in Italy, 2 (1) in the Netherlands, l(l) 
in the UK and 1 (0) in Denmark. 
Defacto control 
Actual appointment of the majority supervisory board (1.1(d)(aa)) 
No examples were found in the sample of the criterion to require consolidation 
where the parent-subsidiary relationship is based on the appointment of the 
majority of board members for two consecutive years. Nevertheless, this provision 
has been implemented in company law in Belgium, France and Spain. 
Actual dominant influence (1.2(a)) 
The criterion to base consolidation on de facto dominant influence was reported in 
14 annual reports in 1993 (3 in 1987), of which 5(l) were in Denmark, 6 (2) in the 
Netherlands and 3(0) in the UK. The Danish companies Novo and Great Nordic 
illustrate this policy, Novo referring to a 'dominating influence' (dominerende 
indflydelse in the Danish report) and Great Nordic to a 'controlling interest' 
(bestemmende indflydelse in the Danish report): 
Novo (1987): 
'The consolidated financial statements include the accounts of the Company and all 
companies in which the group owns more than 50% of the voting rights or in some 
other way has a dominating influence. " 
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Great Nordic (1993): 
"The consolidated accounts comprise Me Parent Company and oil Danish andforeign 
subsidiaries, in which the Parent company, directly or indirectly. has a confrollinS 
interest. " 
Unified management (1.2(b)) 
References to the parent-subsidiary relationship as unified management were found 
in the annual reports of 13 groups in 1993 (6 in 1987), including 9 out of 29 (31%) 
German groups, either together with a majority shareholding or as a single 
consolidation criterion. A study by Treuhand (1990) found the same proportion for 
the year 1989, where in 16 cases out of 51 (31%), disclosing groups based the 
consolidation of a subsidiary on einheidicite Leitung. In the following extracts, 
einheitliche Leitung is referred to as 'uniform control' by Bayer and as 'under the 
central direction of the parent company' by MAN in the English translation: 
Bayer (1993): 
"The Financial Statements of the Bayer Group Include Bayer AG and 28 German and 
135foreign subsidiaries in which Bayer AG. directly or Indirectly. has a M4JOrify of the 
voting rights or which art under Its un(form controM 
MAN (1993): 
"Comprised In the group's consolidatedfin-ancl4l sixements are MAN AG. as well as 73 
German companies and 63 non German companies under Me central direction of AtAm 
AG. " 
Although this criterion is not implemented in French legislation, 4 French annual 
reports referred to it in 1993 (1 in 1987). In fact, as described in part 3 of this 
chapter, the French notion of contr6le exclusif is based cndrcly on the existence or 
past exercise of voting rights. An example was reported by Mmy Cointreau which 
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refers to 'effective management control' for which the French wording was 
pouvoir effective de direction. 
Rimy Cointreau (1993): 
'77ze companies over which Rimy Cointreau exercises exclusive control due to 
-a direct or indirect holding of more than 50% of the share capital, or 
-effective management control, 
arefidly consolidated. " 
Dejure versus defacto control 
In 1993,17 companies (9 %) and II in 1987 (9 %) communicated 'de jure' and 'de 
facto' control as the basis for consolidation without further specification of the 
underlying criteria, of which 7 (3) were in Italy, 4 (3) in France, 4 (3) in Belgium 
and 2 (2) in Denmark. In some cases, the blanket terms 'de jure control' and/or We 
facto control' were used (see the Belgian group Sipef and the Italian group Fiat 
below); in others a term such as 'effective control' is used, still without specifying 
the underlying criterion (see the French group Total below). Given the conceptual 
conflict with respect to defacto control in Europe such reporting policies may be 
interpreted differently. Indeed, it may be noted that Italy adopted none of the three 
defacto control criteria of the Seventh Directive. 
Sipef (1993): 
"Global consolidation is appliedfor the subsidiaries where the Holding Company exerts 
control either dejure or defacto. " 
Fiat (1993): 
" The consolidated financial statements include the financial statements of Fiat S. p. A., 
the parent company, and of all Italian andforeign subsidiaries which constitute the Fiat 
Group, in which Fiat S. p. A. holds, directly or indirectly, more than 50% of the voting 
capital or has de facto control. " 
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Total (1993): 
'All subsidiaries regarded as significant are fully consolidated in the consolidated 
financial statements. Companies in which the ownership is less than 5017o, but over 
which the Company maintains effective control, are alsofidly consolidated. " 
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7.5 Concluding remarks 
In an attempt to evaluate the evolution of national regulations concerning the 
definition of a subsidiary prior to and following the implementation of the Seventh 
Directive, this- chapter has explored the distinction between de jure and de facto 
control in Europe. Given the discretion concerning the four de jure consolidation 
criteria and the three de facto criteria, the legal definition of a subsidiary for 
consolidation has been implemented in a different manner in almost every country. 
Perhaps this was inevitable, given the controversy underlying the scope of 
consolidated accounts in Article I of the Directive (Petite, 1984). Moreover, it 
appears that structural differences in corporate group organisation which have 
developed over time have resulted in diverging approaches towards accounting for 
groups, and that these different structures act as a barrier to legal harmonisation, 
with the concept of 'control' remaining elusive at the national and international 
level. 
With respect to de jure control, only the legal criterion of a majority of voting 
rights was implemented in each country's law. Resistance to uniformity was found 
at a number of levels with respect to each of the other de jure control rights. 
However, it is with particular respect to de facto controY that legal barriers to 
harmonisation are evident. In fact, in certain countries the three de facto criteria 
were adopted in conjunction with additional dejure presumptions, thus resulting in 
some confusion in the interpretation of de facto control in the countries involved. 
It appears, that the lack of uniform definition of the 'unified management' and 
'dominant influence' criteria in the Seventh Directive, and the discretion provided 
to countries with respect to the adoption of its provisions, has led to ambiguity of 
what is 'commonly' interpreted as de jure and de facto control in Europe. 
190 
Finally, financial reporting practices suggest that the considerable variety in 
accounting policies is attributable in part to the fact that harmonisation of laws is 
not complete. 
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PART III 
STATISTICAL MODELLING OF COMPLIANCE 
WITH ACCOUNTING REGULATION 
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CHAPTER8 
A PROBABILITY MODEL OF COMPLIANCE IN 
FINANCIAL REPORTING 
8.1 Objective 
The objective of the statistical analysis carried out for this study is to determine 
whether the avoidance of full compliance in accounting practice is influenced by 
regulatory factors, in particular the source of the regulation and the degree of 
formalism in the rules themselves. In this section the model used for the analysis is 
developed. 
The nature of count data, such as multiple accounting choices, implies that 
conventional regression methods would be inappropriate for our purpose, as both 
the dependent response variable 'compliance' and the hypothesised explanatory 
factors are discrete rather than continous outcomes, with assigned qualitative 
values (Fienberg, 1977). For the purpose of our analysis a probability model is 
required to describe the odds that a company fully complies with the regulation, 
rather than avoids the regulation, as a function of regulatory regressors. 
8.2 The binomial linear logistic model 
The binomial distribution 
The distributional properties of the response variable 4compliance' require a 
binomial modelling approach. As reported subsequently, in aggregate, the observed 
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values were 38,5% full compliance with the regulations and 44.8% creative or 
partial compliance. Only 6.9% of the observations were non-compliant while 9.9% 
of the cases were unqualified data. By offsetting the decision to contravene the rule 
in question, a conditional probability model is required to describe the relative odds 
that a company chooses either to comply unambiguously with the regulations in 
force or to resort to some form of avoidance, either through creative compliance 
or partial disclosure. A suitable probability model for count data in the context of 
a binary response is provided by the binomial distribution' (Cox and Snell, 1989). - 
In the particular case of a binary response, the random variable Y can take only two 
values, which are conventionally assigned: the value 1 (for our purpose full 
compliance) and the value 0 (for our purpose creative or partial compliance). The 
probability p, that Y=I is denoted the compliance probability which can be written 
as P(Y 1) p and the corresponding probability of creative or partial compliance 
is P (Y 0) 1-p. Expressing the two probabilities in a single equation, where y, 
the observed value of the random variable Y, is either I or 0, leads to the following 
probability distribution which is known as the Bernoulli distribution: 
P(Y = Y) = P" G- P)'-Y' Y= O'l. 
The mean, or expected value of the random variable Y is defined as E(Y) =0xP (y 
0) +Ix P(Y = 1) p. 7be variance of Y is given by Var (Y) = p(l - p). 
For n binomial observations of the form y, In,, where i=1,2,... ' n and where 
E (yj )= ni pi , pi is the probability of full compliance corresponding to the ith 
observation. 
1 The Poisson distribution would be a suitable probability model for count data in the context of a 
multinomial response. 
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The logistic transformation 
The linear probability model relates Y to a set of factors X, which explain the 
response variable Y so that P (Y = 1) =F (x, fi) and P (Y = 0) =I-F (x,. #) and 
indeed, that P(Y) = ir + OX with a set of parameters fi reflecting the impact of 
changes in X on the probability P of full compliance. This model has the principal 
defect that the linear specification is not constrained to the limited range from 0 to 
1, which is imposed on probabilities. 
Instead, a model is required that will produce predictions for a given regressor so 
that 
lim P(Y = 1) =I and lim P(Y = 1) = 0. D'X-. )+- DIX-*- 
In order to ensure that the fitted probabilities will lie between 0 and 1, the 
probability scale must be transformed so that it varies monotonically with X, yet 
remains within the boundaries 0 and 1. In principle, any continuous probability 
distribution is adequate. However, in econometric applications the probit and logit 
models have been used almost exclusively (Greene, 1990). The logistic function 
will be used for our application mainly due to its mathematical convenience. 
I 
Conventionally, the logistic transformation of a success probability p is log [pl(l. 
p)], denoted as logit (p). The function presents a sigmoid curve that is symmetric 
2 about p=0.5, and which is essentially linear between p=0.2 and p=0.8 . The 
mathematical convenience of the logistic transformation is evident in its property 
that a value of logit (p) in the interval + co) corresponds to a value of p in the 
range (0,1). Indeed, as p --> 0, logit (p) w; as p -ý 1,109it (P) -4 + oo; and for 
' See Collett, p. 54, (199 1). 
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logit 03 p=0.5, (P . The relationship between p and x is sigmoidal, whereas 
logit (p) is linearly related to x. 
For our purpose, pl(l-p) is the odds of full compliance, relative to creative or 
partial compliance, and the logistic transformation of p is the log ratio of ftffl 
compliance relative to regulatory avoidance. Consequently, we adopt the linear 
logistic regression model as the complement of the linear regression model in the 
case that the regressand is not a continous variable but, instead, a dichotomous 
variable in a given classification (Cramer, 1991). As explained later, the regressors; 
of the equation have been assigned muldnon-dal categories. 
The linear logistic model 
The associated linear logistic model for the dependence of p, on the values of k 
explanatory variables, xj, , x., ,*''9 
XMI 9 
is 
logit(pi) = 
logTi 
A 
P) 
= DO +PIXIi +02X21+"'+PkXki 
3 Similarly, the probit transformation is also adequate, as the function is symmetric in p and 
represents a sigrnoid curve. For any value of p in the range (0, I), the corresponding value of the 
probit (p) will lie between -- and oo and when p=0.5, probit (p) = 0, The standard normal 
distribution function, usually denoted by (D (ý) serves as a probit transformation, and so 4 is such 
that q) (ý) = p, or 4= (D- I (p), where the inverse function 0-1 (p) is the probit transformation of 
p, written as probit (p). 
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which can be rewritten as, 
A 
exp(po+plxli+", +Pkxki) 
(2) 
+ exp(p 0 
+P 
IXU 
+"'+P 
kXki) 
or, writing Tj i=Ijpjx. , 
eni 
1+eT" 
8.3 Statistical modelling 
The method of estimation: maximum likelihood 
The preferred method of estimation of the k+I unknown parameters 
P09P19-4k for probability models is maximum likelihood (Colett, 1991). The 
likelihood function is given by 
pi" pi)'-' (4) 
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The estimation of the maximum likelihood estimates is generated by equating 
the derivatives of log L to zero and by fitting parameters from a generalised linear 
model by using iterative proportional fitting (Aitken et al., 1989). Accordingly, our 
analysis was carried out using the generalised linear modelling system GLIM 4 
(Francis et al., 1993). Once has been obtained, the estimated value of the linear 
systematic component of the model, the linear predictor, is 
"ýPO+PIXIi+P2X2i+-+PkXki, From the linear predictor, the fitted 
probabilities ý of full compliance can be found through equation (3). P 
Fit of a linear logistic model 
Summary statistics that measure the discrepancy between observed binomial 
I proportions y, / n, and fitted proportions A, , serve to test the adequacy of an 
estimated linear logistic model. 
A measure of the fit of a current model is the value of the likelihood L^,, when the 
values of the unknown parameters are set equal to their maximum likelihood 
estimates, which can be compared to the value of the maximum likelihood for a 
model for which the fitted values coincide with the actual observations, termed the 
full model. A full model, or saturated model, has the same number of unknown 
parameters as there are observations and is therefore not useful on its own, since it 
does not provide an abstract of the data. The maximised likelihood under the full 
model is denominated Lf - 
The deviance D is a summary statistic, which tests the goodness of fit of the 
current model by measuring the extent to which the current model deviates from 
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the full model. The deviance is minus twice the logarithm of the ratio of these 
maximised likelihoods, so that 
D=-21og(L, /L, )=-2BogL^ -iogL Lf (5) 
A large D indicates that L, is small in comparison to Lf and hence indicates the 
inadequacy of the current model. In contrast, a small D can be interpreted as 
evidence of the appropriateness of the current model. 
In the relevant case of binary data, the deviance on fitting a model is not itself 
suitable as a measure of the goodness of fit as it depends only on the fitted 
probabilities and is uninformative with respect to the conformity between the actual 
observations and their corresponding fitted probabilities. 
Instead of employing the deviance itself to evaluate the adequacy of an adopted 
model, the distribution of the deviance, under the assumption that the model is 
correct, is required. The deviance is asymptotically distributed as X2 with (n-k) 
degrees of freedom, where n is the number of binomial observations and k is the 
number of unknown parameters included in the current linear logistic model. The D 
statistic can be compared to the X2 - distribution with (n - k) degrees of freedom. If 
the observed value of the statistic exceeds the upper 100a% point of the X2 
distribution on the given number of degrees of freedom, where a is sufficiently 
small, the lack of fit is regarded as significant at the 100a% level. When the 
deviance on fitting a particular model is declared to be significantly large, the 
model is deemed to be an inappropriate summary of the data. 
However, even though the D- statistic can be used to determine whether a current 
model can be regarded as adequate fit for the actual observations, the general 
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approach to measure goodness of fit of linear logistic models is the comparison of 
a sequence of nested models, where one model encompasses additional variables in 
comparison to another4. 
8.4 Comparing linear logistic models 
The empirical analysis compares a hierarchy of nested linear logistic models to 
describe the odds of full compliance relative to creative or partial compliance as a 
function of different sets of regressors. In general, two models are defined as 
nested if one model includes additional variables with regard to another. The 
difference in the deviances of two nested models measures the relevance of the 
additional variables for the improvement of the fit of the model. The effect of each 
explanatory variable in a model cannot be estimated independently of the others, so 
the order in which the terms are included is important when interpreting the model. 
In general, the comparison of model (1) which is nested within model (2), may be 
denoted as follows: 
Model (1): 109't(P) =0+AA 
Model (2): 109't(P) =0+AA+P h+lXh+l kXk 
The difference in deviance DI - D2 which counts for the effect of the additional 
variablesXh+1 9 
Xh+2 9*... x, afterXI PX21 ... x, have already been taken into account, is 
denoted the deviance of fitting xh+l OXh+2 0- 1 Xk adjusted forx,, x2 t... xh - 
See Colett, pp. 67-74, (199 1). 
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Since the deviance for each model has an approximate X2 - distribution, the 
differences between two deviances will also approximately follow a X2 - 
distribution. Denoting the maximum likelihood under model (1), model (2) and the 
fun model by 41942 1 and 
Lf respectively, the two deviances 
are D, = -2[log Lcl - log 
Lf ] and D2= -2[log 42 - log 
Lf I- 
When subtracting D1 D2, the term Lf disappears, so that 
D, - D2 = -2[log 
L,, 
- log 
42 ] and the X2 approximation to the difference between 
two variances can be used to compare nested models. 
F- Test 
The relative goodness of fit of two nested models can be compared by examining 
the ratio of (i) the change in deviances from two models within a hierarchy divided 
by the change in degrees of freedom, to (ii) the deviance for the M model, for 
which the fitted values coincide with the actual observations, divided by its degrees 
of freedom. 
Where the deviance of a higher order model is D,, on v. degrees of freedom and 
the deviance of the lower order model, containing a subset of the terms in the 
higher order model, is D. on VL degrees of freedom, and DF is the deviance of 
the full model on v. degrees of freedom, the ratio 
[(DL 
- DH) I (v, - 
(DF IVF) 
has an F-distfibution5 on (VL - VH )l (VF) * 
5 Since the deviance for each model has an approximate e- distribution, the differences between 
two deviances will also be approximately follow a X2 - distribution. 
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8.5 Incorporating regulatory factors into the linear predictor of compliance 
As noted earlier, the objective of our statistical analysis is to determine whether the 
avoidance of full compliance is influenced by regulatory factors, in particular the 
rule-issuing authority and the extent of formalism in the rules themselves. 
Compliance is also assumed to vary over different subject areas of accounting. 
Furthermore, we have substituted the country of incorporation as an alternative 
indicator, this time representing national regulatory systems, rather than the type of 
regulation. 
The first model considers-an outcome which is independent of regulatory factors 
but conditional on the decision not to violate the regulations. By offsetting the 
companies which decided to contravene the rule in question, the conditional 
probability model to describe the relative odds that a company chooses either to 
comply unambiguously with the regulations in force or to resort to some form of 
avoidance, either through creative compliance or partial disclosure is therefore as 
follows: 
logit(PI) = log( 
Pi )=Do 
I-Pi (7) 
Given the binary response, a logistic transformation of the linear predictor is used 
to generate fitted probabilities p which lie between zero and one. 6 
The second model adds the effects of differences in regulatory design to the model 
of conditional independence. The associated linear model, where the probability 
I See Collett (1991) and Cramer (1991) for further discussion of statistical modelling of binary 
data and logit analysis. 
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that a company in the th jurisdiction will fully comply with the regulations depends 
on regulatory design (RDj) is therefore as follows: 
logit(pi)=Iog( Pi )=PO+PIRDi (8) 
1 P, 
We define RD as a factor distinguishing between formal and anti-formal regulatory 
texts, and we also include an interaction term when a particular set of regulations 
combines both features. 
The third model adds to this the effects of differences in regulatory source. The 
associated linear model, where the probability that a company in the rh jurisdiction 
will fully comply with the regulations depends on regulatory design (RD, ) and 
regulatory source (RS, ) in that jurisdiction, is therefore as follows: 
logit(pi) = log( I 
pi 
P, 
)= Do + PIRDj +P 2P'SI (9) 
The second explanatory factor, RS, represents the source of regulations governing 
the relevant accounting issue in each jurisdiction, in the form of either legislation, 
accounting standard or recommendation, or the interactions of law with standards 
and law with recommendations. 
In a fourth model we substitute the country of incorporation, C, as an alternative 
indicator, this time representing national regulatory systems. The associated linear 
model, where the probability that a company in the th jurisdiction will fully comply 
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with the regulations depends on regulatory design (RD, ) and the country of 
incorporation ( Ci ), is therefore as follows: 
log't(Pi)": 109( Pi )ý00+PIRDi+P3cl (10) 
Pi 
The third explanatory factor, C, represents the European countries subject to our 
analysis and is therefore defined as a nine-level factor without interaction terms. 
The empirical analysis will be carried out separately for each of the subject areas of 
accounting and also for the aggregated subsets for which we win add a factor 
representing the three areas of accounting regulation in a fifth model. The 
associated linear model, where the probability that a company in the f4 jurisdiction 
will fully comply with the regulations depends on regulatory design (RD, ), and 
regulatory source (RSi) in that jurisdiction, and on the particular area- of 
accounting regulation (AR, ) , is therefore as follows: 
Pf 
-00+01RD I+ 
P2RSi + 04ARi log't(PI) ý- 109(l 
Pi 
As explained earlier, the decrease in the goodness-of-fit statistic provides a suitable 
measure of the significance of the factors added when fitting these models in 
sequence. The estimated regression coefficients, being logits, indicate the relative 
effect of the different levels of each explanatory factor. These statistics form the 
basis of the tables presented and discussed in Chapter Ten. Before that, however, 
the data collected and the research design are described in Chapter Nine. 
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CHAPTER 9 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out to define the research design for the empirical analysis of this 
thesis. It describes the criteria used in selecting the sample and presents the survey 
results obtained from the annual reports of European companies. Accounting 
policies were examined for compliance with the relevant regulations in the three 
accounting areas under investigation using anýUal report disclosures by companies 
in the years 1987,1993 and 1995. Ibis chapter goes on to define the criteria used 
in categorising compliance behaviour and for assigning different levels to the two 
explanatory variables: regulatory source and regulatory design. The chapter ends 
with a preliminary analysis of the distribution of compliance in the sample. 
9.2 The sample 
This section provides details on the sample and the criteria for its selection. The 
sample of companies was drawn from nine European countries. In addition to a 
domestic stock exchange listing, these companies also had to be quoted on another 
foreign stock exchange elsewhere in the European Union in at least two of the 
three years covered by the study. The countries in which the companies were 
incorporated were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. A total of 154 European companies 
were included in the sample, being all interlisted companies quoted on the relevant 
stock exchanges in 1993 fitting the selection criteria. 
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The appendix of the thesis contains a list of all companies selected for the analysis, 
which were chosen on the basis of the following criteria: 
1 The published annual report and financial statements were available 
during at least two consecutive periods for the financial years 1987, 
1993 and 1995. 
2 The company is not a subsidiary of another company in the survey. 
3 The company is registered in one of the following European countries: 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, 
Spain or the United Kingdom 
4 The company is an industrial company; that is, not a bank or insurance 
company. 
5 The company has foreign transactions. 
6 The company has an equity listing on the domestic stock exchange 
7 The company has an equity listing on at least one foreign stock 
exchange in Europe 
Company reports published by the selected companies were analysed for 
compliance behaviour. The starting year was taken as 1987. By 1993, financial 
statements could be expected to reflect the Fourth and Seventh Directives which 
had by then been implemented in all of the countries under study. In the same year, 
a number of International Accounting Standards were revised with the objective of 
narrowing their options, and these revised standards were to become effective two 
years later in 1995. In that year, the IASC agreed with IOSCO the potential 
recognition of IASs for companies listed on international stock exchanges and a 
change in EU regulatory strategy with respect to harmonisation was also 
announced. Consequently, the three years selected for the review of compliance 
were 1987,1993 and 1995. 
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Table 9.1 
Sample of companies, cross-classifled by country and year 
COUNTRIES NUM3ER OF COMPANIES 
1987 1993 1995 
BELGIUM 7 10 9 
DENMARK 3 5 5 
Fk, kNCE 15 22 21 
GERMANY 22 23 21 
IRELAND 9 9 8 
ITALY 8 10 9 
SPAIN 8 11 11 
THENMERLANDS 17 20 18 
UNITED KINGDOM 29 44 41 
TOTAL 118' 154 143 
Notes 
The sampling frame comprised all European companies interlisted between two or more 
stock exchanges in the European Union in 1993, the eventual sample excluding 
companies for which it was not possible to obtain the necessary financial reports. 
The difference in sample size from year to year is accounted for by new interlistings 
after 1987 but prior to 1993 (i. e. reports for 1993 and 1995 were included) and by 
delistings after 1993 (Le. reports for 1987 and 1993 were included). 
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Table 9.1 provides a breakdown of the distribution of the sample cross-classified 
by countries and years. The table indicates that the sample sizes are unequal for 
each country which reflects the fact that in each country a different number of 
companies fulfilled the selection criteria. An equal number of companies for each 
year could not be obtained because during the period 1987 to 1995 a number of 
companies in the sample either became delisted or ceased to exist following 
acquisitions, mergers and bankruptcy, or else they were set up or became listed 
after 1987. However, for the majority of companies, all three accounting periods 
were analysed and at least two observations were collected from each company. 
While all sample companies are included for the year 1993, there were 36 missing 
observations in 1987 and II in 1995 due to the above-mentioned causes. 
9.3 Observed accounting practices 
This section describes the observed accounting practices for the three areas of 
accounting regulation under study: revaluation of fixed assets, foreign currency 
reporting and the definition of a subsidiary. 
9.3.1 Revaluation of fixed assets 
As can be seen in Table 9.2 historic cost accounting, rather than revaluation, was 
the dominant policy choice during each of the sample years. As the use of historic 
cost is accepted by all national regulators, companies using historic cost accounting 
fully -complied with the national requirements. The French, Spanish and Italian 
companies did likewise, reporting a policy of historic cost which was periodically 
adjusted for inflation in accordance with laws which enabled price-level 
adjustment. 
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In Germany, a movement towards internationally accepted valuation rules, which 
remained within the boundaries of national requirements, was clearly observable. 
While assets were subject to maximum tax depreciation rates by the majority of 
German companies in 1987, by 1995 straight-line depreciation had been adopted 
by half of the companies. This creative avoidance of national valuation rules by a 
change in depreciation strategy in order to accommodate- international rules is 
illustrated in the following examples. 
Babcock 1995. 
"In adaptation to international standards, depreciation of property, plant and 
equipment is now carried out uniformly throughout the Group according to the straight- 
line method The lump-sum accruals for warranty obligations have been reduced As a 
result, income before taxes has increased by DM 22 million due to the change in the 
method of depreciation and by 20 DM million caused by the reduction of lump-sum 
accruals for warranty obligations. Tax-allowable provisions shown in the subsidiaries' 
balance sheets have been reversed in the consolidated balance sheet likewise increasing 
income. 
Willa 1995: 
"In compliance with international accounting standards newly acquiredfixed assets are 
written off uniformlyfollowing the straight-line method asfrom 1995 onwards. " 
Veba 1995. 
"The following accounting principles applied to the VEBA consolidated financial 
statements have been modified to comply with U. S. GAAP effective January 1,1995: 
To value fixed assets, depreciation periods for power plants and distribution units have 
been adjustedfrom the periods previously acceptable under tar law to those as defined 
by German Commercial Lawfor the depreciation of such assets. (... ) " 
In countries which refer in legislation to the general concepts of either 'current 
value accounting or revaluation of fixed assets, companies are required to revalue 
regularly and to disclose detail with respect to the relevant assets and revaluation 
basis. While some companies make use of the broadness of the law and avoid 
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further substantiating it (see Pernod Ricard), other companies specify the detail and 
circumstances which the relevant rules require (see P&O): 
Pernod Rkard 1995. - 
"Property, plant and equipment are valued at cost or when applicable, at a revalued 
cost in compliance with legal requirements. " 
P& 0 1993: 
"Investment properties and properties occupied by the Group companies are included 
in ftxed assets at their latest valuations plus subsequent additions at cost, and surpluses 
and deficits on valuation are included in the revaluation reserve. A substantial 
proportion by value, including the largest properties, is valued annually by the Group 
chief surveyor and triennially by external valuers. ( .. ) The valuation ofproperties at 31 
December 1993 were all made on the basis of open market value by external valuers, 
principally Healey & Baker, totalling fl, 465.2m, and by the Group chief surveyor RA 
Knight FRICS, totalling L54.3m. " 
9.3.2 Foreign transactions 
Chapter Six of this thesis separated the issue of translating foreign transactions 
from the issue of translating foreign financial statements. For the empirical analysis 
the area of foreign currency reporting has been confined !o the accounting for 
foreign transactions only. In fact, the analysis in Part Two demonstrates that, while 
IAS 21 has been widely adopted by regulators and used in practice with respect to 
the translation of foreign subsidiaries, this has not been repeated with respect to 
accounting for foreign transactions. In particular, the recognition of unrealised 
exchange gains has remained contentious among European countries. Moreover, 
even'though considerably different authoritative sources implemented the content 
of the international standard for foreign subsidiaries this acceptance of IAS 21 has 
led to a relatively homogeneous rule design on this issue in Europe. In contrast, the 
rules for foreign transactions not only differ in their sources of authority but also in 
their rule design across Europe. Finally, in order to prevent an overrepresentation 
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of observations for the issue of foreign currency reporting, the statistical analysis 
has been limited to one aspect only, that of accounting for foreign transactions. 
As can be seen in Table 9.3, many different approaches exist in practice with 
regard to the reporting of foreign exchange differences and these do not always 
My correspond to national requirements. For example, the majority of French 
companies included unrealised exchange gains in the consolidated profit and loss 
account and hence reported in line with the rules of IAS 21 instead of * 
deferring 
such gain to the balance sheet as French regulations require. This practice was 
explained by a provision in French law which allows companies to. employ different 
valuation methods in the consolidated financial statements than those used in the 
annual accounts. An example which illustrates this creative compliance with 
national law in practice is Thomson: 
Thomson 1995-- 
"Monetary assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currencies are converted at the 
exchange rates prevailing at balance sheet dates. In accordance with an option of the 
French law on consolidation, the Company records the related unrealised exchange 
gains and losses under 'Other financial income (expense), net' in the accompanying 
consolidated statement of income. " 
In the German sample, not avoidance but violation of national rules for the 
treatment of foreign transactions occurred. Table 9.3 shows that for the years 1987 
and 1993, all the German sample companies only valued foreign payables and 
receivables at the closing rate (unless hedged) if this resulted in a lower asset value 
and a higher liability value, in accordance with GoB. However, by 1995, some 
companies had relaxed this strict interpretation of GoB by applying it only to long 
term monetary items, while translating all short term payables and receivables at 
the closing rate. This non-compliance behaviour was observed in the annual report 
of Hoechst: 
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Hoechst 1995: 
"For the first time, short term receivables and liabilities in foreign currency are 
uniformly stated in the 1995 Groupfinancial statements at the buying or selling rate on 
the balance sheet date in accordance with IAS 21. In previous years, the closing rates 
were only used so long as no unrealised gains resulted. Due to this change in the 
currency translation method, the profit before taxes on income shown is DM 80 million 
higher in the year under review. " 
9.3.3 The definition of a subsidiary 
National differences in regulatory design with respect to group control do not seem 
to constrain compliance behaviour in reporting practice. As can be seen in Table 
9.4, in France, even though the regulator has issued narrow, detailed rules and 
emphasised their literal interpretation, companies avoid the criteria specified in the 
national law and, instead, report in an indeterminate manner. For instance, not a 
single French company referred to the formal consolidation criterion that a parent 
company exercised 'at least 40% of voting rights during two years whilst no other 
shareholder has held a higher proportion. Instead, the French sample companies 
disclosed in rather a broad and flexible way referring, for example, to 'controlling 
interest', as in the case of Camaud Metalbox: 
Carnaud Metalbox 1995. 
"The group financW statements include the accounts opf all significant subsidiaries in 
which Carnaud Metalbox holds, directly or indirectly a controlling interest. " 
Avoi4ance of regulation occurred most obviously by failure to disclose the 
accounting policy choice which had been made. In particular, the consolidation 
criteria were not specified in the UK, where the regulatory strategy was to adopt 
both legal and economic group control. Most companies did not describe the 
criteria upon which they decided to include a subsidiary into the consolidated 
accounts. This example of partial compliance is illustrated here by Guiness: 
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Guiness 1995. - 
"Basis of consolidation: The Group accounts include the accounts of the company and 
its subsidiary undertakings. " 
As described earlier, the French legislator adopted a legal concept of group control 
with emphasis on the literal interpretation of the defined control rights. However, a 
number of companies such as R6my Cointreau referred to management control, 
thereby clearly contravening the national regulation: 
R6my Cointreau 1993: 
"The companies over which Rofty Cointreau exercises exclusive control due to 
-a direct or indirect holding of more than 50% of the share capital, or 
- effective management control, 
are fidly consolidated. " 
Conversely, the Dutch legislator constrained group control to the cases of actual 
economic parent-subsidiary relationships. Yet by giving priority to the existence of 
legal control rights, some reporting companies violated the Dutch consolidation 
principles, as the following example of Wereldhave demonstrates: 
Wereldhave 1995. - 
"Companies which form a group with Wereldhave are included in the consolidated 
annual accounts. Interests of less than 100% are consolidated on a proportional basis. 
Proportional consolidation provides a direct illustration of the magnitude of 
Wereldhave's investments, other related assets and liabilities, and results. " 
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Table 9.2 
Observed accounting practices: The revaluation of fixed assets 
1987 1993 1995 
Historic cost (straight-line depreciation) 41 61 63 
Belgium 5 7 6 
Denmark I I I 
France 9 14 13 
Germany 2 6 10 
Ireland I I I 
Italy 0 0 0 
Netherlands 11 16 16 
Spain 0 0 0 
UK 12 16 16 
Historic cost (full use of depredation) 20 17 
Belgium 0 0 0 
Denmark 0 0 0 
France 0 0 0 
Germany 20 17 11 
Ireland 0 0 0 
Italy 0 0 0 
Netherlands 0 0 0 
Spain 0 0 0 
UK 0 0 0 
Historic cost adjusted for inflation in accordance with enabling laws 17 23 22 
Belgium 0 0 0 
Denmark 0 0 0 
France 4 4 4 
Germany 0 0 0 
Ireland 0 0 0 
Italy 7 10 9 
Netherlands 0 0 0 
Spain 6 9 9 
UK 0 0 0 
Periodic revaluation (basis not defined) 7 10 10 
Belgium 2 3 3 
Denmark 2 3 3 
France 3 4 4 
Germany 0 0 0 
Ireland 0 0 0 
Italy 0 0 0 
Netherlands 0 0 0 
Spain 0 0 0 
UK 
__ . 
0 0 0 
Current cost accounting 9 4 3 
Belgium 0 0 0 
Denmark 0 0 0 
France 0 0 0 Germany 0 0 0 
Ireland 0 0 0 Italy 1 0 0 
Netherlands 6 3 2 
Spain 1 0 0 UK 1 1 1 
Revaluation of land and buildings (by a surveyor) 25 39 34 
Belgium 0 0 0 Denmark 0 1 1 France 0 0 0 Germany 0 0 0 Ireland 8 8 7 
Italy 0 0 0 Netherlands 0 1 0 
Spain 1 2 2 
UK 16 27 24 
Report not available 0 11 
Belgium 3 0 1 
Denmark 2 0 0 
France 6 0 1 
Germany 1 0 2 
Ireland 0 0 1 
Italy 2 0 1 
Netherlands 3 0 2 Spain 3 0 0 
UK 151 01 3 
Total 154 1 154 1 154 
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Table 9.3 
Observed accounting practices: The reporting of foreign exchange differences 
1987 1993 1995 
Foreign exchange gain and loss in profit & loss account 70 101 96 
Belgium 4 4 4 
Denmark 3 5 5 
France 9 16 is 
Germany 0 0 2 
Ireland 9 9 8 
Italy 4 7 6 
Netherlands 12 Is 14 
Spain 2 2 2 
UK 27 43 40 
Foreign exchange short term gain and loss in profit & loss accoum 4 2 2 
long term gain and_loss deferred in balance sheet Belgium 0 0 0 
Denmark 0 0 0 
France 1 0 0 
Germany 0 0 0 
Ireland 0 0 0 
Italy 0 0 0 
Netherlands 3 2 2 
Spain 0 0 0 
UK 0 0 0 
Foreign exchange short term gain and loss in profit & loss account 3 4 
long term gain deferred (or not recognised), long term loss in profit & Belgium 0 0 0 
lossaccount Denmark 0 0 0 
France 0 0 0 
Germany 0 0 2 
Ireland 0 0 0 
Italy 0 0 0 
Netherlands 1 3 2 
Spain 0 0 0 
UK 0 0 0 
Foreign exchange loss in profit & loss account, gain deferred in 26 31 26 
balance sheet (or not recognised) Belgium 3 4 4 
Denmark 0 0 0 
France 1 0 0 
Germany 17 21 16 
Ireland 0 0 0 
Italy 0 0 0 
Netherlands 0 0 0 
Spain 5 6 6 
UK 0 0 0 
Foreign exchange gain and loss deferred in balance sheet 3 6 6 
Belgium 0 0 0 
Denmark 0 0 0 
France 0 0 0 
Germany 0 0 0 
Ireland 0 0 0 
Italy 2 3 3 
Netherlands 0 0 0 
Spain 1 3 3 UK 0 0 0 
Method not disclosed 15 Il q 
Belgium 0 2 1 Denmark 0 0 0 
France 5 6 6 Germany 5 2 1 
Ireland 0 0 0 
Italy 2 0 0 
Netherlands 1 0 0 
Spain 0 0 0 
UK 2 1 1 
Report not available 35 0 11 
Belgium 3 0 1 
Denmark 2 0 0 
France 6 0 1 
Germany 1 0 2 
Ireland 0 0 1 
Italy 2 0 1 
Netherlands 3 0 2 
Spain 3 0 0 
UK 
__ 1 
151 01 3 
Total 1 154 1 154 1 154 
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Table 9.4 
Observed accountinp, practices: The defmition of a subsidiary 
1981 1993 1995 
Solely legal criteria 37 33 36 
Belgium 3 3 3 
Denmark 1 2 1 
France 4 1 2 
Germany 12 8 12 
Ireland 0 0 0 
Italy 2 4 4 
Netherlands 8 3 2 
Spain 7 9 9 
UK 0 3 3 
Solely economic criteria 2 5 5 
Belgium 0 0 0 
Denmark 0 0 0 
France 0 0 0 
Germany I I I 
Ireland 0 0 0 
Italy 1 0 0 
Netherlands 0 3 3 
Spain 0 0 0 
UK 0 , 1 1 
Legal and economic criteria combined 13 25 27 
Belgium I I I 
Denmark 1 2 3 
France 2 5 5 
Germany 1 5 5 
Ireland 0 0 0 
Italy 4 5 4 
Netherlands 3 5 6 
Spain 0 0 0 UK Ol 2 3 
Indeterminate consolidation cnteria 11 25 
Belgium 3 6 4 Denmark 0 1 1 
France 9 14 11 
Germany 0 0 0 
Ireland 0 0 0 
Italy 0 1 1 
Netherlands 0 3 4 Spain 0 0 0 UK Ol 0 0 
Consolidation criteria not specified 56 67 53 
indication of principal subsidiaries Belgium 0 0 1 Denmark 1 0 0 France 2 3 2 Germany 8 9 3 Ireland 8 9 8 Italy 1 0 0 Netherlands 6 6 3 Spain 1 2 2 UK 29, 38 34 
Report not available 35 0 -1 
Belgium 3 0 
Denmark 2 0 0 France 6 0 1 Germany 1 0 2 Ireland 0 0 1 Italy 2 0 1 Netherlands 3 0 2 Spain 3 0 0 UK 151 01 3 
Total 4 
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9.4 Classification of compliance behaviour 
This section describes the characteristics of accounting practices which are 
classified according to different levels of compliance and on which the following 
statistical analysis is based. Following the comparison of the reported policies with 
the relevant national accounting regulations to which the reporting company was 
subject, compliance behaviour was assigned to one of three categories: either (i) 
full compliance, (ii) the avoidance of regulations or (iii) non-compliance with the 
regulations. Avoidance of regulations comprises either creative or partial 
compliance. 
Full compliance with the accounting regulation is assigned when a company's 
reported policy corresponds unambiguously with the national regulatory 
requirement. Creative compliance applies when the reported policy is not strictly in 
conformity with the ruI6 but, at the same time, does not violate the rule. Partial 
compliance refers to the case in which a company provides insufficient information. 
Finally, non-compliance is defined as those instances when there is a clear 
indication by the company in its annual report that the rule in question is 
contravened. 
A detailed analysis of the criteria assigning reported accounting policies into one of 
the three compliance levels, together with the regulatory requirements in each area 
of accounting policy for each country is provided in Tables 9.5 to 9.7. 
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9.5 Classification of the regulatory variables 
The aim of the empirical analysis is to analyse the relationship between compliance 
in financial reporting practice and the regulatory factors of accounting and, in 
particular, to examine whethqr (i) the authority issuing the regulation and (ii) the 
degree of formalism are statistically associated with companies' compliance 
behaviour regarding accounting rules. 
Sources of accounting regulation 
Tables 9.8-9.10 summarise the sources of authority of accounting regulation in the 
nine European countries under study for the three accounting areas fixed asset 
revaluation, foreign currency reporting and the definition of a subsidiary. For the 
purpose of our statistical analysis, the variable 'regulatory source' has been 
classified into the three main types of regulatory instruments which have been 
described in Part One of this thesis. These are: (i) laws, (ii) standards and (iii) 
recommendations. As has been seen, the different regulatory authorities act either 
individually or in interaction with each other. Accordingly, the factor regulatory 
source' has been assigned five levels comprising three main effects and two 
interactions; that is (1) law, (2) standard, (3) recommendation, (4) law and 
standard, (5) law and recommendation. 
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Table 9.8 
THE REVALUATION OF ASSETS 
Source of Accounting Regulation 
Parliamentary Government Ministerial Professional Professional 
Law Decree Legislation Standard Opinion 
Belgium ArrW Royal 
Denmark Regnskabslov 
France Code de OECAvis 
Commerce CNCC 
Norme 
Germany Handelsgesetz- 
buch 
Ireland CompaniesAct SSAP 19 
ED 51 
Italy Leggefiscale 
Netherlands Burgerlijk General 
Wetboek Administrative 
Order 
Spain Ley 
UK Companies Act SSAP 19 
ED 51 
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Table 9.9 
FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS 
Source of Accounting Regulation 
Ministerial Accounting Governmental Professional Professional 
Order Plan Guideline Standard Opinion 
Belgium Bulletin No. 
20 CNC 
Denmark Regnskabsvej 
-ledning No. 9 
France PCG 
p. 11.12-13 
Germany IdW 
Stellungnahme 
Ireland SSAP No. 20 
Italy Documento 
No. 9 CSPC 
Netherlands RJ 
Richtlijnen 
1.03. PO6-12 
Spain Ordenes PGC Documento 
ministeriales p. V. Ma No. IOAECA 
UK SSAP No. 20 
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Table 9.10 
TIRE DEFINITION OF A SUBSIDIARY 
Source of Accounting Regulation 
Parliamentary Law Government Decree Professional Standard 
Belgium Arriti Royal 
Denmark Arsregnskabsbekendt- 
gorelsen 
France Loi Decrse 
Germany Handelsgesetzbuch 
Ireland Group Accounts Law Financial Reporting 
Standard No. 2 
Italy Codice Civile Decreto Legislativo 
Netherlands Burgerlijk Wetboek RJ Richtlijnen 2.03.103 
Spain Real Decreto 
UK Companies Act Financial Reporting 
StandardNo. 2 
227 
In order to ensure that the empirical analysis is not unduly influenced by the 
classification into law, standard and recommendation, the regression estimates 
were obtained using three different approaches to classification. First, law is 
defined as parliamentary legislation, government decree and ministerial legislation, 
while standards comprise rules issued by a standard setting agency which is either 
government-controlled or a self-regulated professional body, and recommendations 
are publications by all other 'non-authoritative' associations. In contrast, the 
second classification confines standards to those issued by a self-regulated 
accountancy body, while defining governmental standardisation as part of law. The 
third alternative classification differentiates between public regulation, on the one 
hand, and private regulation on the other. Public rules consist of parliamentary 
legislation, government decrees, ministerial orders, national accounting plan and 
governmental guidelines, while private rules comprise professional standard setting 
and recommendations. 
Degree offormalism of accounting rules 
Figures 9.1 to 9.3 summarise the grouping of countries relative to the factor 
regulatory design for the three accounting areas. As can be seen, policy design is 
either (i) formal, (ii) anti-formal or both (iii) formal and anti-formal. Accordingly, 
the factor regulatory design has been categorised into two main effects and one 
interaction effect. 
Table 9.11 surnmarises, the classifications of the variables 'regulatory source' and 
dregulatory design' for the three accounting policies under study. The table shows 
clearly that regulatory strategies not only vary between countries, but also between 
different accounting policies within the same country. 
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Figure 9.1 
Countries 
THE REVALUATION OF ASSETS 
Desien of rules 
Formalism 
Italy 
.0 Spain 
I 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
The Netherlands 
France 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Price-level adjustment laws authorise the revaluation of 
defined assets, during a limited time in line with specified 
inflation indices 
Anti-formalism 
Current cost accounting or revaluation of individual 
fixed assets is at the discretion of companies, which can 
judge the basis and timing of revaluation. 
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Figure 9.2 
FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS 
Countries Desian of rules 
Formalism 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Ireland 
The Netherlands 
Spain 
United 
The rules are prescriptive with respect to both the 
exchange rate and the treatment of the translation 
difference 
Anti-formalism 
Germany 
Italy 
The rules allow judgement and flexibility with respect to 
both the exchange rate and the treatment of the 
translation difference 
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Fieure 9.3 u 
THE DEFINITION OF A SUBSIDIARY 
Countries 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
Germany 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Desian of rules 
Formalism 
"A majority of voting rights 
" Right to appoint a majority of board members 
" Control contract 
" Appointment of a majority of board members for two 
consecutive years by exercise of voting rights 
"A majority of voting rights is based on an agreement 
Anti-formalism 
The Netherlands * Dominant influence 
9 Unified management 
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9.6 Preliminary analysis of compliance 
This section provides some preliminary comparisons of the distribution of 
compliance in the sample. The analysis is concerned with the frequency of full 
compliance (FC), creative compliance (CC) / partial compliance (PC) and non- 
compliance (NQ for the different areas of accounting policy, the nine countries, 
the three years, the different classes of regulatory sources and regulatory design. 
Areas of accounting regulation 
Table 9.12 presents the distribution of full-compliance, creative compliance / 
partial compliance and non-compliance cross-classified for the different areas of 
accounting. As can be seen, there are different distributions of compliance for the 
accounting subjects under study. 
Table 9.12 Compliance across areas of accounting policy 
Compliance across FC% CC% NC% NR% Total% 
subjects & 
PC % 
Revaluation of fixed 59.09 29.00 1.95 9.96 100 
assets 
Definition of a 23.81 58-44 7.79 9.96 100 
subsidiary 
Foreign transactions 60.17 18.18 11.69 9.96 100 
Note. FC = full compliance, CC = creative compliance, pC= partial 
compliance, NC = non-compliance 
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The initial investigation suggests that the area of consolidation; i. e., the definition 
of a subsidiary, has a higher rate of creative/partial compliance than the areas of 
revaluation and translation. The rate of non-compliance is smallest for revaluation 
(1.95%), higher for consolidation (7.79) and highest for translation (11.69%). 
Countries 
Table 9.13 presents the distribution of full-compliance, creative/partial compliance 
and non-compliance for the different countries in the data set. The table is 
restricted to the combined data set rather than the individual areas of accounting 
under study. 
Table 9.13 Compliance across countries 
Compliance across 
countries 
FC % CC % 
& 
PC % 
NC % NR % Total % 
Belgium 33.33 40.00 13.33 13.33 100 
France 26.26 58.59 4.55 10.61 100 
Denmark 55.56 31.11 0.00 13.33 100 
Germany 73.91 19.81 1.93 4.35 100 
Ireland 39.51 56.79 0.00 3.70 100 
Italy 27.78 17.78 44.44 10.00 100 
The Netherlands 60-00 18-89 12.78 8.33 100 
Spain 59.60 20.20 11.11 9.09 100 
United Kingdom 44.70 41.67 0.00 13.64 100 
The table indicates considerable variation in the extent of compliance in the 
countries under study. While Gerrnan accounting practice follows the national 
requirements to a large extent, French companies are the foremost in avoiding 
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control. In fact, the proportion of full compliance ranges from 73.9 1% for 
Germany to 26.26% for France, while the rate of creative compliance ranges from 
58.59% for France to 19.81% for Germany. The rate of non-compliance is 
generally small, except in Italy where it reaches 44.44%. Similarly to Germany, full 
compliance dominates creative compliance in the Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, the 
United Kingdom and Spain. However, creative compliance dominates ftffl 
compliance in Belgium, France and Ireland. 
Years 
Table 9.14 indicates the distribution of full-compliance, creative/partial compliance 
and non-compliance, cross-classified for the different accounting periods under 
investigation. 
Table 9.14 Compliance across years 
Compliance across years FC % CC % NC % NR % Total 
1987 39.83 30.52 6.93 22.73 100 
1993 52.70 40.17 7.13 0.00 100 
1995 50.54 34.92 7.38 7.16 100 
It appears that there are no major changes in compliance behaviour between the 
accounting periods investigated. In all the years under consideration full 
compliance dominates creative compliance while the rate of non-compliance is 
around 7%. The relatively high rate of non-availability of the annual report in 1987 
(22.73%) explains the increase of both full compliance and creative compliance in 
1993 and 1995. 
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Regulatory Source 
Table 9.15 presents the distribution of full compliance, creative/partial compliance 
and non-compliance for the different institutional authorities issuing the relevant 
regulation. 
Table 9.15 Compliance and the sources of regulations 
Compliance across regulatory 
source 
FC % cc % 
& 
PC % 
NC % NR % Total % 
Legislation 45.05 40.11 5.86 8.97 100 
Standard 73.86 3.41 11.74 10.98 100 
Recommendation 65.66 11.11 16.16 7.07 100 
Legislation & Standard 26.03 57.91 4.87 11.19 1 00 
Legislation & Recommendation 72.73 16.67 0.00 10.61 100 
The table shows considerable variation between the different regulators. The 
analysis distinguishes regulation which has been issued by a single regulator taking 
the form of either legislation, standard or recommendation from regulations which 
exist as a combination of these different regulators. It appears that regulation in the 
form of individual standards is most successful in achieving full compliance with 
the proportion at 73.86. Also regulations in the form of recommendation and in the 
form of combined legislation and recommendation appears to have a relatively high 
rate of full compliance and a relatively low rate of creative compliance. In contrast, 
creative compliance is higher if rules have the authority of legislation (40.11 %). 
The least successful combination for achieving compliance appears to be the one 
where an accounting area is governed by legislation and a standard together, as 
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indicated by the proportions of 26.03% for full compliance and 57.91% for 
creative compliance. 
Regulatory design 
Table 9.16 presents the distribution of fall compliance, creative/partial compliance 
and non-compliance for the different forms of regulatory design identified in the 
data set. I. 
Table 9.16 Compliance and the design of regulations 
Compliance across FC % CC % NC % NR % Total % 
regulatory design 
I Formal 56.41 25.16 8.49 9.94 100 
Anti-formal 50.31 30.47 9.41 9.82 100 
Formal & Anti-formal 23.08 66.67 0.00 10.26 100 
As can be seen in Table 9.16, full compliance dominates creative compliance if an 
accounting rule is formulated in either a formal or an anti-formal manner, while in 
cases where an accounting rule includes both formal and anti-formal approaches, 
creative compliance (66.67%) clearly dominates full compliance (23.08%). A 
formal rule appears to be the most successful in achieving full compliance with a 
proportion of 56.41%, while only 50.31% of the companies fully complied with an 
anti-formal rule. 
As can be seen in the preceding tables, the Probabilities of non-compliance are 
relatively small when compared to the distributions of either creative or full 
compliance. Therefore the following analysis will be concerned with modelling the 
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impact of different regulatory factors on the ratio of fiffl compliance relative to 
regulatory avoidance; i. e., either creative or partial compliance. Hence, as indicated 
in Chapter Eight the statistical modelling is based on a binomial probability model 
treating non-compliance as non-stochastic. 
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CHAPTERIO 
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE 
IN EUROPEAN FINANCIAL REPORTING PRACTICE 
10.1 Introduction 
Following the theoretical modelling approach for binary data which was described 
in Chapter Eight, the empirical analysis sets out to analyse whether compliance 
behaviour in European reporting practice is associated with regulatory variables, 
particularly the source and the design of the regulations. A separate statistical 
analysis is carried out for each of the accounting policies under study and also after 
aggregating these subsets. In order to verify that the empirical results are not 
influenced by the selected categories of the variable 'regulatory source, the impact 
of different classifications of regulatory sources on compliance behaviour is 
analysed as outlined in the previous Chapter. Finally, the question of whether the 
source of the regulation exercises a stronger explanatory power on compliance 
than do the differences between national accounting regimes is analysed. 
Non-compliance is treated as non-stochastic in the analysis', which assumes that 
accounting policy choice is restricted to either full compliance or creative / partial 
compliance. Similarly, the non-availability of the annual report for a particular year 
due to censoring in 1987 and 1995 is introduced as a non-stochastic component. 
1 The distribution of compliance in the sample is dominated by full and creative compliance 
which comprise 83.3% of the counts whilst featuring a generally low count for non-compliance. 
For the aggregate of all accounting subjects under study, 38.5% of the companies fully complied 
with the regulation, 44.8% of the companies creatively complied, whilst 6.9% of the companies 
did not comply with the regulation and in 9.9% of cases there was missing data due to censoring. 
A binary, rather than a multinornial modelling approach was therefore adopted. 
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The analysis is carried out by comparing linear logistic models. Starting with the 
factor 'regulatory design', the models add successively the factors 'regulatory 
source' and 'country of incorporation' in order to compare their relative 
explanatory power over the dependent variable 'compliance'. The reduction in 
deviance of each model indicates the contribution of regulatory factors to 
compliance behaviour. 
Following the comparison of models for each accounting policy, the models for the 
aggregated set of accounting policies are described with regard to both their 
reduction in deviance and their parameter estimates for the different levels of each 
explanatory factor. 
10.2 Comparison of models 
Tables IO. la-c present the results of comparing nested linear logistic models. The 
models vary with respect to three regulatory factors: (i) regulatory design; e. g., the 
rule's degree of formalism, (ii) regulatory source; e. g., the authority issuing a 
particular rule and (iii) the country where the reporting company is incorporated, 
as an alternative to regulatory source. 
The tables themselves differ with respect to the categories of the explanatory factor 
gregulatory source'. In fact, Table 10.1a shows the results when the type of 
regulation has been categorised into (i) legislation, including both parliamentary 
legislation and delegated legislation, (ii) standards issued by a standard setting 
agency which is either government-controlled or a self-regulated professional body 
and (iii) recommendations circulated by all the other 'non-authoritative' 
associations. Table 10.1b, on the other hand, presents the results when the type of 
regulation has been classified into (i) legislation, in this instance including 
parliamentary legislation, delegated legislation and provisions enacted in an 
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accounting plan, (ii) standards issued by a professional accountancy body and (iii) 
recommendations published either by non-authoritative private associations or 
public bodies in an advisory function. Finally, Table 10.1 c presents the result when 
the type of regulation is either (i) private or (ii) public. In this case the distinction 
between law, standard and recommendation is less relevant. Public regulations may 
be enacted by parliament, ministers, or a governmental accounting agency, while 
private regulations may be issued by authoritative or non-authoritative professional 
associations. It should be noted that combinations of the different levels occur 
within each of the above categorisations. 
Model 0: Complete independence 
In linear logistic modelling the lowest-order model is generally denoted the model 
of complete independence. Under this model, which is not reported in Tables 
10. la-c, the probabilities of full compliance are entirely independent of the 
regulatory source, the degree of formalism and the country of incorporation. 
Furthermore, the model is unconstrained by the statistical design which is confined 
to binary data analysis; that is, in the model of complete independence, the 
alternative outcomes of the response variable compliance, which can be ftw 
compliance, creative / partial compliance, non-COMpliance or no response due to 
censored data are treated as stochastic. Thus, the model of complete independence 
has no descriptive validity, and will be modified according to our research design in 
Model 1. 
Model 1: Conditional independence 
Model I reflects the constraints imposed by the statistical design of binary data 
modelling. These constraints are twofold. Firstly, the statistical analysis will be 
restricted to the counts of full compliance and creative / partial compliance only. 
As has been noted earlier, the reporting Of full compliance and creative or partial 
compliance comprises 83.3% of the total counts in the sample and therefore the 
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binary data design permits us to model more precisely the relative odds of 
compliance with regulation. Secondly, the model is restricted to the counts where 
the annual report was actually available for analysis. 
Model I may be described as the model of conditional independence. While the 
fitted values of full compliance and creative / partial compliance are conditional on 
both the actual compliance (full or creative / partial) and the availability of the 
annual report. for analysis, the probability of compliance is entirely independent of 
regulatory factors. Thus the model of conditional independence predicts the odds 
of full compliance with the regulations rather than avoidance of full compliance, 
given the decision not to contravene the regulation. The model of conditional 
independence is the model against which the influence of regulatory factors on the 
relative odds of full compliance and creative / partial compliance is assessed. 
Model 2: Regulatory design 
The extent to which the regulatory design affects compliance behaviour is 
evaluated in Model 2. The design of a regulation has been categorised as either 
formal, anti-formal or a combination of the two. By adding the factor to the model 
of conditional independence, the reduction in deviance indicates the contribution of 
regulatory design to compliance behaviour. As indicated in Table 10.1a, the 
regulatory design has a significant effect on the probability of full compliance in the 
case of revaluation (F=6.826) but not in the case of foreign currency accounting 
(F=1.037) and consolidation (F=0.755). Combining the three areas together, it can 
be seen that the design of regulation is not itself a significant factor in explaining 
compliance behaviour (F=1.278). 
However, before concluding that the regulatory design is irrelevant for explaining 
compliance with accounting regulations, it is necessary to consider whether the 
factor may be significant if combined with other regulatory effects; namely, the 
source of regulation and the country of incorporation. 
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Model 3a: Regulatory design and regulatory source 
In the third model, compliance behaviour is described as a function not only of the 
regulatory design but also of the source of regulation. As has been noted earlier, 
three different modes of classification of the factor regulatory source were analysed 
to verify the results. The-analysis presented in Table 10.1a distinguishes between 
(i) legislation, (ii) a standard issued by a governmental or professional 
standardisation agency and (iii) a recommendation released by a 'non-authoritative' 
association. The analysis incorporated combinations of regulatory sources, acting 
either dependently or independently; that is, (iv) legislation and standard and (v) 
legislation and recommendation. 
As can be seen in Table 10.1a the source of regulation is highly significant in 
explaining compliance behaviour for all areas of accounting regulation under study, 
both individually and combined. When making a comparison, we find that the 
change in deviance when adding the effect of regulatory source to Model 2 is 
greatest in the case of foreign currency accounting (F=60.081), less strong in the 
case of consolidation (F=19.183) and smallest in the case of revaluation (F=5.477). 
In comparison with regulatory design, the authority issuing a regulation dominates 
regulatory design in explaining compliance in reporting practice, except for the 
individual policy of revaluation. Combining the three policy areas together, the 
reduction in deviance is significantly higher when the source of regulation 
(F=25.495) is added to the model containing only the factor regulatory design 
(F=1.278). 
Following the analysis presented in Table 10.1 a, the explanatory factor regulatory 
source has been modified into two other justifiable classifications. As can be seen 
in Tables 10.1 b and 10.1 c, the interpretation of the impact of the modified factor 
on compliance behaviour does not differ. Hence, the empirical results are robust 
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with respect to the different valid approaches to classifying the source of 
regulation. 
In Table 10.1b, which treats standardisation plans as legislation rather than as 
standards, the reduction in deviance which occurs if the effect of regulatory source 
is added to Model 2 remains highest in the case of foreign currency accounting 
(F=60.033) and is still significant after pooling the subsets (F=20.815). Similarly, in 
Table 10.1c, which presents the results of the analysis distinguishing between 
public and private regulation, the effect of the regulatory source is highest in the 
case of foreign currency accounting (F=63.158) and is again highly significant after 
pooling the subsets (F=33.924). 
Model 3b: Regulatory design and countyy of incorporation 
In the final model presented in Tables IO. la-c, the impact of different national 
regulatory regimes across European countries on cqmpliance is assessed as an 
alternative to regulatory source, in addition to the factor regulatory design. When 
compared with Model 3a it can be seen that differences between the regimes of 
various countries contribute less to an explanation of compliance behaviour than 
do the sources of regulation. This result holds for all three subject areas, both 
individually and combined. Moreover, this finding is confirmed across different 
classifications of the factor regulatory source. 
As can be seen in Table 10.1a, if we combine the three policy areas together, the 
reduction in deviance is significantly higher when the source of regulation 
(F=25.495) is added to Model 2 than it is when differences between countries 
(F=9.343) are added to Model 2. For the individual policy of revaluation, the 
dominance of the source of regulation in comparison to the differences between 
countries is shown by a value of F=5.477 compared to F=3.194. Regarding foreign 
currency accounting, the dominance of the source Of regulation in comparison to 
the differences between countries is shown by F=60.081 compared to F=29.763. 
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Finally, in the case of consolidation the dominance of the source of regulation in 
comparison to the differences between countries is indicated by F=19.183 
compared to F=9.108. 
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103 Comparison of parameter estimates 
Tables 10.2a-c set out the regression estimates obtained from each model 
described above when the data are aggregated across the three areas of accounting 
policy. As in the previous section, the three tables differ with respect to the 
classification of the factor regulatory source. 
While the reduction in deviance is a measure of the significance of the explanatory 
factors on compliance, the estimated regression coefficients indicate the rclative 
impact on compliance of the different categories within each explanatory factor. 
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Table 10.2a (Law, agency, recommendation) 
Estimates of regulatory effects on compliance 
Models Conditional Regulatory 
Independence design 
Regulatory Regulatory 
design + design + 
regulatory country of 
structure incorporation 
Deviance 455.10 452.56 369.10 393.76 
Degrees of Ereedom 457 455 451 447 
A"oundngpofides 
(logit reZWve to asset revaluadon)., 
Translation of foreign transactions +0.495* +0.298 -0.905 &A (112 
(0.163) (0.187) (0.396) (0.187) 
Definition of a subsidiary -1.609* -IA90* -1.4260 -1.7360 (0.154) (0.224) (0.248) (0.224) 
Add. - reguZatory design 
OVU rektive to jormaUsm): 
Anti-formalism -0.350 +0.231 -0.716* (0.171) (0.278) (0.171) 
Formalism + anti-formalism -0.535 -0.028 -1.0970 (0.237) (0.257) (0.237) 
Add. - reguZatorystructure 
(logit rektive to kgislation): 
Standard +2.800* 
(0.470) 
Recommendation +1.453 
(0.637) 
Legislation + standard -1.5290 
(0.218) 
LegisMon + recommendation, +0.111 
(0,393) 
Add. country of incorporation 
(ke reUtive to UK). - 
uermany +1.7240 
(0.252) 
Netherlands +1.1660 
(0.292) 
France 
-13820 
(0.230) 
Denmark +0.710 
(0.416) 
Belgium -0.089 
(0.314) 
Ireland -0.576 
(0.291) 
Italy 
-0.117 
(0.432) 
Spain +0.711 
0,378) 
Notes 
The model of conditional independence predicts the odds of full compliance with the regulations 
rather than avoidance of full compliance, given the decision not to contravene the regulation. 7le 
extent to which regulatory design affects compliance behaviour is evaluated in the second model. In 
the third model, compliance behaviour is described as a function not only of the degree of formalism 
but also the type of regulation. The final model includes variation across the countries in which the 
sample companies are incorporated. 
The logits reported above are obtained from a binomial logistic regression, and are reported as log. 
relatives with respect to one of the categories of each explanatory variable. Ile (1.0) dependent 
variable is an indicator of full or partial compliance, non-compliance being offset in the regression. 
The vector of observed values comprises outcomes for 154 European multilisted companies in 3 areas 
of accounting policy. The standard errors of the logistic regression coefficients are given in brackets, 
and significant parameter values at the I% level are marked with an asterix. 
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Table 10.2a (Law, agency, recommendation) 
Estimates of regulatory effects on compliance 
Models Conditional Regulatory 
Independence design 
Regulatory Regulatory 
design + design + 
regulatory country of 
structure incorporation 
Deviance 
Degrees of fi--&m 
455.10 
457 
452.56 
455 
369.10 
451 
393.76 
447 
Accountingpolicies 
(logit relative to asset revaluation)., 
Translation of foreign transactions +0.485* +0.299 -0-905 +0-038 
(0.163) (0.187) (0.396) (0.187) 
Definition of a subsidiary -1.609* -1.490* -1.426* -1.736* (0.154) (0.224) (0.248) (0.224) 
Add. - regulatory design 
(logit relative tojormalism): 
Anti-formalism -0.350 +0.231 -0.716* 
(0.171) (0.278) (0.171) 
Formalism + anti-formalism -0.535 -0.028 -1.097* 
(0.237) (0.257) (0.237) 
Add. regu hitory structure 
(logit reZative to legiskrdon). 
Standard +2.800* 
(0.470) 
Recommendation +1.453 
(0.637) 
Legislation + standard -1.529* 
(0.218) 
Legislation + recommendation +0.111 
(0,393) 
Add. - counny of incorporation 
(logit relative to UK): 
Germany +1.7240 
(0.252) 
Netherlands +1.166* 
(0.292) 
France -1.382* 
(0.230) 
Denmark +0.710 
(0.416) 
Belgium -0.089 
(0.314) 
Ireland -0.576 
(0.291) 
Italy -0.117 
(0.432) 
Spain +0.711 
(0.379) 
Notes 
The model of conditional independence predicts the odds of full compliance with the regulations 
rather than avoidance of full compliance, given the decision not to contravene the regulation. The 
extent to which regulatory design affects compliance behaviour is evaluated in the second model. In 
the third model, compliance behaviour is described as a function not only of the degree of formalism 
but also the type of regulation. The final model includes variation across the countries in which the 
sample companies are incorporated. 
'Me logits reported above are obtained from a binomial logistic regression, and are reported as log. 
relatives with respect to one of the categories of each explanatory variable. 71e (1,0) dependent 
variable is an indicator of full or partial compliance, non-compliance being offset in the regression. 
The vector of observed values comprises outcomes for 154 European multilisted companies in 3 areas 
of accounting policy. Ile standard errors of the logistic regression coefficients are given in brackets, 
and significant parameter values at the I% level are marked with an asterix. 
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Table Ia2b (Law, professional standard, recommendation) 
Estimates of regulatory effects on compliance 
Models Conditional Regulatory Regulatory Regulatory 
Independence design design + design + 
regulatory country of 
structure incorporation 
Deviarwe 455.10 452.56 382.03 393.76 
Degrees of freedom 457 455 451 447 
Accountingpo&*s 
(logir relative to asset revaluation): 
Translation of foreign wansactions +0.485* +0.298 -2.219* +0.038 
(0.163) (0.197) (0.334) (0.187) 
Definition of a subsidiý -1.609* -1.490* -IA95* -1.736* 
(0.154) (0.224) (0.245) (0.224) 
Add: regulatOrY design 
(logit relative to formalism): 
Anti-fonnalism -0.350 -0.247 -0.716* 
(0.171) (0.254) (0.171) 
Formalism + anti-fOnnalism -0.535 -0.267 -1.097* 
(0.237) (0.254) (0.237) 
Add: reguldO? Y structure 
(10git rekdve to legislation): 
Standard +4.130* 
(0.436) 
Recommendation +3.033* 
(0.484) 
Legislation + standard -0.899* 
(0.194) 
Legislation + recommendation +0.554 
(0.381) 
Add. country of Incorporation 
(logit relative to UK). - 
Germany +1.724* 
(0.252) 
Netherlands +1.166* 
(0.292) 
France -1.382* 
(0.230) 
Denmark +0.710 
(0.416) 
Belgium -0.089 
(0.314) 
Ireland -0.576 
(0.291) 
Italy -0.117 
(0.432) 
Spain +0.711 
(0.378) 
Notes 
7le model of conditional independence predicts the odds of full compliance with the regulations 
rather than avoidance of full compliance, given the decision not to contravene the regulation. The 
extent to which regulatory design affects compliance behaviour is evaluated in the second model. In 
the third model, compliance behaviour is described as a function not only of the degree of formalism 
but also the type of regulation. The final model includes variation across the countries in which the 
sample companies are incorporated. 
The logits reported above are obtained from a binomial logistic regression, and are reported as log. 
relatives with respect to one of the categories of each explanatory variable. The (1,0) dependent 
variable is an indicator of full or partial compliance, non-compliance being offset in the regression. 
Tbe vector of observed values comprises outcomes for 154 European multilisted companies in 3 areas 
of accounting policy. The standard errors of the logistic regression coefficients are given in brackets, 
and significant parameter values at the I% level are marked with an asterix. 
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Table 10.2c (Public versus private regulation) 
Estimates of regulatory effects on compliance 
Models Conditional Regulatory Regulatory Regulatory 
Independence design design + design + 
regulatory country of 
structure incorporation 
Deviance 
Degrees of freedom 
455.10 
457 
452.56 
455 
393.61 
453 
393.76 
447 
Accountingpolicies 
(logil relative to asset revaluation): 
Translation of foreign transactions +0.485* +0.298 -2.068* +0.038 
(0.163) (0.187) (0.298) (0.187) 
Definition of a subsidiary -1.609* -1.490* -1.720* -1.736* 
(0.154) (0.224) (0.244) (0.224) 
Add. regulatory design 
(logit relative to fonnalism): 
Anti-fonnalism -0.350 -0.426 -0.716* 
(0.171) (0.242) (0.171) 
Foffnalism + anti-fomWism -0.535 -0.367 -1.097* 
(0.237) (0.253) (0.237) 
Add. - regulatory structure 
(logif relative to public standard setter): 
Private standard setter +3.491* 
(0.351) 
Private & public standard setter) -0.664* 
(0.183) 
Add. country of incorporation 
(logir relative to UK): 
Germany +1.724* 
(0.252) 
Netherlands +1.166* 
(0.292) 
France -1.382* 
(0.230) 
Denmark +0.710 
(0.416) 
Belgium -0.089 
(0.314) 
Ireland -0.576 
(0.291) 
Italy -0.117 
(0.432) 
Spain +0.711 
(0.378) 
Notes 
The model of conditional independence predicts the odds of full compliance with the regulations 
rather than avoidance of full compliance, given the decision not to contravene the regulation. 'Me 
extent to which regulatory design affects compliance behaviour is evaluated in the second model. In 
the third model, compliance behaviour is described as a function not only of the degree of formalism 
but also the type of regulation. The final model includes variation across the countries in which the 
sample companies are incorporated. 
The logits reported above are obtained from a binomial logistic regression, and are reported as log. 
relatives with respect to one of the categories of each explanatory variable. 7le (1,0) dependent 
variable is an indicator of full or partial compliance, non-compliance being offset in the regression. 
The vector of observed values comprises outcomes for 154 European multilisted companies in 3 areas 
of accounting policy. The standard errors of the logistic regression coefficients are given in brackets, 
and significant parameter values at the I% level are marked with an asterix. 
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It is important to note that, in contrast to conventional regression analysis, the 
calculated parameter estimates are logits; that is, they are log-relatives with respect 
to the first category of the relevant explanatory variable. The standard errors of the 
logistic regression coefficients are given in brackets, and significant parameter 
values at the 1% level are marked with an asterix in the tables. 
A fourth explanatory factor, accounting policy, has been added to the comparison 
of parameter estimates. The inclusion of this factor permits investi gation of 
whether compliance behaviour differs not only among the regulatory factors 
design, source and national reporting regime, but also from one individual 
accounting policy to another. 
Different areas of accounting policy 
The reported estimates are logits relative to asset revaluation. As indicated by the 
asterix in Table 10.4, in all four models the tendency towards avoidance is 
significantly greater in the case of the definition of a subsidiary, than in the other 
policy areas. For example, in the model incorporating the factors regulatory design 
and regulatory source the area of consolidation induces significantly more 
avoidance (logit = -1.426*) than asset revaluation. Moreover, the models, which 
do not contain the factor 'regulatory source, suggest that the area of consolidation 
is comparatively more subject to creative compliance. 
Regulatory design 
The *reported estimates are logits relative to formalism. When incorporating 
variations between countries, rather than differences between regulatory sources, 
anti-formal rules induce significantly greater avoidance (logit = -0.716*) in 
reporting practice, than do formal rules. 
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However, regulations which combine both formal and anti-formal. elements, 
contribute to an even greater probability of avoidance in reporting practice (logit = 
- 1.097 *) than do rules which are either formal or anti-formal. 
As suggested earlier, the factor 'regulatory design' is insignificant when added to 
the factor 'regulatory source'. This result is confirmed by the non-significant 
parameter estimates in Model 3 in Tables 10.2a-c. It is important to note that the 
interpretation of the parameter estimates remains identical across all the different 
classifications of regulatory source. .. 
Regulatory source 
The reported estimates are logits relative to legislation. As can be seen in Table 
10.2a, when compared to law, a standard issued by a accounting standard setter 
induces a significantly higher rate of full compliance (logit = +2.800*). However, 
when an issue is addressed in both law and standard, this induces a significant 
tendency towards avoidance of regulations (logit = -1.529*). 
When regulation exists only in the form of a voluntary recommendation, this results 
in a greater tendency towards fiffl compliance, than does legislation. However in 
comparison to standards, recommendations contribute less to full compliance (logit 
+1.453), although this result is only significant at the 5% significance level. 
Tables 10.2b and 10.2c present the corresponding results after the variable 
regulatory source has been re-classified. Similarly, the results in Table 10.2b 
suggest that regulation issued by a professional standard setting body leads to a 
significantly higher rate of full compliance (logit = +4.130*) than does legislation. 
Recommendations induce a significantly greater proportion of full compliance 
(logit = +3.033*) than legislation but not as much as a professional standard. As 
before, when a policy is regulated by both law and professional standard, the 
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tendency towards avoidance of regulations is significantly higher (logit = -0.899*) 
than under any of the other regulatory sources. 
In accordance with the results indicated in Tables 10.2a and 10.2b, the results 
presented in Table 10.2c suggest that regulation issued by a private standard setter 
leads to a significantly higher rate of full compliance (logit = +3.49 1 *) than does 
public accounting regulation. When an area of accounting regulation has been 
addressed by both public and private regulators, regulatory avoidance in the form 
of creative / -partial compliance is significantly higher (logit = -0.664*) when 
compared to either public or private rules. 
Hence, the interpretation of the results has been conflimed after controlling for 
different valid classifications of the factor regulatory source. 
Countyy of incorporation 
The reported estimates are logits relative to the UK. Tables 10.2a-c show that ftill 
compliance with regulations tends to be significantly higher in Germany (logit = 
+1.724*), followed by the Netherlands (logit = +1.166*). On the other hand, the 
avoidance of regulations tends to be significantly higher in France (logit 
1.382*). 
The last chapter of the thesis will be concerned with the interpretation of the 
statistical analysis and will endeavour to explain the empirical results and to draw 
conclusions which are relevant to the regulation of accounting. 
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CHAPTER 11 
INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has exarnined the different. forms of accounting regulation and their 
association with compliance behaviour in financial reporting. The aim of this 
chapter is to-interpret and explain the empirical results obtained from the logistic 
regression analysis and, furthermore, to draw conclusions for the regulation of 
accounting. Each of the following sections evaluates the impact of the different 
explanatory factors; that is, the source of regulations, rule design, the different 
accounting policies and, finally, the ways in which compliance varies from one 
country to another. 
11.1 The source of regulations 
The empirical analysis suggests that compliance by European companies with 
accounting regulations is systematically associated with the type of institution 
issuing the relevant accounting regulation. Thus, the nature of the regulatory 
authority could constitute an important influence over compliance behaviour. 'Ibis 
result proved to be significant in all three areas under investigation, both 
individually and combined. Moreover, the regulatory source was found to be the 
most powerful explanatory factor associated with compliance behaviour after 
controlling for rule design and differences in national regulatory regimes. This 
remained so when alternative classifications were used. 
Thus, irrespective of whether a rule is highly detailed or open-textured, the source 
of regulation is systematically associated with compliance behaviour. In all three 
areas of accounting policy, the source of regulation has a stronger influence on 
compliance than the country of incorporation. This finding suggests that the 
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institutional structure -of the rule-issuing authority would be more decisive in 
influencing compliance behaviour than intercountry differences in their approaches 
to rule-making. 
As depicted in Figure 11.1, the results suggest that full compliance with accounting 
regulation is significantly higher when such regulation has been issued by a 
standard setting agency. Conversely, full compliance is relatively lower when the 
governing rules have been promulgated in the form of legislation, either by the 
legislature itself or in the form of delegated legislation. Hence, full compliance is 
lower and, therefore, creative compliance is higher when the governing rules are 
written as law. However, when the rules of accounting are contained jointly in both 
legislation and a standard, creative compliance in financial reporting is at its 
highest. These results could support the arguments in favour of delegating 
accounting regulation to a separate standard setting agency, which acts 
independently. The arguments for delegating the function of regulating accounting 
to a specialised agency have been noted in Chapter Two. 
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Figure 11.1 
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11.2 Regulatory design 
The empirical results suggest that the degree of formalism in accounting regulation 
is only a systematic explanatory factor in certain policy areas. While the design of 
rules significantly affects compliance behaviour in the area of valuation, there is no 
systematic relationship in the areas of foreign currency reporting and consolidation. 
When compared to the source of regulation, the design of rules was seen to be less 
important in explaining compliance behaviour. Nevertheless, accounting regulation 
drafted in a formalistic, highly detailed manner was found to generate a higher rate 
of compliance than did accounting rules drafted in a general, open-textured 
manner. Hence, discretion and judgement in accounting regulation is associated 
with a greater probability of creative compliance than is prescription and 
formalism. However, when the regulator has adopted a compromise in drafting, in 
that the rule contains elements of both precise and open -formulations, this is 
associated with even greater regulatory avoidance. A reigulatory text which is 
drafted in both precise and general language indicates that the accounting issue in 
question was itself controversial requiring a compromise by the regulators 
themselves. As was evident for the definition of a subsidiary, accounting practice is 
able to take advantage when such compromises are in the form of mixed regulatory 
strategies. 
It has been suggested earlier that fonnalism in accounting regulation leads to a 
higher degree of compliance because a precise rule eliminates discretion and 
uncertainty. This advantage (at least for the issue Of revaluation) could overcome 
the obvious disadvantages of precise rules: that is, inflexibility and the fact that 
they cannot be accommodated to the variety of circumstances to which they might 
need to be applied. Therefore, despite the criticism that very precise rules in 
accounting are likely to be either over-inclusive or under-inclusive, judgemental 
rules which are adaptable to the individual circumstances of a commercial 
transaction seem less optimal for the disclosure of financial information. 
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11.3 Accounting policies 
Of the three areas of accounting included in the analysis, it was found that the issue 
of consolidation, or to be precise, the definition of a subsidiary for consolidation 
gave rise to the lowest rate of compliance. This finding was highly significant, and 
remained so after controlling for other explanatory factors: namely, the differences 
between countries, the design of regulations and the source of regulations. 
This result suggests that, in accounting, irrespective of whether a regulation is 
detailed or general and, furthermore, irrespective of whether a regulation takes the 
form of legislation, professional standard or recommendation, there are certain 
accounting policies that are more susceptible to creative compliance than others. 
The reason why the issue of defining a subsidiary for consolidation is more likely to 
be avoided in practice than other accounting policies might be its potential for off- 
balance sheet financing (Tweedie and Whittington, 1990) and its aptness for 
avoiding regulatory control without violating the letter of the regulation (McBamet 
and Whelan, 1991). Moreover, as the consolidation decision is only an issue of 
recognition, not one of measurement, it only impacts the notes to the financial 
statements, and not the balance sheet or the profit and loss account. In contrast, 
both the revaluation of assets and accounting for foreign transactions are 
measurement issues. In general, however, the main result reported here with 
respect to the influence of regulatory strategies show the same tendencies across 
the three areas of accounting policy investigated. 
11.4 Country differences 
Notwithstanding earlier conclusions, the empirical results suggest that there are 
significant differences in compliance behaviour between nation-states, even after 
controlling for different areas of accounting policy and for different approaches to 
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rule design. Even though the source of regulation is a more important explanatory 
factor than the country of incorporation, the results- indicate that compliance with 
accounting regulations was at its highest in Germany during the period of the 
research study. Conversely, compliance was lowest in France. This result supports 
the suggestions of vagabondage comptable mentioned in our earlier discussion of 
creative compliance by French companies, which prompted a new regulatory 
structure for accounting in France in 1998. 
Figure 11.2 summarises the probabilities of regulatory avoidance for the different 
European countries under study. A possible explanation for the compliant 
behaviour of German multinational companies might be the strong influence of tax 
law on financial accounting, despite the finding that the general tendency in other 
countries is to avoid regulations which take the form of law rather than of 
standards. It is worth commenting that this high degree of compliance with the 
national requirements appears to have dissuaded German multinational companies 
in the past, in contrast to their French competitors, from seeking equity listings on 
international capital markets. (Ebke, 1997). 
Finally, it is important to note that the period under investigation in this research 
study was the years 1987 to 1995. During that time a large number of French 
multinational companies were already applying IAS or US PAAP. This was long 
before the recent regulatory reforms in the French accounting regime, which have 
allowed such companies to use IAS for consolidated accounts, which have been 
endorsed and translated into French by the new CRC only since 1998. In contrast, 
the move towards IAS or US GAAP by German multinational companies did not 
occur until the end of the investigation period and then accelerated during the years 
1996 and 1997. In March 1998 a law was passed which enabled German 
companies listed on international stock exchanges to use IAS or US GAAP for 
consolidated financial statements, rather than the national accounting rules. 
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Figure 11.2 
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In conclusion, while this thesis has identified variations in the probability of 
compliance from one country to another, the main finding is that a more decisive 
factor associated with compliance is the source of regulation involved; that is, 
whether it is legislation, a standard, a recommendation or some combination of 
these. To a lesser extent, the degree of formalism present in the drafting of 
accounting regulations is also associated wih compliance behaviour. 
In the context of international accounting research, the thesis has addressed the 
issue of compliance (full compliance, creative, compliance, partial compliance and 
non-compliance) using a specifically comparative approach. The research issues 
raised should be of some interest, as it is shown that simple classifications at the 
country level are inappropriate; that is, over the areas of accounting policy 
investigated, the type of regulation and the manner in which it is drafted is shown 
to vary not only across countries but within countries. Moreover, a mixture of 
regulatory instruments is. also observed in some cases (i. e. a standard or a 
recommendation is sometimes issued in addition to legislation) and certain legal 
texts contain some provisions which are precise and others which are more flexible. 
The methodological contribution of the thesis therefore, is to use a probability 
model with a factor structure permitting interactions between these main effects. 
This approach leads to conclusions about compliance in accounting which may be 
generalised across countries, thus placing less emphasis on international differences 
at a superficial level and greater emphasis on the effect of regulatory strategies on 
corporate reporting when the details of regulatory texts are taken into 
consideration. 
ItzIl 
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APPENDIX 
SAMPLE COMPANIES 
French sample companies (22) 
I Accor(87,93,95) - 
2 Alcatel Alsthom (87,93,95) 
3 Beghin Say (87,93,95) 
4 Bioblock Scientific (93,95) 
5 BIS (87,93,95). 
6 BSN (87,93) 
7 Camaud Metalbox (93,95) 
8 Club Med (87,93,95) 
9 Elf Acquitaine (87,93,95) 
10 Eurotunnel (93,95) 
11 Henri Maire (93,95) 
12 Lafarge Coppee (87,93,95) 
13 LVMH (87,93,95) 
14 Lyonnaise des Eaux (87,93,95) 
15 Pemod Ricard (87,93,95) 
16 Piscines Jean Desj oyaux (93,95) 
17 PSA (87,93,95) 
18 Remy Cointrau (93,95) 
19 Saint Gobain (87,93,95) 
20 Thomson (87,93,95) 
21 Tivoly (93,95) 
22 Total (87,93,95) 
German sample companies (23) 
23 Asko(87,93,95) 
24 Babcock (87,93,95) 
25 BASF (87,93,95) 
26 Bayer (87,93,95) 
27 BMW (87,93,95) 
28 Computer 2000 (93,95) 
29 Continental (87,93,95) 
30 Daimler Benz (87,93,95) 
31 Degussa (87,93,95) 
32 Hoechst (87,93,95) 
33 Kaufhof (87,93,95) 
34 Kl6ckner HumboIdt-Deutz (87,93) 
35 Linde (87,93,95) 
36 MAN (87,93,95) 
37 Mannesmann (87,93,95) 
38 RWE (87,93,95) 
80 Cable & Wireless (87,93,95) 
81 Charter (87,93,95) 
82 Courtaulds (87,93) 
83 Euromoney Publications (87,93,95) 
84 Fisons (87,93) 
85 GEC (87,93,95) 
86 GNK (87,93,95) 
87 Glaxo (87,93,95) 
88 Grand Metropolitain (87,93,95) 
89 Great Universal Stores (87,93,95) 
90 Guiness (87,93,95) 
91 Hanson (87,93,95) 
92 ICI(87,93,95) 
93 Ladbroke, (93,95) 
94 Lamont (93,95) 
95 Laura Ashley (93,95) 
96 Marks & Spencer (87,93,95) 
97 M]3 Caradon (93,95) 
98 Perkins Food (93,95) 
99 Pilkington. (93,95) 
100 P&O (87,93,95) 
101 Rothmanns (87,93,95) 
102 RTZ (87,93,95) 
103 Saatchi & Saatchi (87,93) 
104 Scottish & Newcastle (93,95) 
105 Sears (87,93,95) 
106 Sema (93,95) 
107 Thom EMI (87,93,95) 
108 Tiphook (93,95) 
109 Whitbread (87,93,95) 
Danish sample companies (5) 
110 Danisco (93,95) 
Ill East Asiatic Company (87,93,95) 
112 Great Nordic (87,93,95) 
113 ISS(93,95) 
114 Novo Nordisk (87,93,95) 
Belgian sample companies (10) 
115 Cockerill Sambre (93,95) 
116 Compagnie Internationale des Wagons-Lits (87,93,95) 
117 Electrabel (93,95) 
118 Finoutremer (93,95) 
jig Geveart ( (87,93,95) 
120 Petrofina (87,93) 
121 Sipef (87,93,95) 
122 SNCB (87,93,95) 
123 Societe Generale de Belgique (87,93,95) 
124 Solvay (87,93,95) 
Irish sample companies (9) 
125 Abbey (87,93) 
126 Clondalkin (87,93,95) 
127 James Crean (87,93,95) 
128 CRH (87,93,95) 
129 Fitzwilton (87,93,95) 
130 Independent Newspaper (87,93,95) 
131 Jefferson Smurfit (87,93,95) 
132 Ryan Hotels (87,93,95) 
133 Waterford Wedgwood (87,93,95) 
Italian sample companies (10) 
134 Benetton (87,93,95) 
135 Fiat (87,93,95) 
136 Montedison (87,93,95) 
137 Olivetti (87,93) 
138 Pirelli (87,93,95) 
139 Raggio di Sole Finanziari (93,95) 
140 S aipem (87,93,95) 
141 SIP (Telecom Italia) (87,93,95) 
142 Sirti (87,93,95) 
143 SME (93,95) 
Spanish sample companies (11) 
144 Acerinox (87,93,95) 
145 Aragonesas (93,95) 
146 Endesa (87,93,95) 
147 Metrocacesa (93,95) 
148 Pycra (87,93,95) 
149 Repsol (87,93,95) 
150 Sevillana de Electricidad (87,93,95) 
151 Tabacalera (87,93,95) 
152 Telefonica (87,93,95) 
153 Union Fenosa (87,93,95) 
154 Uralita (93,95) 
80 Cable & Wireless (87,93,95) 
81 Charter (87,93,95) 
82 Courtaulds (87,93) 
83 Euromoney Publications (87,93,95) 
84 Fisons (87,93) 
85 GEC (97,93,95) 
86 GNK (87,93,95) 
87 Glaxo (87,93,95) 
88 Grand Metropolitain (87,93,95) 
89 Great Universal Stores (87,93,95) 
go Guiness (87,93,95) 
91 Hanson (87,93,95) 
92 ICI(87,93,95) 
93 Ladbroke (93,95) 
94 Lamont (93,95) 
95 Laura Ashley (93,95) 
96 Marks & Spencer (87,93,95) 
97 MB Caradon (93,95) 
98 Perkins Food (93,95) 
99 Pilkington (93,95) 
100 P&O (87,93,95) 
101 Rothmanns (87,93,95) 
102 RTZ (87,93,95) 
103 Saatchi & Saatchi (87,93) 
104 Scottish & Newcastle (93,95) 
105 Sears (87,93,95) 
106 Sema (93,95) 
107 Tborn EMI (87,93,95) 
108 Tiphook (93,95) 
109 Whitbread (87,93,95) 
Danish sample companies (5) 
110 Danisco (93,95) 
ill East Asiatic Company (87,93,95) 
112 Great Nordic (87,93,95) 
113 ISS(93,95) 
114 Novo Nordisk (87,93,95) 
Belgian sample companies (10) 
115 Cockerill Sambre (93,95) 
116 Compapie Intemationale des Wagons-Lits (87,93,95) 
117 Electrabel (93,95) 
118 Finoutremer (93,95) 
jig Geveart ( (87,93,95) 
